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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the components of Poland's emerging foreign policy in light of the withdrawal
of Soviet hegemony from Eastern Europe and efforts by the Poles to reestablish their political and
economic autonomy. For the first time since the brief period between World Wars One and Two, Poland is
free to construct a foreign policy based on their own perceptions of Polish national interests. The factors
influencing these perceptions include an historical memory unique to Central Europe and the realities of a
geostrategic position that continues to play a crucial role in European security. This thesis will examine
the contributions that these factors have made to the Polish political character and their related impact on
the formulation of the Polish strategy for internal reform and external stability. The developing strategy
will then be examined in order to determine Poland's views of European security as it stands poised between
a now united Germany and a disintegrating Soviet Union. This thesis will argue that Poland's strategy has
the potential to provide a mechanism for Soviet reform and measured stability, while acting as a potential
bridge for East European integration with the West. In this way, and because Poland's strategy provides for
the maintenance of Western security institutions and the focussed commitment to an open and integrative
European union, it will be argued that Poland stands as a valuable non-traditional partner for the United
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I. INTRODUCTION--STABILIZATION AND REFORM
For the irst time since the brief period between World Wars One and Two Poland is constructing a
fully independent domestic and foreign policy. Free of Soviet hegemony, the Poles have embarked on an
ambitious internal transformation of their political institutions and economic mechanisms. This
construction, it is hoped, will return to Poland the sovereignty and freedom that have been denied it for
most of the past three centuries. But this construction does not take place in a vacuum. Indeed it is taking
place in the very dynamic environment of post-communist Europe. Therefore, as Poland advances the
internal transformations that will determine the political and economic makeup of the Polish state, it is also
drawing on and contributing to the external development of a new security arrangement for Europe.
Poland's foreign policy, perhaps more so than that of any other East European nation, must address the two
fundamental issues facing European security in general--German unity and Soviet reform and stability. The
methods and direction taken by Poland in addressing these issues may prove instrumental in ascertaining the
proper formula for reconciling East-West differences and asymmetries, and building the foundation for a new
European security system.
Poland's geographic location has long been a tragic liability for Polish foreign policy. Despite the
optimistic outlook for increased European integration and security signaled by the change in Soviet political
attitudes and the benevolence of German aspirations, the Poles are acutely aware that building security for
Poland and for Europe is a very complex and tenuous undertaking that faces many formidable obstacles.
Economic asymmetries between East and West and the rising tide of post-communist nationalism are
among the many factors that are obscuring the vision of Europe's future and fanning Polish sensitivity.
Heightening this sensitivity is the realization that even internal Polish economic and political reform is
difficult, painful and uncertain. Speaking before the German Society for Foreign Policy in Bonn in
February 1990, Polish Foreign Affairs Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski cautioned, "It is in the interest of
all (Europeans) that any modification of the (European security) order that has existed up to now should
come about without too great complications either internally or externally." "The changes occuring in
Central Europe," he continued, "are very radical." "They represent a denial of what had existed before." But
he pointed out, "on our continent recent history and the present are intertwined." "Various fears and
uneasiness have emerged in Europe and vigilance is called for." "However, by no means ought we to fear
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evolution in Europe as long as it comes about with full respect for national sovereignty, democracy and
human rights, and in an orderly way. Europe needs stabilization so that this evolution can develop in a
direction we wish to take it." "To combine stabilization and reform in this way is no paradox, political
realism demands it."1
Poland's political realism reflects at once both a vision of Europe's future and the realization of the
political, social and economic tasks that must be addressed in order to secure that future. Polish foreign
policy may be able to overcome its geographic liability by contributing to the development of an all-
European security arrangement that affords all European nations the freedom, sovereignty, economic
opportunity and territorial inviolability that Poland itself desires. Such a development must not be
sidetracked by German domination, political, economic or otherwise, nor by the instability and danger
inherent in the potential radicalization, violent breakup and destruction of the Soviet Union. To prevent
these dysfunctional developments requires a policy that supports German unity but only as it pertains to
integration in the context of a wider and deeper European integration. German unity, according to
Skubiszewski, "should come about...in intimate interaction with progress toward regaining the unity of the
entire continent." 2 German unity has since been achieved but the political choices that the new Germany
will make in the future, choices concerning the future of NATO, the European Community and other
institutions, will determine what this unity will mean for Europe and the new security paradigm that is seen
to be developing. Making sure that these choices coincide with the rhetoric of integration and European
unity remains paramount for Poland.
Additionally, the Soviet Union should not be isolated in order to preclude a destabilization and
radicalization of events spurred by a Soviet perception of security setbacks and economic isolation. "Poland
considers the success of the policy of restructuring and reforms in the Soviet Union to be of the greatest
importance," claimed Skubiszewski. "For us good, normalized relations with the Soviet Union are priority
number one in our state strategy."3
1Speech at the German Society for Foreign Policy , Bonn, 7 February 1990, "The Legal and Statal
Unity of the German People and Developments in Europe," in ,m=parhix 25 March 1990 as cited in




But Poland's political realism must also deal with the fact that for a number of reasons, relations with
both the Soviet Union and Germany are strained. The wounds of Nazi aggression during World War Two
have not fully healed. Polish sensitivity concerning the Oder-Neisse border represents a fundamental
mistrust that continues to influence Polish attitudes toward Germany and European security. It is a
mistrust that coalesced around the border issue despite the fact that prior to unification the majority of
Germans had no interest in changing the border. And it remains a potent influence on Polish foreign policy
thinking despite the satisfactory, final and formal border agreement reached shortly after Germany's official
unification on October 3, 1990.
Concerning Soviet relations, a collection of historical blank spots continues to stir heated anti-Soviet
protest despite recent Soviet admissions that are attempting to set the record straight. Furthermore, the
Soviet legacy of political repression and economic exploitation have left an indelible mark on the Polish
political psyche creating popular attitudes that often find reconciliation or even cooperation difficult. This
is set against an historical background rich in anti-Russian sentiment stemming from Moscow's complicity
in the destruction of Poland's political sovereignty and territorial existence during the late eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. Poland, therefore, is faced with the formidable task of creating a stable and secure
foreign policy based on stances that must overcome deeply scarred historical relationships.
Compounding these delicate foreign policy issues are the interrelated and monumental internal
problems that Poland faces in regaining its sovereignty and restructuring its political institutions and
economic system following decades of ruinous communist rule. In this sense Poland is faced both with the
Herculean task of rebuilding its own ship of state while at the same time monitoring, influencing and
assisting the construction of a secure and common European port facility. That such a construction will be
a difficult undertaking is a fact not lost on the Poles. Internally the old political institutions, and the
communist bureaucracy are proving as difficult to reform and restructure as the antiquated and malformed
economic infrastructure. Operational political sophistication and economic entrepreneurship all but
obliterated under communist rule, must be relearned to compliment new democratic and free market
institutions and aid the establishment of the functional political and economic systems that can carry Poland
into a stable and prosperous future. But while much effort must be exerted on these internal tasks, the
Poles are faced with the demands created by a very real external political vacuum. Externally the
fundamental East-West balance of power is rapidly evaporating. Despite the limitations imposed on Polish
sovereignty and the Polish standard of living by the Soviet role in Poland, the East-West balance
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nonetheless represented a respite from Poland's classic foreign policy dilemma. Soviet guarantees against
German aggression and the sustained division of the two Germanys offered Poland a fundamentally stable
foreign policy posture. The events of the past year, however, have shaken that stability. Though the
retreat of Soviet hegemony in Poland is a widely welcome development, the unification of Germany and the
withdrawal of Soviet forces are not unanimously embraced.
In many ways, therefore, Poland represents a model for ascertaining the demands of a new European
security order and the directions needed to achieve this. Poland's struggle to reconstruct its political
sovereignty and establish economic viability is representative of the steps necessary to reduce the political
and economic asymmetries in Europe and enhance the eventual economic integration of Europe and perhaps,
ultimately, its political integration. If this latter development is to be realized it will become necessary to
fundamentally reconcile the new Europe with the reality of a united Germany and the necessity of
integrating a stable and cooperative Soviet Union. Encouraging German cooperation under the design of a
wider and deeper European integration is the Polish formula for the German phase of such a reconciliation.
Soviet integration, given the deep systemic political and economic turmoil in the Soviet Union, will
undoubtedly prove more difficult. But Polish attempts to avoid the political isolation of the Soviet Union
through maintenance of a reformed Warsaw Pact and Polish desires to maintain economic links with the
Soviet Union through a reformed Council for Mutual and Economic Assistance and new free market
mechanisms may prove to be a useful design for directly and indirectly influencing Soviet reform short of a
violent, destabilizing and catastrophic Soviet revolution. Such a design may provide the stability required
to ensure the success of economic reforms and political normalization thereby providing time for the
development of new levels of cooperation and trust that will prove to be crucial for enhancing an integrative
Euopean process.
In relation to European stability and integration, the Polish model spotlights the tremendous historical
and nationalistic obstacles that must be crossed in order to create a process that replaces traditional fears
with developing trust. Furthermore, Poland's geostrategic position between Germany and the Soviet Union
creates a geopolitical situation unique to Ceaaal Europe. Fatalistically perceived as "good tank country"
Poland has endured a long and painful history as the primary invasion corridor from East to West and vice
versa. Central European geography has dictated that Poland more so than any other Central European
nation has been a key strategic consideration in the cataclysms that have punctuated twentieth century
history. Poland has struggled with this liability for centuries and has yet to find an attractive solution to
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the problem. Ruinous internal division, failed attempts at neutrality and repressive political alignments and
foreign control which have severely limited or completely obliterated Polish sovereignty are the legacy of
Poland's dilemma as the crossroad of Europe. Given these facts, it can be argued therefore that a European
design which can recognize and respect Polish sovereignty while providing a guarantee for Poland's security
may in fact be the design which can best serve East-West normalization and a stable and open European
integration. Policy makers and planners concerned with creating the future European security environment
must remain sensitive to both Poland's internal restructuring and its external foreign policy concerns. The
informed judgement required to formulate new, forward-looking strategies requires a firm grasp of the
economic and political resuscitation that is required in Central Europe as well as he balance that is needed
to address an all-European security concept.
The goal of this thesis is to contribute to that understanding through an analysis of the progress and
implications of Poland's internal reforms and the direct and indirect manifestations of Poland's emerging
economic and foreign policy. This analysis will include an historical and contemporary examination of the
major foreign policy issues confronting Poland, including the Oder-Neisse border and German unification as
well as the major factors involved in Polish-Soviet relations. Of central importance to both Polish-Soviet
relations and the Polish influence on European security is an understanding of the development of Poland's
increasingly autonomous political voice and its emerging political and economic influence in both Warsaw
Pact and European affairs. This voice and influence are critical developments in Poland's increasing
contribution to the future of European security as it relates to such issues as economic reform in Central
Europe, designs for European economic integration, the reform and the role of the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance, the future of the Warsaw Pact, the role and disposition of Soviet forces in Eastern
Europe and, the role of U.S. forces in European security.
Functionally, this thesis is divided into five major blocks of investigation. Following this
introductory overview, chapter two will examine the history of the Oder-Neisse border with Germany and
trace the course of negotiations concerning its final resolution. This examination will highlight both the
traditional Polish fears concerning German aspirations and the enduring impact of Germany on Poland's
post-communist foreign policy. The third chapter will examine the history and contemporary record of
Polish-Soviet relations in an attempt to balance the historical and security perspectives that will influence
Poland as they move toward European integration and a new security paradigm. Of critical importance to
this evolution is the nature and degree of success that has been achieved in forging an autonomous political
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voice and economic system. Chapter four will examine Poland's ambitious undertakings in reforging
political sovereignty and an open and integrative market economy, both of which will prove to be
important factors in keeping Europe on a peaceful and integrative course. Additionally, these steps are
instrumental in increasing Poland's political and economic influence in Europe and, most decidedly, within
the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union itself. Chapter five will fuse the implications of Poland's historical
security perspectives and the implications of its increasingly influential political and economic voice in
order to discern the complexion of Poland's emerging foreign policy and the implications for European
security. Finally, the sixth chapter will examine the evolution of Western analysis concerning current
developments in the Soviet Union and fuse this with an examination of U.S. interests in Europe. By way
of summary it is argued that Poland's foreign policy agenda may prove to be an effective conduit of U.S.
policy in Europe in that Poland is working to construct a new European security paradigm that closely
reflects long-term U.S. interests in Europe.
It will be argued that Poland's long-term goals for an all-European security arrangement and its short-
term realism and caution concerning its construction may provide U.S. policy makers with a valuable non-
traditional partner for engaging in that construction. On many issues Poland's interests coincide with or
support U.S. interests in Europe suggesting that U.S. aid to Poland, economic, political and otherwise,
may go well beyond simply assisting Poland's economic recovery and help build a new and stable European
security order.
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II. THE ODER-NEISSE BORDER AND GERMANY
A. THE CONTEXT OF CHANGE
The watershed events in Eastern Europe during the last several months of 1989 and early 1990 have
shaken loose the communist hold over East European identity. Countries that previously had stood as a
seemingly homogeneous Soviet controlled buffer zone have once again emerged as distinct social and
cultural identities each with its own unique political and economic agenda. Such characteristics, of course,
had always been present, but the weight of Soviet political and military power and the polarization of the
Cold War had, in many ways, muted their expression. Aspirations to German reunification, long awaited
by some and feared by others, were muted as well. Preoccupation with the realities of post-war Europe and
the East-West conflict had held this process out of reach of the foreseeable future. The rapid pace of
political change in the past twelve months, however, thrust an explosion of national and ethnic expression
upon the European scene and propelled the issue of German reunification toward its final realization.
The collapse of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 led to the euphoric and long-awaited embrace of
East and West Germans. By the end of January 1990, East German Prime minister Hans Modrow, faced
with the steady drain of East German emigration and the prevailing onslaught of public opinion favoring
political reform and German unity, offered a four point plan for reunification. This offer came in the wake
of Soviet President Gorbachev's cautious approval of the process. Within days the inevitability of
reunification was a reality. By mid-February plans for a common currency were drawn up and East Germans
were descended upon by West German politicians bidding for support in the March 18th elections that were
to meld the two nations together politically. It soon became apparent that the division of Germany, born
out of the destruction of World War Two and nurtured by forty-five years of Cold War, was rapidly being
consigned to the past.
Such developments offered hope for the potential of a larger, more secure European integration coming
as they did simultaneously with a diminishing Soviet threat, the political and economic collapse of
communism, the promise of a new European security order based on the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) negotiations, opportunities for conventional, nuclear and chemical arms
agreements and the approach of 1992 and the planned economic union of the Western Europe's Economic
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Community (EC). But if the direction and rapid pace of change have aroused hope they have also fueled
deep fears.
Unbridled national and ethnic expression have accentuated deep emotional wounds from World War
Two and have spotlighted hemophilic conditions that stretch back through centuries of historical animosity,
conflict and hatred. Long standing ethnic, national and territorial disputes have been renewed. One of the
most important and complex examples is the the case of the Oder-Neisse border between Poland and East
Germany. This dispute is punctuated by a long history of conflict between Germany and Poland; a conflict
that has persisted since the end of the Second World War despite normalization treaties between Poland and
both the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The
complexity of this territorial dispute lies in the dynamics of Polish-German historical memory and the
difficulties of post-war politics. Adding to the complexity is the issue of German reunification; a process
that has intertwined contemporary East-West security, economic, political and ideological concerns. The
Oder-Neisse issue had been a source of destabilization in a swiftly moving, emotional process that was not
easily controlled. It had been poised as a potential stumbling block for both German reunification and the
advent of a new European security order. On the other hand, a reunification process that addressed Polish
sensitivities could set the foundation for greater European integration and security. The Polish-German
border issue may prove to be one of the first test cases in a larger European issue. It will test the ability of
rationality and interdependence to succeed in the face of the destabilizing effect of resurgent nationalism and
historical animosity. Seen from a Polish perspective, however, it is an issue that serves to spotlight
fundamental foreign policy concerns that extend beyond the border question itself to questions concerning
the role Germany may play in the new Europe and what that will mean for European security.
Polish territorial sensitivities highlight the fears that German reunification has caused. Polish fears,
specifically, are the product of a historical memory that stretches back through centuries of conflict and is
punctuated by the terrible experiences of World War Two. Poland has been both conqueror and victim in its
long history in Central Europe, but from the height of its prowess in 1643 to the present day it has known
much tragedy. Much of this tragedy has been at the hands of Germany and it is this fact that has produced
the Polish adage: "As long as the world exists, the German will never be a brother to the Pole."
B. THE BURDEN OF HISTORY
Poland's western territories were established at the Potsdam Conference of August 2, 1945. The
three heads of Government agree(d) that pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier, the
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former German territories east of a lir running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinemunde, and
thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River and along the western Neisse
River to the Czechoslovakian frontier...shall be under the administration of the Polish State."4 This
decision effectively extended Poland's frontier westward to incorporate approximately 168,000 square
kilometers of what, in 1937, had been German Silesia, Brandenburg and Pomerania and partially
compensated Poland for the 260,000 square kilometers that the Soviet Union had annexed on the eastern
frontier. Poland's new territories were diverse and valuable, ranging from the industrial centers in Silesia,
through the agricultural tracts in the north-central areas and including the ports of Stettin (Szczecin) and the
former free city of Danzig (Gdansk).
This demarcation was the latest in the long fluctuating history of Central European political
cartography. It is the history of this fluctuation that distorts ethnic locations and territorial claims and
serves to crystalize historical memory toward national and ethnic animosity. Speaking in Warsaw on
November 9, 1989, West German Prime Minister Helmut Kohl stated, "the Germans and Poles-neighbors
in the heart of Europe--have spent most of their history living in peace, a fact which is not sufficiently
known. It is also true that they have inflicted deep wounds on each other, especially in recent times."5
Kohl's statement came by way of summary as he advanced the course of contemporary normalization. But
this has proved to be a difficult course, and large scale reconciliation may prove more elusive still. For it is
also true that these "periods of peace" were often periods of malignant festering and perhaps the most
predominant psychological factor influencing Polish foreign policy attitudes are precisely the deep wounds
that Kohl spoke of.
"Enormous influence on security policy is exerted by a nation's historical memory," wrote Adam
Rotfeld. This is particularly true in Poland where "Polish historical memory reveals a multiplicity
of conditions and experiences that have shaped and continue to shape security attitudes and policies."6
4 Norman Davies, God's Playgound: A History of Poland: Volume II (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1982), 50.
5
"Kohl Meetings Reportage Continues, Visit Ends, Speaks at Warsaw Dinner" in RzezpIiia 10-
12 November 1989 as cited in FBI EU-822I, 14 November 1989,51.




In 1386, the union of Lithuania and Poland and the rise of Roman Catholicism ushered in a
"golden age that was to last for 300 years."7 Poland would rise to become one of the most powerful
nations in Europe. Already a center for commerce and trade and renown as a cradle of scholarship and
education, by 1410 Poland firmly established itself as a European power by defeating the Knights of the
Teutonic Order at the battles of Grunwald and Tannenberg. By 1634, the Polish Empire stretched from "the
Baltic in the north, including Prussia, which was a fiefdom of the Polish crown, to the Black Sea in the
south, while to the east it stretched to within 200 miles of the gates of Moscow."8
Though clashes with both Russian and Germany can be traced to this period, the significance of
this era for Poles lies most markedly perhaps in the fact that it serves as the point of contrast for a once
great nation that would eventually be chiseled away to the point of non-existence. During this process,
several important conditions of Polish security would be reinforced; its geostrategic position together with
its inherent vulnerability, the lack of natural frontiers, and the dangers of internal conflict nestled as it is
between two great power.
In the mid-seventeenth century Poland possessed both a strong economy and a powerful army.
Despite the lack of natural frontiers, it appeared that Polish security in the crossroads could be assured.
Constant conflict with the Cossacks, Tatars, Russians, Swedes and the Prussians had been checked by
Poland's might. Future threats could have been met, as well, but for the tragic flaw of Polish political
culture; "that fatal inability of Poles to agree among themselves around a national purpose in times of
peace," despite the knowledge of their precarious geostrategic position.9
This lack of internal unity emanated from Poland's loose system of democracy in which the
gentry, or szlachta, were granted privileges in return for raising army detachments to fight the various
invading armies. The most influential privilege in the parliamentary system was found in the provision
"whereby any legislation could be voted down by a single member of parliament. Each member was also




entitled by his one vote to dissolve the Sejm at any time."10 This liberum veto evolved from the
assumption that "all nobles were equal and that each possessed in his person the well-being of the
nation."1 1 But functionally, this privilege proved disastrous. "Between 1652, when the liberum veto was
first used, and 1764 when King Stanislaw II August Poniatowski attempted in vain to make constitutional
reforms, forty-eight out of fifty-five sessions of the Sejm fell under the liberum veto." 12
By 1770, the result was chaos bordering on civil war. Internal disputes over Catherine the
Great's meddling and religious issues were compounded by Cossack attacks and a revolt in the Polish army
provoked by the Sejm's inability to agree on a budget. Constitutional changes attempted by Stanislaw
pushed the nobility into revolt and alarmed the absolute monarches that ruled in Poland's neighboring
countries.
Into this vacuum marched Catherine the Great and her Russian army, fresh from her own victory
over the Turks. Austria and Prussia, concerned that Russia's influence would grow too strong, moved in as
well in order to claim their own portion of the spoils in Poland. In August of 1772, the three powers
effected the First Partition of Poland. Approximately thirty percent of Poland was distributed; the bulk of
this going to Russia through the annexation of White Russia up to the Dvina and Dnieper rivers. Austria
began its encroachment into Polish Galicia and Prussian territory was extended into Polish Prussia.
Poland's slide into non-existence had begun.
Years later Poland would be subjected to yet another partition. On May 3, 1791, liberal
members of the Sejm, in the absence of the reactionary members, voted through a constitution, the first
written constitution in Europe, modeled closely on the American example. Revolutionary for its time, it
was nonetheless short-lived. As a direct threat to the absolute monarches of Europe and additionally
dangerous in that it could establish stability and strength in Poland, Catherine again moved in, resolved to
"stamp out the French plague." Supported by conservative members of the Polish nobility, she crossed the
Polish border in May of 1792 and rewarded Polish liberalism with the Second Partition and the imposition





and political domination, Polish nationalism rose once more. In 1794, under the leadership of Tadeusz
Kosciuszko, an army of peasants rose to confront overwhelming odds and demand self-rule, freedom and
civil right. Russia and Prussia were quick to intervene and, after bitter fighting, defeated Kosciuszko at the
gates of Warsaw.
The decision of the three powers concerning the Third Partition of Poland was to have profound
implications for the map of Europe and the historical memory of Poles. In final settlement of the Polish
issue, Russia, Prussia and Austria proclaimed:
"In view of the necessity to abolish everything that could revive the memory of the existence of the
Kingdom of Poland, now that the annulment of the body politic has been effected...the high
contracting parties are agreed and undertaken never to include in their titles...the name or designation
of the Kingdom of Poland, which shall remain suppressed from the present and forever." 13
Poland, which for three centuries had been one of the most dominant nations in Central Europe,
was erased from the political map of Europe, an act Thomas Jefferson described as "a wound...inflicted on
(the) character of the eighteenth century..ran atrocity of a barbarous government..." 14
For the entire span of the nineteenth century, Poland was deprived of existence. The years of
national oblivion saw a crop of political constructs that never proved to be a successor to the Kingdom of
Poland or even a vehicle for Polish autonomy; the Duchy of Warsaw (1807-1815), the Grand Duchy of
Posen in Prussia (1815-1849), the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodermeria (1772-1918), the Congress of the
Kingdom of Poland (1815-1874) and the Republic of Cracow (1815-1846). Foreign occupation, political
and cultural oppression and the fragmentation of the Polish people among the various constructs and newly
demarcated foreign nations led every Polish revival to its ultimate miscarriage. Norman Davies aptly noted
that even the Second Republic of Poland-its independent years between 1918 and 1939-"must be viewed as
a brief interlude in the overall stream of statelessness. Even the People's Republic of Poland, (founded in
1945, formally constituted in 1952) which has exercised effective authority since the Second World War,
bears serious limitations on its sovereignty." 15 The events of 1989 and the evolution of post-roundtable
Poland have eliminated these limitations but Davies' conclusion still holds: "for the greater part of modern
13Ibid., 270.




history, statelessness has been the Poles normal condition. Genuine independence has rarely been more
than a pipe-dream." 16
The inability to realize this dream has helped mold the unique Polish political character that is
manifested today. Adam Rotfeld concluded:
"The perception of the English or French, who have lost their wars but never, for any longer period
of time, political independence, will not be the same as those of the Poles, who cannot forget that a
misconceived approach to security resulted in one of the great powers of the fifteenth and seventeenth
centuries being partitioned by its neighbors toward the end of the eighteenth century and
disappearance from the map of Europe for 123 years. The Polish people never came to terms with
this loss of statehood..." 17
2. Hope and Destruction
The outbreak of World War One, however, offered Poles hope for a solution to the Polish
Question. Both alliances offered independence in return for Poland's military support. The fragmented
kingdom once again confronted its age old dilemma; choosing an alignment strategy between two powerful
and warring nations. Tragically, the war eventually saw Poles fighting for Germany. Austria-Hungary and
Russia.
However, by the end of the war and as a result of the collapse of the three occupying powers,
Poland had achieved its independence. The Treaty of Versailles and the Conference of Ambassadors
eventually delineated Polish frontiers. Baltic access, that once stretched from the Bay of Pomerania up to
and including the Lithuanian coast, was now limited to a narrow corridor between German north-east
Pomerania on the west and the free city of Danzig and East Prussia on the east. Though not extending to
the Oder-Neisse rivers, Poland's western borders, nonetheless, extended deep into Brandenburg and Silesian
territory.
Poland's eastern borders, however, were delineated by other means. Even before the Treaty of
Versailles was concluded Polish patriot Jozef Pilsudski engaged the Soviet Union in a war in the hope of
curbing the alarming potential for a resurgent and expansionist Russian empire. Pilsudski hoped to "create
a safety belt isolating and weakening Russia to the point where she could no longer be a major




such as the Baltic states, the Ukraine, and Byelorussia, possibly in a loose federal relation with Poland."
1 8
After a see-saw campaign the Polish-Soviet War of 1920 was concluded by the Treaty of Riga (1921) which
established the Polish-Soviet frontier as it was to exist until 1939. Poland's eastern frontiers extended
eastward into Byelorussia and the Ukraine on a north-south line approximately 40 kilometers west of
Minsk. This territory, however, would again be reclaimed by the Soviets in 1939 in a time-honored tug-of-
war that established the groundwork for the resurgent Polish Question which occupied much of the
discussion at Yalta and eventually lead to the Potsdam solution.
The German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939 was followed soon after by the Soviet
invasion on the 17th. Internal instability, lack of cohesive political unity and foreign policy isolation had
left them vulnerable. Britain and France could do little to help Poland despite their guarantees. The
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact later revealed the secret protocol that set the stage for the fourth partition of
Poland in 167 years. These event would no doubt strengthen Polish perceptions concerning national
security--if they could survive. Norman Davies pointed out:
"The events of World War Two were incomparably worse than anything which the Polish nation had
suffered before. The conduct of the Nazis and Soviets make the misdeeds of their Prussian, Austrian
and Tsarist predecessors pale into insignificance. In the 19th century, the Poles had been faced with a
life of deprivation. In the 20th century, they were faced with extinction." 19
The history of World War Two in Poland is a litany of destruction and horror that is surpassed
only by the level of carnage in the Soviet Union. Polish casualties equalled the combined casualties of
Great Britain, the United States, France, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Canada, Italy, Austria, Romania,
Yugoslavia and Japan.2 0 Polish losses in the Warsaw ghetto uprising alone outnumbered U.S. losses for
the entire war. Of a total of approximately 50 million casualties during the war, 7 million were Polish.
Deportation, forced labor and mass execution occurred at the hands of both the Soviet NKVD and the Nazi
Einsatzgruppen. The massacre of Polish POWs at the Katyn Forest and the elimination of the Polish elite
in Nazi concentration camps fueled the Polish sense of isolation and seemed to indicate that the decapitation
18 Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1973 (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1974), 106.
19 Davies, 80.
2 0 Steven, 286.
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of Polish society could be accomplished. Only Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union in June of 1941 saved
Poland from this double jeopardy.
Poland was nonetheless, four years away from the end of its greatest trial. When it was finally
over the intense pain of six years of war sharpened ethnic and national hatred. The Second World War had
punctuated Polish historical experience with its most indelible moral and spiritual mark. Fifty years later,
issues such as the upkeep and recognition of German war graves is an intensely debated and deeply
emotional subject.
As the Soviet Union and Poland's communist leadership had often sought to legitimize
themselves at the expense of the Nazi legacy, and attempted to divert attention away from their own
complicity in Poland's suffering, hatred of Germans was consistently fueled. The collapse of communism
may, therefore, offer new hope for mutual understanding between Poles and Germans in the future.
Presently however, Polish fear and animosity continues to concentrate on the Nazi legacy. They interpret
this legacy, not as the aberration of a single man, but as the potential of a nation. It was, after all, the
German nation, not only Hitler, that had perpetrated these deeds. It is a collective responsibility.
3. Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam
The Potsdam decision to extend Poland westward to the Oder-Neisse rivers grew from intense
debates echoing from the Tehran conference in 1943 and the Yalta conference in February 1945. These
debates represented a unique mix of Polish, Soviet, U.S., and British interests. Following Hitler's invasion
in September, 1939, the Soviets concluded that Poland "ceased to exist." Offered for foreign consumption,
this justification served to implement the design of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact's secret protocol. By
mid-summer of 1941, however, Operation Barbarossa had compelled the Soviets to reach an arrangement
with the Polish government in exile in London. Despite this cooperation, Stalin and the London Poles
were quick to polarize on the issue of territory, each contesting the status of Poland's eastern frontier. For
their part, Britain, France and the United States were determined that the Polish state would remain an
independent post-war state. Increasingly however, the question was; in what form?
Diplomatic relations between Poland and the USSR were reestablished following an arrangement
of July 30, 1941. In the interest of improving Polish-Soviet relations in the face of Nazi aggression, the
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Soviets "conceded that the territorial changes of 1939 were not valid."2 1 Just days later, however, in
Pravda, an article appeared "applauding the Soviet-Polish pact" but also claiming that the Soviet actions in
1939 were justified as "Moscow was duty bound to give a helping hand to Ukranians and Byelorussians
who made up most of the population in the Eastern regions of Poland."2 2 The Polish-Soviet frontier was
not considered immutable. The Soviets, despite their alliance with Poland, did not recognize the Treaty of
Riga. The border would be a matter for the future.
Just five months later Stalin would insist that the British Foreign Ministry recognize the Soviet
frontiers of 1941. The allies opposed this idea but political sensitivities compelled cautiousness in order to
avoid any thought of a Soviet separate peace with Hitler. At the Tehran conference in November, 1943, the
Soviets made their territorial claims explicit. Additionally, they were contesting the rightful heir to the
Polish government; insisting that the Soviet backed Lublin government and not the London Poles were to
be the post-war administrators of the Polish state. This position was enhanced by Stalin's indignation and a
breakdown in relations between Stalin and the London Poles concerning attempts by the Poles to prompt a
Red Cross investigation of the Katyn forest massacre despite the Soviet contention that it was a Nazi crime.
By January 1944, the Red Army had crossed the Polish Frontier, giving Stalin added confidence
in toughening his stance. He spoke of the injustice of the Treaty of Riga. The Nazi-Soviet partition had,
from the Soviet viewpoint, rectified this situation. Picking up on a Churchill proposal made at Tehran,
Stalin claimed that "the rebirth of Poland as a strong and independent state...must be through the restoration
to Poland of lands which belonged to Poland from time immemorial and were wrested by the Germans from
her." 2 3 The past thirty years had seen two major conflagrations conducted in and across the Polish
crossroads. Extending Soviet influence and Polish territory westward, Stalin calculated, would introduce the
strength needed to defend the crossroads and extend the natural buffer of distance between Western Europe
and the Soviet Motherland. In this respect, "the Polish Question," claimed Stalin, "is a matter of life or
death for the Soviet State."2
4
2 1 Avin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War Two: Imnerial and Global
(Glenview, Illinois: Scott Foresman and Co., 1989), 61.
2 2 Ibid.
2 3 Ibid., 64.
24Rotfeld, 68.
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At Yalta, the Allied desire to attain Soviet military intervention into the war with Japan and the
hope for post-war East-West cooperation led the Western allies to an agreement (some would say a sellout)
on Soviet terms concerning Poland. For Poles it became a cruel repetition of history as once again their
borders and politics had been decided by three great foreign powers. The Soviet puppet Lublin government
would be installed with only minor compromises and possession of Poland's eastern territory would remain
with the Soviet Union.
Concerning the western Polish border, the Lublin Poles where in agreement with their Soviet
bosses. The Poles submitted "The Statement of Poland's Position with Regard to Her Western Frontier" to
the Potsdam conference on July 10, 1945. This memorandum made the specific case for the Oder-Neisse
line based on "moral justification and historical rights, geographic situation and ties, demographic needs,
economic requirements and defense considerations."2 5
The Potsdam Conference Report of August 2, 1945 formally extended Polish "administration" to
the Oder-Neisse border. The Potsdam agreement held that "final delimitation of the western frontier of
Poland should await the peace settlement;" a peace settlement seemingly put on indefinite hold by the Cold
War.2 6 Forty-five years of Polish administration seemed to suggest a sense of permanence concerning
Polish claims but the conditional nature of the Potsdam agreement had been the basis for a potential legal
German claim to possession of Poland's western territories. Such a potential claim was the fundamental
reason behind Polish sensitivity during both the 1970 border negotiations with the FRG and the 1990 talks
with a reunifying Germany. Given the context of Polish history, the possibility of such a claim evoked
strong fears and opened deep wounds, most notably, the trauma of World War Two. Additionally, in both
1970 and 1990, Polish fears were heightened by German political hedging, right-wing revisionist rhetoric
and persistent expellee protests. And in 1990, the Poles were not unaware that the 1970 border treaty with
the FRG had nearly been defeated during the Bundestag ratification despite popular trends favoring
normalization.
2 5Ibid.
26See Potsdam Conference Report dated 2 August 1945, Chapter IX.
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C. GERMANY AND SOVIET-DIRECTED FOREIGN POLICY
The distant specter of German reunification had always posed the threat of raising the border issue,
and as that the two German states moved toward unification early in 1990, Polish threat perceptions became
palpable. For Poland, German unification represented uncertainty and vulnerability. The lack of a peace
settlement threatened to undermine treaties of normalization with both the FRG and the GDR.
Additionally, the open-ended Final Act of the 1975 Helsinki CSCE process offered little ground for Polish
security in the matter.
On November 9, 1989, Polish Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki, speaking during Helmut Kohl's visit to
Warsaw, referred to "elementary and universal truths."
"One of these truths is that history is made by people. If we are to avoid succumbing to its burdens,
if we are to believe that a better future is possible, and if we are to be capable of acting for the sake
of the future, then we must remember that history is shaped by people and not by some fatalistic
forces that condemn individuals and nations to repeat previous mistakes and commit new ones."2 7
One thousand years of conflict and tragedy cannot be "erased from historical memory," claims
Mazowiecki. "Let it remain," he argues, "as a warning for future generations. At the same time, it is our
intention and task--a mutual one, I think--to cross this shadow once and for all."2 8 Crossing this shadow
had not been an easy task, however. German unification had given new vitality to fears and arguments that
have been wrestled with, at varying levels of urgency, for over four decades.
1. The Treaty of Zgorzelec and Soviet Alligned Foreign Policy
As Europe ossified into two opposed armed camps in the late 1940s, "it mattered little that the
Peace Conference that was to finally determine Poland's territorial boundaries was never held."2 9 On July
6, 1950, the German Democratic Republic, formerly the Soviet zone of occupation, officially recognized
the Oder-Neisse border between the GDR and Poland. The Treaty of Zgorzelec formally recognized the
"delimited and existing Polish state frontier."3 0 The treaty was welcomed by the Poles but soon came to
2 7
"Mazowiecki Speaks At Dinner" in Rzecz lila 10-12 November 1989 as cited in FBIS RRU-
89-218, 14 November 1989, 54.
2 8 Ibid.
2 9 Davies, 502.
3 0 Rotfeld, 73.
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be understood as a manifestation of growing Soviet territorialism; a trend that would take more concrete
form in Berlin in 1961 as the Soviets attempted to solidify and secure their claim in the post-war order.
Socialist brotherhood notwithstanding, antipathy between East Germans and Poles was still very common.
The Communist party line that "all evil Germans are concentrated in the Federal Republic whilst all good,
democratic, anti-fascist Germans have somehow been assembled in the GDR, cut very little ice" in
Poland.3 1 Socialist brotherhood had not been able to wipe out Polish-German historical memory or the
antagonism that rises from it. Confrontation between East Germans and Poles have continued to the
present. Disputes over the upkeep of war graves, historical sites, school textbooks, maps and other cultural
issues are as prominent in the GDR as they are in the FRG.
In Poland, the German Question has always been a predominant feature of foreign policy.
Internal political conflict and chronic economic problems have diverted attention from the issue at various
points in the post-war period but German reunification and the perceived threat to the western border have
never been displaced from the Polish political consciousness. It is a matter of vital national interest, etched
indelibly into the contemporary Polish political culture and deeply effecting Polish security choices.
"Historically, Polish foreign policy has revolved around four options: 1) to ally with either Russia or
Germany; 2) to attempt to isolate herself and be totally independent of European conflicts; 3) to
rely on a third, outside force such as France or Great Britain; or 4) to instigate general and permanent
European settlement, a security system, in which Poland's situation between Russia and Germany
becomes a mere fact rather than a liability." 3 2 As the immediate post-war years sunk into the depths
of the Cold War, the failure of cooperation between the big powers and the growing Soviet
domination in Eastern Europe, compelled Poland to consolidate its position and implement security
arrangements with the Soviets as the fundamental basis of foreign policy. The Soviet-Polish Treaty
of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Postwar Cooperation of April, 1945 was followed by the
Warsaw Treaty in May of 1955. The Warsaw Pact (WTO) was born and Cold War military blocs had
been institutionalized. For Poland, however, the WTO offered tangible security in light of the Paris
treaties of October, 1954 which paved the way for the FRG's admission into NATO. The Federal
Republic soon posed a strong threat once again as military capabilities enhanced under the NATO
framework and the ongoing economic miracle lifted it out of the post-war ruins.
2. Rebuffed Soviet Initiatives and the Seeds of Normalization
By 1958, however, international contacts between the Soviet Union and the West were opening
the doors for new East-West initiatives. In an attempt to influence the European security environment in a
31Davies, 623.
32 peter J. Potichnyj and Jane P. Shapiro, eds., From the Cold War to Detente (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1976), 152.
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commensurate direction with Soviet objectives of German isolation and U.S. disengagement, the Kremlin
attempted to take advantage of Polish-German relations to forward its own designs. Polish Foreign
Minister Adam Rapacki forwarded the Soviet plan for a "Nuclear Battlefield Weapon Free Corridor" which
would.
"embrace a corridor of a definite width on both sides of the demarcation line between NATO and the
WTO, starting from Central Europe, with the possibility of extending it to the north and south of
the continent... This concepL..is an attempt to prevent such a lowering of the threshold of use of
nuclear weapons which obliterates the differences between nuclear and conventional weapons..." 3 3
In effect the Rapacki Plan offered "a two pronged effort to isolate West Germany from Poland's
allies and within the Western alliance and to constitute a preliminary bridge building effort to forge a
relaxation of European tension and to prevent a continued division of Europe into two armed camps."3
4
Arguably, the plan would have provided a measure of security for Poland itself by recognizing the territorial
status quo, restricting any nuclear capability on German soil and prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons
against Polish territory, but the broader Soviet design within the plan proved unacceptable for Germany and
the Atlantic Alliance as they faced a capable and imposing Soviet military threat. The Rapacki Plan ran
into the hard-line stance of FRG Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and a NATO concensus that such a plan
"would undercut the American advantage in...tactical nuclear weapons without offsetting the ...Soviet
advantage in longer-range...missiles." 3 5 . Gomulka would revive the concept in 1964 but suspicion and a
justified mistrust again left the Rapacki-Gomulka Plan a dead letter. For Poland, security and territorial
guarantees once again hedged on the maintenance of the Elbe border between the FRG and the GDR.
Rebuffed by the West Germans, Poland aligned with the GDR and under Soviet direction
consolidated a list of conditions for Polish-West German normalization: 1) above all, recognition of the
Oder-Neisse boundary as permanent; 2) recognition of the GDR by the FRG; 3) full renunciation of
nuclear weapons by the FRG; 4) FRG renunciation of the 1938 Munich Agreement; and 5) the
3 3Rotfeld, 71.
3 4 Louis Ortmayer, Conflict. Compromise and Conciliation: West German-Polish Normalization
196&1976, University of Denver Graduate School of International Studies Monograph Series in World
Affairs (Colorado: University of Denver, Colorado Seminary, 1975), 13.
3 5 Ulam, 612.
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abandonment of the Hallstein Doctrine (Bonn's claim to the sole representation of the German people). 36
By 1969, however, several factors significantly changed this position and paved the way towards
normalization in the 1970s.
Despite numerous attempts at invigorating economic cooperation with the GDR, Poland was
increasingly disappointed with East Germany's failure to provide substantial support for Poland's widespread
economic problems. This was underscored by the impossibility of rapid multilateral economic integration
and cooperation within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) as evidenced by the
pessimistic outlook outlined at the April, 1969 CMEA summit. Chronic and intensifying economic
problems and the leadership's inability to provide any relief or viable solutions were pushing Poland
towards a crisis. The communist leadership began to look West, specifically toward the most logical and
capable source of economic assistance--West Germany.
At the same time the CMEA conference was outlining the necessity for new East-West
multilateralism, the WTO was meeting in Budapest with a Soviet blessed proposal for a European security
conference. The proposal spurred a reassertion of East European efforts to decrease East-West tension and
address specific issues of national interest. The Poles began to rethink their position. Additional
momentum was provided to this evolving reorientation by the ongoing attempts at a Soviet-West German
rapprochement. Polish fears were heightened by the prospects of another Rapallo or Molotov-Ribbentrop
Pact. The Poles feared the possibility of "an overall European settlement which would not be fully
satisfactory to Polish interests" and were therefore interested in establishing their own dialogue with the
FRG. 37
Given the domestic economic needs and the opportunities presented by international
developments, Gomulka broke new ground in a speech delivered on May 17, 1969. Taking an unusually
moderate tone, he proposed concluding a border treaty with the FRG along the lines of the Zgorzelec Treaty.
Although he addressed several of his previous conditions for Polish-West German normalization, now only
one-recognition of the Oder-Neisse border--was necessary. This dramatic turn of event coincided with
36See Ortmayer, pp. 11-14 and Potichnyj and Shapiro, pp. 152-153
37 otichnyj and Shapiro, 153.
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changing views in West Germany, where, as Gomulka cautiously noted, "in some circles there have
developed tendencies which seem to indicate a somewhat different orientation in Bonn's eastern policy." 38
E. NORMALIZATION AND A NEW WEST GERMAN OSTPOLITIK
Bonn's Ostpolitik under Chancellor Adenauer had been consistently hard-line and predictable in the
early post-war period. Adenauer's fundamental anti-communism and his political designs to strengthen
West Germany's position with the Western allies dominated his foreign policy. The European division, he
concluded, was a result of Soviet communism and Poland was viewed merely as a satellite reflecting Soviet
influence in Europe. No contact occurred between Bonn and Warsaw as Adenauer looked to deal directly
with the Soviet Union and then only from a position of strength. Gomulka's "Polish October" of 1956 and
the subsequent Rapacki and Gomulka Plans were shrugged off. "Adenauer chose to speak only with a free
Polish people."3 9 His vision of the future saw an eventual withdrawal of Soviet hegemony in the GDR
and a renegotiation of the Oder-Neisse line with the Poles. The German question, therefore, was open on a
long-term basis.
The open ended border issue and Adenauer's legacy would become two important aspects in the
dynamics of West German politics during the 1970 Polish-West German normalization debates and they
remained at the center of the debate in early 1990. German claims for the former territories, the "legal"
argument, and the CDU/CSU~s position as the voice of the Landsmannschaften (Expellees) and the
Familien sanmenfuhrung (separated families) were all developed and reinforced during this period.
1. Detente, Willy Brandt and the West German Electorate
By 1966, however, Adenauer's Ostpolitik was out of step with the ongoing process East-West
detente. Furthermore, several new developments added to the dynamic political environment. The
adjustments made by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) at Bad Godesberg in 1959 had helped it emerge as
a broad based popular electoral party with a growing voice in policy making and a domestic and foreign
policy agenda of its own. By December, 1966, growing SPD support enabled the establishment of the
"Grand Coalition"--an SPD/CDU/CSU national front--which marked the dawning of a new Ostpolitik
under Willy Brandt.
3 8Ortmayer, 45.
3 9 Ibid., 9.
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"The Brandtian Ostpolitik envisioned the reduction of tension in Europe--imperative for the
establishment of an all-European security system--through the FRGs implementing of normalized
relations, economic cooperation and also through industrial co-development with Eastern
Europe..."4 0
Gomulka and the Poles would see in this attitude a potential for both the status quo acceptance
of existing borders and the opportunity for economic cooperation. Long-term possibilities for Poland's
fourth security option-European cooperation--also appeared to have a champion in West Germany.
The SPD's new Ostpolitik, however, was never assured politically despite indications that public
opinion favored normalization. Many factors conspired to bury the SPD's new initiatives. The Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 brought severe fire upon any normalization process with the WTO.
Christian Democrat leaders warned of the threat of the German radical right. Intense conflict rose between
SPD party leaders and expellee/refugee groups. This was particularly crucial "since the expellees constituted
the second largest organized grouping in the SPD after the labor unions."4 1 In a situation similar to Kohrs
in early 1990, Brandt's "SPD concensus on foreign policy lasted only as long as the SPD's detente policy
remained diffuse, subject to wide interpretation and elaborated in relatively abstract terminology."4 2 The
SPD tried to hold expellee support for the upcoming Bundestag elections in 1969, but the contradiction in
their respective Ostpolitik objectives and the CDU's strong integrative pull of expellees, compelled the
SPD to disassociate themselves from these groups.
Despite this fact, the 1969 federal elections brought the Social Democrats to power, aided greatly
by a coalition with Walter Scheel, Hans Dietrich Genscher and the Free Democrats (FDP). Disassociated
from the expellees, the SPD/FDP coalition could pursue its Ostpolitik in a less ambiguous fashion.
Problems remained, however. The CDU/CSU still dominated the Bundestag and the FDP support was
unstable, representing, as it did, the view of the FDP elite and not of the party's full parliamentary faction
or the FDP general electorate. Political survival, therefore, hedged on a successful and forward-looking
Ostpolitik. "Fortunately for the SPD/FDP leadership, these pursuits corresponded more closely to the
4 0 Ibid., 18-19.
4 1 1bid., 27.
4 2 Ibid.
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political and social aspirations of the FRG electorate that did the rather strident criticism of the CDU
opposition.- 43
The change in the political and social aspirations of the FRG electorate had begun in the early
1960s. Public criticism of Adenauees Ostpolitik grew rapidly as West Germany was left behind in the
process of European detente. By 1965, the FRG's major parties were reexamining their eastern policies in
an attempt to come to grips with the detente process and accelerate the stalled integration of the FRG into
Western Europe. Perhaps the greatest impetus to favorable West German public opinion came from a series
of memorandum promulgated by West German and Polish religious organizations.
In 1965, prompted by a message from the Polish Catholic Bishops to the German Episcopate,
the FRG Evangelical Church issued a memorandum calling for reconciliation with Poland. This was
followed by an exchange of letters between Polish and West German Catholic bishops aimed at loosening
the "Ostpoliik logjam created by Adenauer's policies. 4 4 The Bensberger Krein memorandum of 1968
followed, stressing that normalization with Poland would involve "small acts of personal reconciliation and
the creation of a more positive domestic and international political atmosphere." 4 5 Gradually, West
German public opinion cmlesced toward national reconciliation and recognition of the Oder-Neisse border.
In March of 1951, only 8 percent of native born West Germans favored permanent settling of the
Oder-Neisse border, 77 percent were opposed and 15 percent were undecided. By February of 1966, the
percentages of those favoring and opposing the border were 27 percent and 51 percent respectively.
However, by November, 1969, those favoring the Oder-Neisse border were in the majority at 53 percent
with 29 percent opposed. In April of 1970, this trend continued, with 58 percent in favor and 23 percent
opposed. The results were most dramatic among the expellees, who had closely mirrored the general
population poll. By April of 1970, 57 percent of the expellees felt that the FRG should come to terms




4 6See Ortmayer, Appendix A Table 5c from Institut fur Demoskopie, Allensbach, "Stimmung im
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The trend toward acceptance of the existing border can perhaps best be explained by the practical
economic and social factors that influenced all West Germans. West Germany's economic miracle had lifted
its people from the rubble of World War Two to become an economically powerful and socially integrative
society. "By the mid-1950s the economic and social development of the Federal Republic was able to
provide a positive basis of working, earning and living conditions for all sections of society (including the
expellees, refugees and former Nazi-activists.)" 4 7 Additionally, political evolution from a constitutional
concensus in 1949 to a popular concensus in the 1960s had fostered political integration and stability.
For these reasons, German popular opinion had swung in favor of accepting the Oder-Neisse
border. The majority, however, was narrow and public opinion was running ahead of the political
sentiment in the Bundestag. This would be underscored by the intense political fight that would surround
the Warsaw Treaty and its ratification. Expellee protest, CDU/CSU opposition and wavering FDP support
threatened to bury the SPD's Ostpolitik.
2. The Warsaw Treaty of 1970
The Warsaw Treaty of December 7, 1970 recognized by mutual agreement the existing boundary
line between Poland and Germany, as specified at Potsdam. Additionally, the accord reaffirmed the
inviolability of the existing frontiers and respect for "each others territorial integrity without restriction."
Poland and the FRG declared "no territorial claims whatsoever against each other" and agreed not to "assert
such claims in the future." In return, Poland attached an "Information" document concerning "measures for
a solution of humanitarian problems" as regards the German minority in Poland. Article four of the treaty
subordinated the accord to existing bilateral or multilateral agreements and the final article subjected the
treaty to ratification before it entered into force, a stipulation that almost proved fatal to Brandt's Ostpolitik.
Ratification in the Bundestag proved to be a bitter process; one that disappointed Brandt's
government and proved to Poles that true reconciliation was a distant prospect. The ratification vote for the
Warsaw Treaty received 248 vote in favor, 17 votes opposed and 231 abstentions 4 8 It was only political
maneuvering, the establishment of a common resolution linking the Moscow Treaty with the Warsaw
4 7 Richard Stoss, "The Problem of Right-Wing Extremism in West Germany," Egg Uan
Politics 11, no. 2 (April 1988): 34.
48Ortmayer, 149.
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accord and, the reaffirmation of the applicability of past treaties, specifically the Potsdam agreement, that
enabled its ratification.
In Poland, the treaty was a foreign policy success contrasting sharply with the current domestic
turmoil that resulted from the continued economic malaise, chronic agricultural failure and announced
increase in food costs that proved to be Gomulka's undoing. A restoration of good relations with West
Germany, it was thought, might very well prove to be of enormous economic benefit for Poland.
Politically as well this effort at normalization was poised to calm Polish fears concerning German
revanchism and thereby ease Poland's humiliating dependence on the Soviet Union for security. And
finally, and certainly of crucial importance for the Poles, the Warsaw Treaty opened a direct and important
dialogue between the two contracting parties at a time when Brezhnev's own overtures of reconciliation with
West Germany were being formalized in the Moscow Treaty of 1970. Conjuring up images of the 1922
Treaty of Rapallo and the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the developing Soviet-German rapprochement
carried the perception of a formidable threat to Polish interests. Polish foreign policy makers to this day
remain keenly aware that cooperation between these two powers has often been at the expense of Poland's
own economic, political and security objectives. Therefore, in addition to the political and economic
possibilities implicit in the Warsaw Treaty, it also acted as a counterweight to the Soviet-German
cooperation, thereby ameliorating what had been and what remains today a prime concern for the Polish
- leadership.
But East-West ups and downs in the 1970s and both West German and Polish domestic issues
soon brought the normalization process from optimistic heights to the daily plod of small steps.
Significant progress was made during the Helsinki CSCE meetings in 1975, and West Germany improved
the outlook by extending substantial amounts of economic aid, credits and debt refinancing to Poland's
troubled economy, but complaints continued, however, and both sides came to realize that they were
involved in a less that reconciled normalization.
The Poles regularly accused the Germans of less than acceptable economic cooperation as
intended in the Warsaw Treaty and they were quick to attack all German revisionist or revanchist statements.
Germany claimed that it was moving generously on economic issues and questioned Polish commitments
on German cultural issues in Poland. The same arguments that periodically blocked Warsaw-Bonn contacts
in the 1970s and early 1980s were also cited as reasons for Chancellor Kohl's postponement of a scheduled
visit to Warsaw to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of World War Two in September of
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1989. Despite the collapse of communism and the increasing democratization of Poland, the similarities
between Polish-West German relations in 1970 and those of 1990 are striking.
E. THE CONTINUITY OF HISTORY
By the end of 1989 the collapse of communism, Soviet troop reductions in Eastern Europe and the
poor state of Warsaw Pact cohesion had increased a sense of vulnerability in Poland that was already high
given the real and projected discrepancies between the economic capabilities of Poland and a reuniting
Germany. Polish security issues, firmly in the hands of the Poles following the withdraw of Soviet
hegemony, returned to two familiar historic requirements: a need to evaluate future foreign policy in terms
of Poland's four classic choices; alignment with the Soviet Union or Germany, isolation, a third power
alliance, or the creation of a broader all-European security order and; the need to take an emphatic stance
concerning "No more Yaltas."
1. Vulnerability and a Search for Security
Historical tensions with both the Soviet Union and Germany are prime factors in Poland's
foreign policy considerations and when European events took their dramatic turn at the end of 1989 Poland
found itself trapped between a need for German economic assistance and the requirement for Soviet security
guarantees against a potentially aggressive unified Germany. And it was the German-Polish dispute over
the Oder-Neisse border that threatened to set the stage for an intransigent Germany and dash hopes for the
development of a new, integrative, all-European security order. The tenuous nature of border guarantees and
the legal argument surrounding the final disposition of the western territories intensified Polish
vulnerability and gave rise to political inputs that served to complicate questions concerning the military
status and alignment of a reunified Germany.
Speaking in Ottawa in February, 1990, Polish Foreign minister Krzysztof Shubiszewski, "called
for a unified Germany to remain in the NATO alliance, warning that it might otherwise become
a...superpower on the European stage."4 9 Thus, Poland became the "first Warsaw Pact country to come
out publicly against a neutral status for a reunified Germany." 5 0 Such a stance was, of course, in line
with both NATO and West German desires but was unique in that it contradicted what was then the official
4 9Paul Lewis, "United Germany Urged to be in NATO," New York Times, 15 February 1990, A8.
Y0 Ibid.
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Soviet desire for a neutral Germany. Poland hoped to gain a sense of security beyond Soviet guarantees by
setting NATO as the "watchdog over a reunited Germany. "5 1
Poland, however, also utilized the Soviet role against German aspirations. A request for Soviet
troop withdrawals, similar to those in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, had not been initiated, pending
developments on the Oder-Neisse border issue. As the Soviet East German divisions were increasingly
isolated by East European withdrawals, Polish guarantees for transit rights through Poland were
increasingly important. Poland saw great value in providing these rights unless the "German army is
effectively controlled by its integration into NATO and (checked by) the continued American presence on
German soil."5
2
All of this was compounded by another familiar historical situation; lack of internal unity.
Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki had urged a sound relationship with the Soviet Union, proposing
Soviet troop withdrawals from Poland only as negotiated by bilateral U.S.-Soviet agreement. Solidarity
leader and Polish parliament member, Bronislaw Geremek felt that opportunity and security in Europe lay
with a federation of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia linked closely with Western Europe. Lech Walesa
was more emphatic, calling for Soviet withdrawals either of their "own free will" or "under duress."
The Soviet Union, however, had championed the Polish opposition to any Yalta-like German
reunification negotiations. Mikhail Gorbachev had been a proponent of a Polish voice in the reunification
process when it first became inevitable in February of 1990. Dismayed by the Ottawa decision, which
established the four powers (Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union) and the two German
states as the principle designers of the reunification process, Poland found reassurance in Gorbachev's
declaration, "We rule out an approach where three or four will initially arrange things and then tell the other
participants the already agreed upon position. This is unacceptable."5 3 Yet, for Poles, historical memory
proved that this is exactly what happened in 1772, 1793, 1794, 1922, 1939 and 1945, each time to the
detriment of Poland.
5 1Bernard F. Trainor, "Shift in West Alliances Focus: From Moscow to a United Germany," N=
York Time, 18 February 1990, All.
521bid.
5 3Francis X. Cline, "Gorbachev Voices New Reservations on German Unity," New York Times , 21
February 1990, Al.
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Prime Minister Mazowiecki had been lobbying for a" 5 plus 2" or even a "33 plus 2" CSCE
process in order to ensure a Polish seat in the reunification talks. Unable to gain entry, he proposed that a
"peace treaty securing his country's post-war western border should precede German reunification." "We are
demanding," he stated, "that before the reunification, the total removal of ambiguities must take place."5 4
Geremek echoed these ideas when he claimed that "Poland has a moral right to participate in the discussions
referring to its borders and its security."
Though not unsympathetic to the Poles, the Ottawa decision, nonetheless, endorsed the "4 plus
2" process as the most practical and efficient method, allowing for European input at a CSCE meeting later
in 1990. Having initially been denied a seat in the process and an agreement for a border treaty prior to
negotiations it was not surprising that emphatic vows to defend the border soon surfaced. Speaking in Paris
a few days after the Ottawa Conference, Geremek stated, "The only way to change the border is war and
Germany knows it."5 5
Though war was unlikely, these comments, born of frustration and heightened sensitivity, were
nonetheless the most destabilizing manifestations yet heard in the Oder-Neisse/reunification issue, carrying
with them implications for European integration as well. The comments underscore the depth of concern in
Poland and the extent to which Poles fear that changes sweeping Eastern Europe can bring about instability.
Asked about recent events in Eastern Europe only 17 percent of those questioned in Poland thought they
would bring lasting peace, 56 percent said they would not eliminate the risk of serious conflict and 19
percent felt they could provoke another World War.5 6 Historical memory and a sense that history is
repeating itself have heightened Polish sensitivity. When they look toward a reunited Germany both
memory and potential are clearly focused.
The destabilizing impact of a united Germany upon Polish security lay in the Polish perception
of three interrelated issues: 1) the legal nature of post-war treaties; 2) the ambiguity in Chancellor Kohl's
5 4 Associated Press, "Warsaw Calls for Border Treaty Before Germanys are Reunited," New York
Time, 20 February 1990, A10.
5 5 Steven Greenhouse, "Polish Official Vows to Defend Border," New York Times , 21 February
1990, A8.
5 6 AIan Riding, "Survey Finds 2 In 3 Poles Opposed to German Unity," New York Times, 20
February 1990, AS.
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assurances and his refusal to explicitly guarantee Polish borders under a united Germany; and 3) a vocal and
substantial right-wing constituency with political interests in their former eastern territories.
2. The Treaties and Germany's Legal Argument
Neither the Treaty of Zgorzelec nor the Treaty of Warsaw ever offered Poland guaranteed security
under a united Germany. In essence, both were defacto acknowledgements of the existing situation and not
dejure conclusions. Each treaty was subordinated to other bilateral or multilateral international agreements
which referred them back to the Potsdam agreement of 1945. Under the Potsdam agreement and in the
absence of a final peace treaty, Poland remained only an administrator of the disputed territories, despite the
fact that the intentions, as evidenced by the Potsdam Expulsion Clause and the Yalta agreement, was to
establish Polish sovereignty. Though the Treaties of Zgorzelec and Warsaw were binding for the GDR and
the FRO respectively, either a separate treaty would have to be concluded between Poland and a united
Germany or a peace settlement would have to be effected, in order to settle the issue. And again technically,
by itself the former would remain a defacto treaty.
The Helsinki Final Act is also less than explicit for Polish desires. The principle that
"participating states regard as inviolable all one another's frontiers, as well as the frontiers of all states in
Europe" seemed to finalize the Oder-Neisse Border in the larger CSCE context of European security.
"Accordingly," it continued, states "will refrain from any demand for, or act of seizure and usurpation of part
or all of the territory of any participating state."5 7 This too was welcomed by the Polish officials, but the
course of the talks on the issue of territory soon took a turn towards ambiguity.
Questions arose, mainly from the FRO, concerning the interpretation of what constituted a
"demand for" parts or all of a particular territory. West German hopes for unification with East Germany
prompted the addition of a floating sentence that was eventually to gain equal weight with the inviolability
clause. This floating sentence, after long negotiation, was finalized as: "The participating states consider
that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by
agreement." 5 8 The "peaceful change" clause was welcomed by a number of nations who also have
outstanding territorial claims, but coming as it did, in reference to the reunification of Germany, Poland felt
5 7 Vojtech Mastny, ed., Helsinki. Human Rights and European Securty (Durham, North Carolina:
Duke University Press, 1986), 76.
5 8 1bid, 79.
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less than secure with the ambiguity. In the final analysis, the Helsinki final act on territorial integrity is
open-ended. Therefore, none of the treaties, established to enhance Polish security with regard to the Oder-
Neisse border, transcended the legal argument that kept the Polish-German issue alive. And West German
politicians knew this.
3. The Expellees
Potsdam's separation of Germany's eastern territories cleaved a substantial part of German
heritage. Germany can also trace historical claims for Silesia, Brandenburg and Pomerania back centuries to
the Teutonic Order of 1226. In 1945 and 1946 as Poland occupied the territory, Polish names were given to
former German cities that were the sites of epic German history. The rich German history of the 18th, 19th
and early 20th century enveloped Silesia, Brandenburg and Pomerania into the Heritage of Frederick the
Great, the Hohenzollerns, the Prussian-Napoleonic legacy and Hindenburg, to name a few. The eastern
territories had been the birthplace and home to a remarkable collection of distinguished German
philosophers, scientists, historians, politicians, military leaders, theologians and nobel prize laureates. In
more contemporary times it was also the location of the Kreisau Circle and other German centers of Nazi
resistance. Conflicting historical claims and divergent historical lessons continued to set Pole against
German and reinforce a cultural and ethnic animosity. Article XIII of the Potsdam Conference Report added
to the conflicL
Post-war resettlement affected millions of refugees, repatriates, deportees, transients, expellees
and prisoners. According to Norman Davies, "The largest single operation involved the expulsion of
Poland's German population." 5 9 By joint British-Polish resolution, Clause XIII called for "the transfer to
Germany of German population or elements thereof remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary...in
an orderly and humane manner."6 0 Davies' figures put the number of German expellees at 5,057,000,
though other sources maintain a reduced figure between 3,000,000 to 3,500,000.61
5 9 Davies, 563.
60Ibid.
6 1 See Anne Sabbat-Swidlicka, "Gazeta Wyborcza on the German Minority in Poland" in RadioEre
EM Research14, no. 46 (17 November 1989) and Leszek A. Kosinski, ed., Demogmphic Developments
in Eamme n (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977)
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All sources agree, however, that "the management of the expulsions left much to be desired" due
in part to limited facilities to execute such a vast undertaking and undoubtedly due to a degree of vengeful
wrath.6 2 Expellees frequently fell ill or even died as families were herded into cattle cars and overcrowded
ships in conditions similar to Nazi and Soviet wartime deportations. Robberies, rapes and beatings were
not uncommon. Though Poles and Soviets had grown accustomed to this type of treatment, it was a new
experience for the Germans. The Bund der Verbriebener (League of Expellees) in West Germany quickly
documented accounts of this "barbarous exodus" under the "Polish revenge;" claiming "acts of atrocity and
genocide"...counting..."their martyrs" in numbers exceeding the official figures of expelled persons. Widely
accepted as exaggerations, many accounts, nonetheless, have been confirmed and serve to highlight the
depth of feeling surrounding the expulsion. Article XIII forced the Germans to relinquish birthplaces,
homes, possessions, heritage and dignity. This scar has never fully healed. German concerns with regard to
the welfare of the German minority remaining in Poland, compensation for relinquished property and
possessions and recognition of German cultural identity in Poland remain priority agenda items for German
normalization with Poland. And the expellee and separated family groups remain a potent political force in
German politics.
The power of the expellee groups in the FRG and the large size of the right-oriented
constituency among the CDU/CSU electorate have consistently presented West German politicians with the
task of providing guarantees to the Poles without explicitly excluding a possible renegotiation. Even Willy
Brandt was confronted with this delicate task, and only FDP support enabled a disassociation with the
expellee groups and cleared the path for an effective Ostpolid. Even then, his Ostpolitik and the Warsaw
Treaty barely survived. Brandes relative distance from CDU/CSU-oriented expellee groups and the ability
to focus the SPD/FDP coalition's efforts on policy issues eventually led to success. Kohl, by contrast, as a
CDUICSU Chancellor holds the expellee groups and right-oriented electorate as a vital part of his
constituency. For this reason he was compelled to remain ambiguous and open-ended on the border issue.
To this task, he had proved politically adept.
4. Political Math and the German Right Wing
Kohl had consistently cited his inability to speak for a united Germany and the lack of a peace
treaty as reasons for avoiding an explicit guarantee. From November of last year when the Berlin Wall was
6 2 Davies, 565.
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breached until the late summer of 1990, he had auempted to calm Polish fears but had always stopped short
of the definitive statement that the Poles required. In a speech delivered in Warsaw in November 1989,
Kohl reiterated his commitment to the Warsaw Treaty of 1970 but claimed he did not want to "alter any
legal positions" citing the "bilateral and multilateral agreement" clause and the fact "that no peace treaty has
been concluded yet."6 3 Kohl was, nonetheless, very optimistic. "Never, since the war," he stated , "has
the international situation been so conducive to a breakthrough in (Polish-German) relations."6 4 Self-
determination, cooperation and mutual respect, he concluded, were the key ingredients in forging improved
relations between the two nations. The result of Kohl's visit was a joint declaration, signed on November
14, 1989, which addressed a number of economic, human rights and cultural issues and reaffirmed the 1970
Warsaw Treaty, but never offered an explicit comment on the future of the border.
Increasing pressure from Poland, the United States Senate, FRG Foreign Minister Genscher and
West Berlin Mayor Momper, among others, had not changed Kohl's position. U.S. assessment, widely
held in many circles, "(was) that Kohl personally understands full well that the Polish-German border
cannot be changed...He is a man facing a close election and is concerned that if he adopts a totally
unambiguous stance, he is going to have some critical votes siphoned off."6 5 Polish sensitivities,
however, were not as concerned with Kohl's "political math" but focussed on the complexion and the
demands of the political right in the FRG.
The success, in early 1989, of the right-wing Republican party which had gained in local
elections the requisite 5 percent vote for admission to the Bundestag, alarmed the Poles, who felt that a
popular, right-wing, anti-Polish groundswell was possible. The gains, primarily in "Protestant nor.hern
Germany and the Protestant regions of predominantly Catholic south Germany, included a substantial
section of the middle class electorate and were particularly strong in economically weak areas.*6 6 This
manifestation seemed to lend credence to early 1980 studies by the SINUS Institute which found the "13
63 "Kohl Meetings Reportage Continues, Visit Ends, Speaks at Warsaw Dinner" in Z. M
10-12 November 1989 as cited in EBI EU-8218, 14 November 1989,52-53.
6 4Ibid.
65Thomas L. Friedman, "West Berlin Mayor Critical of Kohl on Boundary Issue," New York Times,
27 February 1990, A8.
66Stoss, 40.
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percent of the West German electorate had a right-wing extremist picture of the world" and 37 percent of the
population revealed a "potential for authoritarian dispositions."6 7 These studies also concluded that 20 to
30 percent of the population displayed anti-semitic prejudices and 49 percent were "clearly hostile...toward
foreigners."6 8
However, despite indications of widespread anti-democratic attitudes and Polish sensitivities
toward them, right-wing extremism in West Germany has at no time become a mass movement. Right-
wing extremist groups have a long history in post-war Germany but have not been able to gain any large
scale support or sustain any long-term performance.
"The political system in the Federal Republic has shown that it is extremely flexible and integrative,
so that right-wing extremist activities have never posed a serious threat. Even during times of past
economic crisis, the popular concensus has proved itself to be extremely stable."6 9
Yet, even though German fascism is not a serious threat, it is by no means dead. And Poles are
quick to translate right-wing statements or popular attitudes into alarming potentials.
Public opinion polls conducted on November 21, 1989 indicated that 66 percent of FRG citizens
favored the Oder-Neisse border, while 19 percent were opposed. In August of 1989, however, 3 months
before the collapse of the Berlin Wall, a similar poll indicated 50 percent in favor and 35 percent
opposed.7 0 The collapse of the Wall and the hope of reuniting with East Germany may have prompted the
increase in the acceptability of the Oder-Neisse line but the percentages, particularly for Poles, were still
relatively low. The numbers indicated a less than optimistic trend has resulted despite almost 20 years of
normalization. (Polls in 1970 were 58% in favor, 23% opposed.)
Adding fuel to the fire was a growing list of recent revisionist public statements by FRG
political figures. In January, 1990, West Germany's chief constitutional judge, Roman Herzog, claimed
that "the German Reich technically still exists and that pre-war borders must be changed with a peace
6 7 Ibid, 38.
6 81bid.
6 9 1bid, 45.
7 0
"polls Show FRG approval of Odra-Nysa Border" 21 November 1989 on West German ZDF TV as
cited in ,BIS Ei-8-224, 22 November 1989, 52.
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treaty." 7 1 The implication that the Oder-Neisse border was not legally recognized as the Polish frontier
confirmed Polish beliefs that "the whole legal structure of the FRG serves to preserve unification tendencies
and recover all territories of the Third Reich in its 1937 borders." 72
In December of 1989, CDU parliamentary group member and chairman of the Association of
Expelees, Herbert Czaja, bitterly criticized an explicit guarantee on the inviolability of the Polish-German
border made by Federal President, Richard von Weizacker. Czaja claimed Weizacker had no right to
"arrogantly determine the future of Germany and the home of East German expellees."7 3 It was Czaja
who, in July, had published remarks that purported to deny that there was any element of aggression on the
part of the Germans in 1939.
But perhaps the most celebrated revisionist comments were made by FRG Finance Minister and
chairman of the Bavarian CSU, Theo Waigel. Waigel was already disliked in Poland due to his role in what
Poland considered an FRG lack of faith in fulfilling economic promises made under the normalization
process commenced in 1970. Speaking at a Hanover rally "under the slogan 'For Our Silesia'," Waigel
claimed that:
"...the German Reich did not perish with the capitulation of the Wehrmacht on 8 May 1945. There
are no binding legal-international instruments which cut away from the German Reich its eastern
territories...until there is a peace treaty, the German question will remain legally, politically and
historically wide open...the state and public authorities have an obligation to ensure that place names
are as they should be...that is why Danzig is Danzig and not Gdansk, and Breslau is Breslau and not
Wroclaw...- 74
The Polish Press listed the "obvious" conclusion "that we are seeing conscious revisionist activity on the
part of the leading Christian Democrat politicians and members of the FRG government. Waigel is not
some pan-German demagogue on the extreme margins of political life but the political heir of Strauss
7 1Richard E. Smith, "Judge's Reich Remark Fuels Borders Debate," International Herald Tribune, 3
January 1990, 1.
7 2 Michal Kolodziejczyk, "The Return of the Dirty German" in Slowo Powszechne ,13 July 1989 as
cited in S EEUI-1ji, 2' Ju"ly 1989, 28.
7 3
"Discussion Continues on Oder-Neisse Line" The Week in Germany published by the German
Information Center, 5 January 1990, 1.
7 4
"Anti-Polish Revisionism in FRG Noted" in IykwlaJ.udu 6 July 1989 as cited in FIiEUfi9
13,13 July 1989, 45.
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and...Federal Minister of Finance."75  Waigel's comments were among several responsible for the
postponement of Kohrs planned visit to Warsaw in September of 1989, dashing hopes for a symbolic
reconciliation on the 50th anniversary of World War Two's outbreak.
For many Poles these developments suggested that revisionism had the potential for a popular
movement. In this light, Kohl's reluctance to provide border guarantees went beyond "political math" and
appeared to be an attempt to keep the lid on a situation that could develop into a popular front seeking to
reclaim the eastern territories. Economic displacement caused by the integration of East Germany into the
West German system, it had been argued, may provide the catalyst for a renewed campaign to reclaim the
valuable eastern territories. This may be especially true in East Germany, where Communist rule
ascertained that West Germany was responsible for the Second World War, and consequently, anti-Nazi
socialization was not as predominant. Mainstream Polish fears, however, envisioned, not a nightmare
scenario of German economic displacement and political turmoil leading to a Bundeswehr occupation of
Poland, but rather, a rational, aggressive and legal approach by a strong unified Germany, utilizing its
considerable political clout, and conducted at a Yalta-like conference without Polish participation.
Nonetheless, as many Poles evaluated their increasing isolation, legally, economically and politically,
historical memory enabled many to conjure up any number of nightmare scenarios.
F. A SHADOW CROSSED?
By March, 1990, however, public opinion in the FRG and the GDR suggested that, with a strong
stance on cultural and social demands concerning the German minority in Poland, an explicit border
guarantee for Poland could be politically acceptable in Germany. German officials indicated that "Mr. Kohl
is considering issuing a joint declaration with East German leaders promising that a future unified state
would respect East Germany's current border with Poland."76 This declaration was expected to be issued
shortly after the March 18th East German elections. Such a declaration, it was thought, would ease the
Polish tensions, open up the tenuous normalization process between the two nations and vault a major
stumbling block to German reunification and future European integration. Poland, for its part, would be
required to reciprocate with renewed efforts to determine the size of its German minority and address German
75Ibid.
7 6Walter Mossberg, "German Unification Expected to Occur Within Three Months of March 18
Election," Wall Street Journal, 28 February 1990, A14.
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demands for cultural, place-name and war grave concessions. On March 6, 1990, Chancellor Kohl's Cabinet
"announced a proposal under which the West German and East German parliaments would adopt identical
resolutions renouncing any territorial claims to Poland and would direct a future unified Germany to put a
'final seal' on the issue."7 7 Polish Prime Minister Mazowiecki claimed the decision was "undoubtedly
concordant with our expectations," but the Poles were still cautious and determined to obtain both a final
resolution prior to further reunification steps and a Polish seat in the reunification process.
As the opening of the two-plus-four talks neared, Poland accelerated its diplomatic effort in order to
protect its interests and escape the specter of another Yalta. Poland persisted with its demand that a place
for Poland be included in the talks. Additionally, the Polish government lobbied for a treaty guaranteeing
the Oder-Neisse border to be signed by both German states prior to reunification. "This position was
repeated several times in a series of formal statements and an extensive diplomatic campaign by the Warsaw
government to explain the demands, including visits by President Wojciech Jaruzelski and (Prime Minister)
Mazowiecki to Paris and Mazowiecki to the United States in March. The campaign was successful: in n-d-
March the participants in the two-plus-four process agreed to invite Poland to discussions dealing with the
issue of its western border."7 8
By the third week of June the two Germanys were endorsing a plan for rapid economic union and
responded to Polish concerns by linking the economic plan with a resolution pledging to conclude a treaty
establishing the Oder-Neisse line as the permanent Polish-German border. "In separate votes in Bonn and
East Berlin, both German legislatures...went on record with identical pledges to meet Poland's demand for a
treaty guaranteeing its western border..." 79 Furthermore, Chancellor Kohl abandoned his previously
ambiguous stance by declaring that, "Poland's border with Germany is final." "At no time," he declared
before the Bundestag, "either today or in the future, will it be questioned through territorial claims on the
part of us Germans. After Germany has been unified, this will be reaffirmed in binding form under
7 7 Serge Schmemann, "Bonn Cabinet Acts to Reassure Poles on Border Policy," New York Times, 7
March 1990, Al.
7 8 jan B. de Weydenthal, "Settling the Oder-Neisse Issue" Radio Free Euroe Report on Eastern
Ell= 1, no. 33 (3 August 1990): 47.
7 9 Edward Cody, "Germanys Ratify Pact for Economic Union, Offer Poles Assurance," The
Washng= Post, 22 June 1990, A30.
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international law by means of a treaty with the Republic of Poland."8 0 Despite these assurances, however,
both German legislatures agreed that only a united Germany could negotiate such a treaty. The Polish
government though encouraged by this "step forward" nonetheless remained adamant, insisting that only a
legally binding treaty would ameliorate Polish security concerns vis-a-vis Germany.
Polands aggressive diplomacy in regard to the border issue reflected the deep concern and fear that
German reunification brings to Polish foreign policy. This is true despite the fact that throughout Europe
the Polish-German border was never questioned. Even within West Germany popular attitudes concerning
the permanence of the Oder-Neisse border had become increasingly favorable. A March 1990 poll sponsored
by the FDFs Friedrich-Nanmann-Foundation, found that 77 percent of the West German electorate was in
favor of finalizing the Oder-Neisse border with only 16 percent opposed. Similarly, the West German
Bundestag and East German Volkshammer delegates reflected the growing popular concensus in passing the
June 21st border resolution with only fifteen and six dissenting votes respectively. Still, Poland persisted.
Polish demands, often perceived as excessive by Western governments who questioned any serious German
interest in Poland's western territory, had nonetheless increased the pressure on Bonn to remove any
ambiguity concerning the border issue and at the same time had compelled the Germans to remove any
conditions for a border guarantee including Poland's abandonment of war reparations for Polish victims of
Nazi crimes and the requirement for Polish cultural concessions for the German minority in Poland. One of
the most stringent of Poland's demands was advanced just days before the Paris session of the two-plus-four
talks. Poland requested that "the four powers preserve their rights in Germany even after unification until
the border treaty had been ratified."8 1 This suggestion found little support from the four powers and
angered many West Germans who charged the Poles with attempting to block or delay German
reunification. Poland quickly modified its position and did not repeat the demand nor advance any new ones.
Additionally, Poland rescinded demands dealing with other issues of bilateral relations in an apparent
attempt to withdraw from an overstated position and secure the true objective-the border agreernenL
On July 17 Poland's diplomatic strategy paid off. In Paris that day, the four-plus-two deliberations
"produced an international assurance that a unified German state would sign an agreement with Poland 'as
0nid.
8 1de Weydenthal, "Settling the Oder-Neisse Issue," 48.
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soon as possible after unification' had been completed." 82 Endorsed by the United Kingdom, France, the
Soviet Union and the United States, as well as the two German states, this assurance carries an international
seal that transcends the ambiguity provided by the individual German resolutions. But if the Polish
government had any further reason to doubt German intentions this was ameliorated by additional pledges at
the Paris conference which were also endorsed by the four powers. These included assurances from both
East and West Germany that a unified Germany "would have no territorial ambitions toward any other
country, that after unification a provision allowing parts of Germany to join the nation as a whole would be
eliminated from the German constitution, and that German laws declaring the border with Poland to be
provisional pending a formal peace treaty would no longer be considemd valid."83
July seventeenth, stated Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, "will go down in history as the
day on which the Polish border was settled to the satisfaction of our Polish friends." 84 Polish Foreign
Minister Skubiszewski agreed, stating that after months of tense concern he was "entirely satisfied with the
results." "The border," he proclaimed, "has been confirmed."85
Seven weeks later, on September 12, 1990, the German Question was officially settled when, in
Moscow, the six member nations of the four-plus-two negotiations signed into being the historic "Treaty
on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany." Though the four occupying powers relinquished
control over Germany, this long awaited "peace treaty" carried a number of provisions which set the Poles
at ease. The two German nations agreed, among other things, to reduce the size of a unified German army
to 375,000 men within three to four years, to prohibit German acquisition of nuclear, chemical or
biological weapons, and to stipulate as soon as possible after unification that "the definitive (German)
borders will consist of what are now the areas of West and East Germany and nothing more..."8 6
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G. CONCLUSION: GERMANY'S INFLUENCE ON POLISH POLICY
Polish-German animosity and the Oder-Neisse border issue have both transcended and outlived Soviet
hegemony in Eastern Europe. It would be a mistake, therefore, to associate the pace of change resulting
from the collapse of communism with the pace of Polish-German reconciliation. The historical wounds are
too deep and filled with emotion. Official and final recognition of the Oder-Neisse border, however, offers
both Poles and Germans the opportunity to escape the burden of history. Normalization and economic
cooperation may now move forward in an environment of developing ist. This is a crucial development
which can lay the foundation for an eventual reconciliation which in turn may provide operational credence
to the rhetoric of European integration. Economic and political cooperation, together with education, youth
and time may eventually be able to forge the EC or the CSCE process into an effective European
integration where borders, despite their definitive political nature, are, nonetheless, economically, socially
and culturally permeable.
But it would also be a mistake to believe that Poland is taking the border resolution as an indication
that any grand design for such a European peace is ready to be effected. Czech President Vaclav Havel has
proposed phasing out both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, calling them "vestiges of the old confrontation."
"We need," claimed Mr. Havel's foreign minister, "a new security structure, based on the CSCE , embracing
everybody in Europe, and the United States."8 7 In a list of "mutual concerns" presented by Havel at a
summit meeting of East European nations in Bratislava, no mention of the Soviet Union or Germany was
made. Polish Foreign Minister Skubiszewski claimed, "I have no obsession with Germany," but the
omission of this consideration in any design for developing a new European security order had clearly left
him dismayed. 88 For the Polish leadership the fact remains that, unlike other less strategic countries in
Eastern Europe, Poland cannot "toss around grand designs for universal peace." For Poles there remains the
feeling that "in post-communist Europe they...remain caught in their custom-made cage."89
8 7 Walter S. Mossberg, "Concept of a 'European Peace Order Challenges U.S. Efforts to Retain
NATO," Wall Street Journal, 12 March 1990, A6.
8 8 Barry Newman, "Poland's Diplomats Navigating Obstacle Course Between Uniting Germany,
Splintering U.S.S.R.," Wall Street Journal, 13 June 1990, All.
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Therefore, despite the historic advance in Polish-German relations signaled by the resolution of the
Oder-Neisse border, Poland views the creation of a new European security order as a more distant prospect,
one that is truly in Poland's best interests but one that will require vigilance, stability, reform and time to
achieve. In this context the potential dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and NATO is viewed as an increasing
vacuum that only contributes to instability. Furthermore, though Polish-German relations are clearly
promising, Germany nonetheless presents a formidable security and foreign policy issue.
The complexion of Poland's emerging foreign policy reflects a number of increasingly influential
positions that will undoubtedly impact the evolution of European security. Frst, the development of trust
that is so vital to the design of European economic or political integration has found a major champion in
the border resolution. As a litmus test the Oder-Neisse agreement may pave the way for the rational and
peaceful resolution of other European territorial issues. But undoubtedly the developing trust between
Poland and Germany represents a significant step in itself both for overcoming national and historical
animosities and, in bridging NATO/Warsaw Pact political polarization. In the end, Polish-German
cooperation and trust may prove as vital to the eventual integration of Europe as Franco-German
coopetion has to the success of NATO. It is Poland's intention, therefore, to encourage and facilitate this
crucial development.
Secondly, though the greatly improved Polish-German relationship is a welcome development in
Warsaw, Polish foreign policy design is still very much concerned with what may become a dominant
German influence in European issues. Economic inf"uence is a major concern. Poland's interest, according
to Skubiszewski, is to end Europe's split "into the poor and schizophrenic East and the rich and rational
West."9 0 Poland is attempting to build a functioning market economy out of the ruins of a communist
command system to effect a reduction in this split but it is also concerned that German economic influence,
both in Poland and in Europe, must not become a hegemonic factor. To this end Poland has sought to
monitor and control German investment in Poland, particularly the Western territories, despite the
temptation to absorb as much investment as possible as a panacea for their economic woes. To offset a
potential disproportionate amount of German influence the Poles have sought investment from a wide
variety of sources including fellow CMEA members (including the Soviet Union), Western European
nations, the United States, Canada and Mexico, and countries from the Middle East arid the Far East
9 0 4bid.
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In a similar fashion, the Polish leadership is engaging in concerted efforts to enhance Poland's
eventual integration into the European Community. Domestic economic reforms in line with EC and
World Bank requirements have greatly enhanced Poland's position. Additionally, Poland has sought to
introduce wide reforms within CMEA. which will be addressed later, in an attempt to create a forum of
economic opportunity for the newly reformed East European economies and to act as a staging ground for
the eventual integration of Poland and other Central European countries into the EC. Behind this design is
a developing Polish influence determined to ensure that the economic integration with the EC and the
subsequent nature and policies of that organization remain an open, integrative force and not one that
becomes a "fortress Europe" subject to the possible domination of a German economic behemoth. The
purpose of Polish designs is, as Skubiszewski stated, "to aid the construction of a common Europe rather
than the hegemony of the one superpower."
Thirdly, on the political spectrum as well Poland remains concerned about Germany's potential clout
and this concern has already had a decided influence. Until this last year post-war Polish security has come
exclusively from the East and though the alternatives to this arrangement are unclear Poland nonetheless
forged a new and brave stand when it opposed Soviet desires for a neutral Germany in March of this year.
Soviet President Gorbachev initially wanted the Pact to oppose the West's demand that a unified Germany
join NATO. Following Poland's lead however, the Pact spoke out for NATO forces in Germany. "From a
historical perspective (the) idea of neutrality is not a durable solution for a large state in the heart of
Europe," claimed Skubiszewski. "How can the status of neutrality be preserved if this German state, a great
economic power, one day opts for an active or expansionist policy? It is dangerous if Germany goes it
alone."9 1
"For the first time the Soviet Union was isolated within its own alliance."9 2 Gorbachev was
compelled to acquiesce. By the time the two-plus-four negotiations were underway, Chancellor Kohl
and Soviet President Gorbachev had worked out a compromise solution for an eventual withdrawal of
Soviet forces from East Germany and an acceptable methodology for a united Germany's membership
in NATO. Under terms specified in the "Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany"
Soviet troops in East Germany will remain until 1994 and "until Soviet troops withdraw in 1994,
the army of the united Germany will not be allowed to station in the area of Eastern Germany any
troops that are also integrated into the NATO military structure, or NATO troops from other
9 1
"Skubiszewski on European Security Policy" in Euwa&chix 25 March 1990 as cited in FBI-
9011. 15 June 1990,9.
92Newman, Al 1.
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countries. After the Soviets pull ouL.., German troops that are part of NATO can be assigned in the
area of East Germany but without nuclear weapons carriers..."93
Poland's design to "check" a unified Germany by supporting its inclusion in NATO had helped
determine the course of European events. Neutrality for Germany had been avoided as had other Soviet
proposals. The Soviet Union had proposed a scheme, for example, "whereby Germany would be a member
of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact until these were dissolved in an all-European security system in five to
seven years."9 4 "Besides being a diplomatic first," as Henry Kissinger pointed out, this arrangement
"would be a complex equivalent for neutrality." In this sense, as the Poles were keenly aware, this would
only have promoted instability and it is stability during these dynamic times that Poles desire most.
In response to the unification of Germany and the need for stability in Europe, and of great import to
future developments in Europe, Polish foreign policy has signed onto both the continuation of a strong
U.S. role in Europe and the maintenance of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. To this end and despite
Western eulogies declaring the Pact's demise, Poland has undertaken a major restructuring of the Warsaw
Pact, to fundamentally restrict Soviet domination and create a consultative alliance. In supporting NATO's
role in Europe and in maintaining the Warsaw Pact the Poles have tried to establish both a rationale and a
working relationship for both alliances in an attempt to maintain a stable European security balance during
the revolutionary social, economic and political changes that are underway.
Finally, Polish foreign policy is dedicated to maintaining Germany fully in the West. Poland is
concerned as are other European nations, most notably France, "that Germany might follow an increasingly
independent course in its relations with the Soviet Union, or even agree to a German-Russian entente or
condominium based on Russian military power and German economic strength and technical expertise."9 5
Such a potential, with all its negative implications for less powerful European nations such as Poland, has
traditionally been a grave concern whenever Germany and the Soviet Union have made overtures toward each
other. This has been true in the past and it was true in July of 1990 when, prior to the commencement of
the two-plus-four reunification talks, Kohl and Gorbachev directly negotiated an agreement on German
membership in NATO. Though Germany's continued membership in NATO coincides with Polish desires
9 3 Friedman, "Four Allies Give Up Rights in Germany," Al.
9 4 Henry Kissinger, "The All-European Security System," The Baltimore Sun, 16 April 1990,15A.
95 David S. Yost "France in the New Europe" Freign.Affair 69, no. 5 (Winter 1990/91): 114.
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and interests, the cordial and independent German-Soviet cooperation underscored Poland's troubling
vulnerability. This is heightened by rapidly expanding German aid and investment in the Soviet Union.
Together these developments suggest to some in Poland that German-Soviet cooperation, given certain
future political and economic choices, may be poised to neglect, isolate or even control Poland's future in
Europe.
Poland's foreign policy aims to avoid the realization of such a scenario by cultivating improved
Polish-German relations including enhanced economic cooperation designed to improve Poland's economic
prospects and to maintain the EC focus on an open and integrative process. Additionally, Warsaw intends
to support continued German membership in NATO and a strong U.S. commitment to Europe as a hedge
against the instability of resurgent nationalism, hegemonic aspirations or explosive disintegration in the
Soviet Union or Central Europe.
For the Polish leadership, as for many others, it is not clear that an all-European security system is a
complement to NATO or the Warsaw Pact. In many respects they are mutually exclusive. Furthermore.
collective security systems have never worked and, though there is a great deal of optimism in Europe
toward creating such a system, it appears to be a distant prospect. Therefore, the abandonment of the
current security order in favor of an uncertain and ambiguous "common European home" is a disconcerting
concept for Polish policy makers familiar with central European history. Germany's role in that history has
created lingering shadows that continue to influence Polish foreign policy initiatives despite the
considerable light cast by the resolution of the Oder-Neisse border.
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II. THE SOVIET SHADOW: POLISH-SOVIET RELATIONS
A. A WESTWARD EXODUS?
"One way to think of Poland," wrote Michael Mandelbaum, "is as the victim of a kidnapping, a
Western nation seized and held captive by an alien force from the EasL"9 6 It is a country that has been
"wrenched out of its natual historical course;" one that has seen its traditional quest for independence,
democracy and liberalism eradicated at the hands of the Soviets. The history of postwar Poland is a history
of a people struggling "to live freely in a country that is not free."9 7
The election of Poland's "roundtable" government in the summer of 1989 and the subsequent
withdrawal of Soviet hegemony from Poland the following autumn represent the dramatic culmination of
that historic struggle for freedom. As a result of these events, the long-suffering Poles have found that
Poland's political and economic decision-making are now increasingly a matter strictly for Poles. But if
Poland is no longer a captive of "an alien force from the East" it is nonetheless still a captive of its
geostrategic cage. The Soviet Union remains a geopolitical reality that can not be ignored and it also
remains both a necessary and potentially profitable source of trade opportunities for the Poles. It is
interesting to note, however, that given the Soviet record of political repression and economic exploitation,
and a series of blank spots in Soviet-Polish history, Polish relations with the Soviets may prove to be
inversely proportional to improving relations with Germany.
1. The Attraction of Western Integration
The integrative pull of Western institutions combined with Poland's widespread cultural disdain
for all things Soviet and the improving situation vis-a-vis Germany seem to suggest that Poland, like many
other East European nations, might be tempted to turn its back on its former captor. The West displays the
models for both liberal democratic political systems as well as successful and prosperous free market
economies, both of which are desired post-Soviet commodities. Most importantly, the West possesses the
technical means, the operational knowledge and the economic resources that are proving so critical to
96Michael Mandelbaum, "Poland Between East and West," SoicU 25, no. 4 (May-June 1988): 10.
9 7 1bid., 11.
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rebuilding Eastern European economies. Poland, like many East European nations, has requested and is
working toward full membership in such Western institutions as the General Agreement on Trade and
Tariffs (GATT), the Council of Europe and the European Community (EC). Poland's economic
restructuring has already proceeded according to guidelines established for eligibility for International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank assistance. Additionally, President Jaruzelski and Prime Minister
Mazoweicki have vigorously sought economic assistance from most Western nations including France,
West Germany and the United States.
Even before the dramatic events of last year, Soviet-controlled Poland had substantial economic
ties with the West. Estimates are that Poland owes western creditors $40 billion stemming from loans
granted over the past decade with about 75 percent of this debt owed to the governments of the Paris Club
lender association and about 25 percent owed to private banks of the Club of London.98 The servicing of
this debt is clearly a major problem for the new Polish government but subsequent western assistance, most
prominently West German and French, has consistently provided for negotiated rescheduling of this large
servicing burden on extremely favorable terms, including at times outright cancellation of a limited amount
of interest payments.
Additional western assistance was obtained through the services of Harvard's Jeffrey Sachs and a
team of western economists who were called upon to introduce broad economic reforms designed to assist
Poland's transition to a market economy. The resulting shock treatment tactics have managed to stabilize
the Polish inflation rate and, though producing the expected degree of social stress, have significantly
moved Poland toward an economic transformation. Additionally, by engaging in such reform tactics, the
Poles now qualify for emergency development and general economic stability funds from the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) which has subsequently floated Poland a $360
million low-interest loan to aid in their economic restruturing. The IMF has also created a $723 million
stabilization fund which will gave the Polish authorities the liquidity necessary to defend the zloty on their
crucial drive for currency convertibility. More recently a treaty signed in Paris on May 29, 1990 established
the "European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, a $12 billion institution that will provide aid to
9 Richard D. Bartel, "Interview with Jeffrey Sachs: Charting Poland's Economic Rebirth," ChallengC,
33, no. 1 (January-February 1990): 23.
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help revive Eastern Europe's economy." 9 9 Of the 40 signatory nations, the European Community and
NATO countries are the dominant shareholders, giving the assistance program a decidedly Western
integrative leverage. Additionally, economic arrangements such as the U.S. Support for East European
Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989 and the reinstatement of "most favored nation" status for Poland have been
forthcoming from many western governments, most significantly from West Germany, which stands as a
key and fully cooperative source of economic assistance for the Poles.
These developments come as little surprise to the Soviets who are lobbying to receive similar
economic and technological assistance. But this economic leverage offers the West perhaps its best strategy
for East European integration as well as for inducing further behavioral and structural changes in the Soviet
Union. Economic assistance can be employed to more fully integrate Eastern Europe and check Soviet
designs fr increased influence without undermining Gorbachev and perestroika.
2. The Bankruptcy of the Soviet Model
Aiding the process of Eastern Europe's movement West is the fact that the Soviets have little to
offer. Beyond energy subsidies and arms production, both of which as will be shown are losing their
importance, the Soviet Union's malformed economy offers little hope for improving Eastern Europe's own
economic problems. In Poland in particular the Soviet Union and the Polish Communist Party had
exhibited a persistent inability to deliver economic growth or an adequate social existence for the Poles and
it was this failure that contributed to their historic inability to gain legitimacy for political or economic
policies.
Even joint enterprises undertaken in the spirit of glasnost and perestroika as part of a 1986
Polish-Soviet treaty failed to materialize. Only one out of eleven planned enterprises, a joint chemical
plant in Cracow, has been constructed and even this is facing substantial production problems. By the end
of 1988 both Poland and the Soviet Union "gradually started to withdraw from the agreement on the
grounds that the joint enterprise projects "lack prospects." 100 An increased emphasis on economic rather
than political criteria is now the guiding principle in economic decision making in Poland and "in this
9 9 Steven Greenhouse, "A New Bank Plans East European Aid," New York Times, 30 May 1990,
A8.
100Roman Stefanowski, "Little Interest in Polish-Soviet Joint Enterprises," Radio Free Europ
Resach 13, no. 23 (June 10, 1988): 9.
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context it is interesting to note Poland's decreasing importance in Soviet trade." "After years of being
second (after the GDR), Poland has now dropped behind the GDR, Czechoslovakia. and Bulgaria to become
the USSR's fourth most important trading parmner." 10 1 As Western economic aid moves into Poland in an
effort to promote free market capitalism, the Westward trend will most likel:, continue, pulling Poland
further out of the sphere of Soviet influence.
Polish movement toward the West, however, is not merely a result of economic factors pulling
in that direction but fundamentally stems from the push of Soviet repression and exploitation set against
the background of anti-Russian sentiments which predate the Russian Revolution. Until the events of this
past year Poland had been forced to endure a political "dictatorship wholly subservient to the Soviet Union,
reliant on terror and the ever-present threat of Soviet military intervention for its survival , and determined
to reconstruct Polish society in accordance with a model few in Poland found congenial." 10 2 Few have
found the model congenial because in every aspect of life, Soviet control in Poland has represented a
tremendous and tragic opportunity cost. Soviet control had contributed to the near destruction of Poland's
historic democratic ideals. Political repression, terror and intimidation were to rule instead. Economic
entrepreneurship and productivity had been crushed only to be replaced by systemic inefficiency, waste,
inactivity and pollution. Over forty years of abstract communist propaganda and party "double-speak"
designed to "distort or conceal the truth" has "permanently warped (the) ability (of the Polish bureaucracy)
to think for themselves." I 3 The tragedy of existence in Communist Poland had transformed a vibrant and
energetic people into a schizophrenic society consumed at times it seemed by apathy, alcoholism and
cynicism or alternately moved to humor, hope and heroism.
Lech Walesa expressed the popular Polish mood concerning Soviet influence and the
achievements of socialism when he stated; "They say they did a lot, but the world also did not stand still.
The world accomplished things. We, too, would surely have accomplished more, for the world
10 11bid., 10.
102Teresa Toranska, Them: Stalin's Polish Puppers (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1987),9.
10 3 1bid., 7.
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accomplished a great deal. So let them not try to explain that they did a loL They did nothing, they cooked
up this horrible fate for our society at the end of the 20th century. More or worse cannot be said." 10 4
B. COOKING UP POLAND'S FATE
In 1944, as the Red Army rolled toward Berlin, the Soviets became liberators of the Polish nation,
just five years after Stalin had declared the non-existence of Poland as justification for his own invasion.
By January 17, 1947, Stalin had completed a remarkable coup that had been engineered through eight years
of political and military maneuvering and ended with the fraudulent elections which formally ushered in
Communist domination of Poland. Polish cultural predilections--long steeped in anti-Russian tradition--
would continually resist this domination only to be crushed by effective communist control. This was the
case in 1956, 1970, and 1981 when Polish resistance and demands for political and economic reform were
met with the threat of Soviet military intervention. In each situation, Polish authorities--Gomulka, Gierek
and Jaruzelski respectively--were able to diffuse the situation enough to maintain tenuous stability, but each
case spotlighted the underlying cost of Soviet domination; political repression and chronic economic
depression. For these reasons, Soviet domination and the Polish Communist Party are widely held as
villainous and alien bodies.
1. The Blank Spots
But for the Poles perhaps the most morally repugnant Soviet malfeasance surrounds the
historical "blank spots" that exist in the official historical accounts of specific incidents in Polish-Soviet
relations. "Blank spots" is a non-inflammatory euphemism for numerous Stalinist crimes committed
against the Polish population. For over fifty years the Poles hav zuused to let these issues rest despite
Soviet control of historical interpretations and judgement and the outright prohibition on mentioning
certain issues.
In April of 1987, bowing to increasing public pressure to set the record straight, Gorbachev and
Jaruzelski signed a declaration which commissioned a joint Soviet-Polish study of these blank spots in
order to clear the record and end traditional hostilities. After some debate as to what issues constituted
"blank spots", the commission listed the agenda items as follows: 1) the dissolution (deportation and
execution) of the Polish Communist Party in 1938; 2) the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 and its secret protocol;
10 4 Louisa Vinton, "The Politics of Property: Divesting the Communist Party of it Assets," Radio
E o Rep ort on Eastern EuroMe 1, no. 17 (27 April 1990): 25.
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3) the deportation and repatriation of Poles in 1939; 4) the Soviet delay in assisting the Warsaw uprising of
1944 and; 5) the massacre of 4,000 Polish officers in the Katyn forest and the disappearance of 10.000
others from the prison camps in Kozelsk, Starobelsk and Ostashkov.
These issues constitute deeply emotional issues for Poles struggling to set their historical record
straight and dissolve Soviet control over the truth. The Katyn forest, until 1987 a forbidden topic,
commemorated by clandestine plots of grass in Warsaw cemeteries, has become a national shrine. But the
truth behind this massacre, as well as the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the delay outside Warsaw in 1944, threatened
to undermine whatever foothold of legitimacy that the Soviets held in Poland.
The Poles had contended that the way to set the record straight was to allow scholars access to
the archives but Soviet sensitivity on these issues led to the creation of a commission of loyal party
members (most of the Soviet members were from the Marxism-Leninism Institute or the Soviet Academy
of Sciences.) In the end, the Soviets maintained their stance that the Munich agreement and the general
direction of foreign affairs in 1938-39 were isolating the Soviet Union and they were therefore compelled to
reach an agreement with the Nazis. The secret protocol partitioning Poland has only recently been
acknowledged. Though it was subsequently declared null and void, the implications and historical results,
for Poland and the Baltic states, were not at issue. The delay outside Warsaw during the Polish uprising
against the Nazis in 1944, generally seen by Poles as a tactic to attrite the inhabitants and ensure Soviet
control in Poland, was recognized by the commission as a logistics problem, merely an army that had
outrun its ammunition and fuel supplies. And initially, the Katyn forest massacre, despite insurmountable
evidence to the contrary, was acknowledged to be a Nazi act; another attempt by the Nazis to discredit the
Soviet Union. For three years the commission clung to the Party line explanation of this event despite
voluminous documentation and widespread public opinion that placed the blame on Soviet excesses.
Slowly, the commission began to "discover" the truth.
Finally, on April 12, 1990, after 50 years of prohibiting any discussion of the Katyn forest, the
Soviet Union admitted responsibility for the massacre that took place there. For Poles, this admission was
an emotional hurdle that seemed to suggest that the dead could lie more peacefully now that the truth was
known to the world. But for many Poles it may be an admission of an unforgivable crime that comes
much too late to repair any damage.
The Katyn forest issue had festered for years as a major obstacle to improved Polish-Soviet
relations. "Many Poles will never forgive the Germans for what they did to their country, and yet they
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reserve most of their bitterness for the Russians, the people who finally liberated them."1 0 5 Germany had
been defeated and divided. German war criminals had been executed and Germany had lost some of its
former territory. But the Soviet crimes had gone unpunished and Poles were not even permitted to openly
mourn their dead. Both the Poles and the Soviet knew that if Polish-Soviet relations were ever to be
repaired, the Katyn massacre would have to be addressed to the satisfaction of the Poles. This was the
rationale behind the Soviet admission of April 12th. What has followed is a macabre and tragic paradox. In
an attempt to improve relations with Poland, the Soviet Union is uncovering the fate of an additional
10,000 Polish officers whose bodies have remained unaccounted for almost fifty years. Following the
Soviet admission of responsibility for the Katyn massacre, two more mass graves were discovered in the
Soviet Union.
On June 14, 1990 both the Moscow News and Gazeta Wyborcza reported that a regional KGB
officer from Kharkov in central Ukraine had discovered a mass grave believed to contain an undisclosed
number of illegally executed Polish officers. This site was found to contain a number of artifacts
identifying the bodies as Polish officers. Additionally, on the following day the Kharkov KGB security
commander General Nikolai Guibadulov provided documentation "revealing that in April and May 1940
Polish officers had been transferred from a prisoner-of-war camp in Starobielsk to the NKVD prison in
Kharkov." 10 6 Days later KGB authorities in Kiev handed the Polish consulate in Kiev a list of 4,031
Polish officers who had been imprisoned in Starobielsk. Though the exact number of Polish bodies in this
gravesite is not yet clear, Ukranian authorities have already indicated that several other sites exist.
On June 19, 1990 while the developments in Kharkov were unraveling, the existence of a second
newly discovered grave was revealed to the Polish embassy in Moscow. By July 6 the Soviets confirmed
that some of the bodies found in a mass grave in Mednoye, near Kalinin, 170 Kilometers northwest of
Moscow, "might have been those of Polish officers held in a prisoner-of-war camp at Ostaszkow." 10 7 It
was also revealed, in decidedly Orwellian fashion, that both the Mednoye and Kharkov sites, are presently
KGB recreation areas.
10 5Steven, 137.
10 6 Karen Lemiski and Jan B. de Weydenthal, "Soviet Officials Identify Probable Grave Sites of
Polish Officers," Radio Free Europe Reort on Eastern Europe 1, no. 32 (10 August 1990): 28.
1071bid.
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The complete story of this tragic episode may never be fully or satisfactorily explained. The
bulk of the documentation, claims KGB authorities, has long since been destroyed. But the revelations
have compelled the Polish government to speak of good will on the part of the Soviets. How far this will
go in repairing Polish-Soviet relations remains to be seen, it is undoubtedly, however, a decidedly positive
development.
2. Economic Exploitation and Political Repression
However, improved Polish-Soviet relations are not solely dependent on the resolution of
historical blank spots. Though a Soviet military presence had maintained a certain utility pending the final
resolution of the Oder-Neisse border and even though the Soviets had championed the Polish cause for a seat
in the German reunification proceedings, anti-Soviet cultural predilections in Poland are as strong as they
ever have been.
This is true because of the legacy left by the historic inability of the communists to provide a
decent wage or standard of living for Polish workers. This chronic economic failure had in turn led to the
manifestation of political repression that served to highlight the brutal and cynical exploitation of Polish
sovereignty and self-respect. On June 28, 1956 workers from the Stalin Metal Plant of Poznan engaged in
a peaceful march demanding improvements in the domestic economy. Confronted by security forces backed
up by tanks, the demonstration quickly turned to violence. In the end over fifty people were killed and more
than two hundred were injured. But for Poles, long accustomed to struggling for their freedom, this was not
the end of rebellion but rather the beginning of a cyclical pattern of economic hardship, public
demonstration and political repression that would repeat itself in 1970 and 1981 and come to be the
hallmark of fraternal union with the Soviet Union.
While there was a multiplicity of reasons for the revolutionary changes that swept through
Eastern Europe, not the least of which was Polish resistance, clearly a major catalyst to both of these
manifestations, was the historical and persistent inability of the communist government to deliver either
economic growth or an adequate social existence for the people. This legacy stems most assuredly,
however, from political decisions made in Moscow and implemented through the decision making and
structural processes set up in the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance.
Throughout the years of Soviet economic control the Poles were systematically robbed of
fertilizer and food supplies to the detriment of Polish agriculture and food market product availability. High
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grade Silesian coal was shipped to the Soviet Union in return for less efficient and highly pollutant brown
coal from the Soviet Union. Polish products demanded by the Soviets were usually technological products
such as naval vessels and equipment, high-voltage electrical equipment and transformer stations. In order to
manufacture these commodities Poland had to import advanced technologies from the West and pay for them
in hard currency, usually obtained through Western loans. In return, the Poles were paid in "transfer
rubles," non-convertible funds that carried all the value of monopoly money. There is no shorter route to
bankruptcy. In these ways, "Poland directly...had been subsidizing the ramshackle Soviet economy" and
Polish historical memory was provided with another chapter that punctuates anti-Russian predilections with
a contemporary record of ruinous economic exploitation. 108
The important underlying cause of Poland's chronic economic malaise was the "tremendous
economic distortions caused by an entrenched Polish military-industrial program responsive primarily to
Soviet needs. In addition to the direct economic costs of military spending, the indirect costs in terms of
skewed priorities and obstacles to economic reform have been very greaL" 1 09 It was Poland's heavy
military burden coupled with the uneconomic buildup of a large heavy industrial sector operating with
obsolete technology that sabotaged the overall performance of Poland's economy. Additionally, other
CMEA member country's economies were developed along similar military-industrial capacities in such a
way as to compete with one another. This in turn hampered both CMEA cooperation and the establishment
of efficient economies of scale. Furthermore, many industrial enterprises and particularly the arms factories
were "deliberately designed with sufficient spare capacity to increase production five to seven-fold during a
mobilization period." As a result arms factories, for example, operated at only 50 to 70 percent of capacity;
an underutilization which greatly increased unit production costs."1 10 All of this was further distorted by
an artificial system of cost calculations for input factors and military-irdustrial development. For example,
military unit costs were "lowered" by reducing the input price of steel which was itself produced at an
artificially lower price through coal, oil, gas and electricity subsidies used in its production. This in turn
10 8 Steven, 145.




has made industry valuations difficult and has therefore proved dysfunctional for accurate cost accointing and
investment stimulation.
The truly dysfunctional element of these costs however had been that this situation established a
malignant dependence that had allowed the Soviet Union to exploit a monopolistic position and deepen
Poland's economic abyss. This monopolistic position had allowed the Soviets successfully to exploit and
direct Poland's economic activity. The Soviets had done this by "raising armament prices, dictating the
timetable and selection of delivered materials and forcing (Poland) to manufacture those parts and final
products that are economically or technologically inconvenient for the Soviet Union to produce." I I I
According to one Polish source, "the Soviet Union, as the stronger partner (had) the power to force its
clients to accept its view-simply by manipulating the price of machines." I 12 Polish analyst cite instances
"in which the Soviets asked Poland to pay prices ten times higher than those of similar Western
products."1 13
Another ruinous Soviet practice involved Soviet demands for technological standards in Polish
exports-standards the Soviets themselves could not easily achieve or afford. Polish shipbuilding, electrical
equipment manufacturing and telephone industries, in particular, faced with Soviet orders, were compelled to
import Western technologies, paying for them in hard currency usually obtained through private or public
Western loans. In return for their products, the Poles were paid in non-convertible "transfer rubles" that
made servicing these loans near impossible. Poland's problematic Western debt of some US $42 billion is
a direct result of this exploitative policy. This has represented a tremendous burden to the Polish domestic
economy, one that continues to plague Poland today in the form of both direct debt servicing requirements
and staggering opportunity costs that complicate efforts to rebuild the devastated Polish economy.
The Soviet's monopolistic position had been institutionalized over the years into the organs of
the WTO and the CMEA through a deliberate and consciously engineered process which began by derailing
and diverting the Polish post-war economy. Following the conclusion of World War Two, Poland enacted
an extremely successful economic plan which concentrated on moderate industrial development emphasizing




factories producing civilian goods as well as the rejuvenation of Poland's traditionally prolific agricultural
sector. "As a result, the first five post-war years of the Polish economy (1945-49) were a success." "The
worst difficulties of the destroyed country were under control by 1948, and relatively good prospects were
outlined by the very ambitious Six Year Plan (1950-55)."l 1 4 Under this plan Poland produced only small
arms, some artillery and the necessary ammunition as part of a military-industrial investment plan that was
"not to exceed 2 percent of total planned investment."' 1 5
Following the outbreak of the Korean War, however, the Soviet Union actively engaged Polish
leaders to change their course of economic planning and implementation, offering the Soviet version of the
"improved" Six Year Plan. As a result of this plan, by 1952, investment in agriculture decreased by 50
percent. Only 4 percent of all Polish factories continued to manufacture goods for agriculture. Consumer
good production plummeted as well, compelling the Poles to implement "fairly strict controls, including
rationing and a ration-card system."1 16 The Soviet's completed this ruinous program by accelerating the
pace of construction in the Polish arms manufacturing and heavy industry sectors thereby rounding out the
recipe for "cooking up Poland's horrible fate."
As the framework for the CMEA and WTO decision making process matured over the
subsequent years, this ruinous course became institutionalized and the policies of exploitation and blind
industrialization continued unabated up until the political upheaval of 1989. Coordination between the
WTO and the CMEA through such organs as the Military Science and Technology Council, the
Technological Committee, the Military Council and the Military-Industrial Commission, effected Soviet
designs for military-industrial production, distribution and investment, military research and development,
allocation of supplies and productions quotas, the promulgation of delivery timetables, the standardization
of arms equipment and, the assignment of specific equipment production responsibilities. These organs
functioned as high level instruments of management, command and control, and serve to highlight the






But arms and technology were not the exclusive economic links shared by the CMEA countries.
The much vaunted intra-CMEA cooperation extended to trade in consumer and agricultural goods as well.
This situation developed because "the foundation and early evolution of the CMEA was sustained not so
much by fostering wade (as is the case with the EC) but by sheer diversion of trade away from traditional
trading partners." Trade through all economic sector therefore became "an attempt to limit the economic
damage caused by the politically motivated separation from the rest of the world." 117 As a result there is
now within the CMEA a network of "preferential markets for uncompetitive goods through which the
Soviet Union supplies essential energies and materials to loss-making East European heavy industries."1 18
That such a form of integration simply has no future in post-communist Europe is just one of many
problems facing Soviet-Polish trade relations.
Poland has produced jet aircraft, helicopters, naval and merchant ships, tanks, motor vehicles,
armored personnel carriers, and various engineering, communications and radar equipment for the Soviets
and in most cases this production proceeded without due regard for comparative advantage, economic
rationality or Poland's own domestic situation. The direct cost to the Polish economy has been staggering.
Since the 1960s, with the exception of the first half of the 1970s, Polish military expenditures outpaced
Polish economic growth. During the period 1976-1980, for example, Polish military outlays equalled
Poland's debt to the West-about US $22 billion. "This trend continued without regard for Poland's
deteriorating economic situation. In 1981, defense spending increased about another US $345 million-in a
country with a foreign debt of US $25-26 billion, a totally disorganized domestic market and a high
inflation rate."1 19 Given the reduction in Polish security tensions derived from such developments as
detente, the Helsinki CSCE accords and the conclusion of border treaties with both the GDR (Zgorzelec,
1950) and the FRG (Warsaw, 1970), it was irrational to have pursued such a devastating trend in military-
industrial production. "Only behind-the-scenes pressure from the Warsaw Pact Command or the CMEA
117 Vladimir Sobell, "The Economic Reintegration of Eastern Europe," Radio Liberty Report on the
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Military Industrial Commission," concluded analyst Michael Checinski, "can fully account for this steady
long-term trend."12 0
Another debilitating long-term trend has been the imposition of fatal indirect costs which also
stem brom Poland's military-industrial cooperation with Moscow. Throughout the years of CMEA-directed
economic union the Soviet Union has constructed a military-industrial infrastructure in Eastern Europe
which has institutionalized East European dependence on the Soviet Union. As Polish industry, for
example, was designed to meet Soviet needs it had been structured to accept only specialized Soviet
military-industrial machinery, equipment and supplies. Furthermore, the dependence on Soviet energy is
compounded by a network of specialized railroads, highways, bridges and pipelines, all of which were
constructed on Soviet direction utilizing Polish funds. Many of these projects were economically irrational
due in large part to the fact that their construction was "primarily for military purposes to help avert
potential bottlenecks for Soviet military transport." 12 1 In this sense they added to the direct cost that the
Poles were already paying for the construction of WTO command posts, depots, storage facilities, barracks,
hospitals and material reserves.
3. The Myth of Energy Subsidies and Arms Trading
Poland in particular relies on the Soviet Union primarily for subsidized oil, gas and electricity.
The Soviets, however, have consistently been decreasing these energy transfers to Poland. Subsidized oil
exports to Eastern Europe in general decreased approximately 10 percent in 1982 and this decline continued
through the 1980S.122 The Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe in 1989 is perhaps the culmination of
this trend. One reason for this development is that more and more the Soviets have been compelled to sell
their oil exports at full market prices to Third World and Western nations in order to obtain an increasingly
vital supply of hard currency earnings to assist their own suffering economy. Over sixty percent of Soviet
hard currency earnings currently come from oil exports, increasingly from exported oil initially imported
120 bd.
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from Middle East and Persian Gulf states in return for arms bansfers. 1 3 In this respect the divestiture of
Eastern Europe is a means of reducing the burden of subsidizing an empire in return for desperately needed
hard currency, currency that only oil and am have been able to obtain.
The elimination of subsidized energy imports and the commensurate loss of this savings will
undoubtedly complicate Poland's economic transformation, which is already feeling the strain of the
austerity program and the energy price increases resulting from the Persian Gulf crisis. However, direct
negotiations with other oil exporting nations, the likely elimination of loss-making and energy-consuming
heavy industries and domestic infrastructure improvements in the Polish energy sector will most likely
improve the long-term performance levels in this sector and therefore improve conditions across the full
spectrum of energy dependent economic activity. Furthermore, this will decrease and perhaps even
eliminate one of the few remaining Polish dependencies on the Soviet Union, leading to an increasingly
independent Polish voice.
Central to Poland's enormous energy consumption is the fact that energy supplies have been
used inefficiently. This is a consequence of Poland's "reliance upon coal with low caloric content, the use
of obsolete machinery, a predominance of energy-intensive industries and a planning system that stresses
gross output over efficiency." 12 4 Without question this energy consuming black hole was fed large
amounts of subsidized oil and natural gas from the Soviet Union. But a debate over the issues of price,
production input costs and infrastructure investment has put the issue of a subsidy to question and stands as
a major stumbling block in current Polish-Soviet trade negotiations.
"On the surface...the oil trade has represented an economic windfall for Eastern Europe." 12 5 The
Bucharest formula which calculated energy prices based upon the average world market price over the
preceding five year period offered Eastern Europe a significant subsidy during the period 1958 to
1975. Following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the commensurate sharp increase in world oil prices,
however, the Soviet Union permanently ended the Bucharest formula in an attempt to close the gap
between CMEA oil prices and the world market price. With the exception of significant subsidies in
1980-81 caused by a lag in price adjustments, the CMEA price for a barrel of Soviet oil has been
approximately 90 percent of the world market price. By 1984, when announced Soviet cuts in oil
exports to Eastern Europe began to be manifested, the CMEA price approximated the market price at
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97 percent of world market price. 126 Since that time Soviet energy exports to Eastern Europe have
decreased with a commensurate increase in price. As a result, the existence of an oil subsidy from
the Soviet Union is rapidly diminishing if it ever existed in the first place.
The Poles are arguing that over the past decade or more, such a subsidy has been substantially
overvalued. This argument gains credibility in light of other factors that "operate to increase the price that
Eastern Europe pays for Soviet energy." 127 These factors include the following. East Europeans must buy
soft goods from the USSR at inflated prices in partial compensation for the loses that the latter allegedly
suffers through energy sales; East European purchases above planned deliveries of Soviet oil are paid with
hard currency at worlI narket prices; the Soviet Union pays a paltry 2 percent in interest to East European
states on the substantial funds that the latter advances to the USSR in joint CMEA energy development
projects, representing a significant subsidy by East European creditors to the USSR and; CMEA price
formulas for energy exports work to Eastern Europes disadvantage during declining or stabilized world
market prices (such as the initial oil glut and subsequent stabilization of prices that characterized oil prices
the 1980s). 12 8 Furthermore, these factors do not include certain exploitive practices that further distorted
Poland's energy situation. The Soviets, for example, would import high-grade Silesian coal for their own
domestic use and export low-grade, low-caloric and highly pollutant brown coal to Poland. This practice in
conjunction with the Soviet directed over-industrialization of Poland has assisted Poland in achieving the
dubious honor of ranking as one of the world's most polluted areas. And there has also been a political cost
accrued from Polish dependence on Soviet energy. Polish compliance with WTO and CMEA initiatives,
especially those detrimental to Poland's own national interests, was often achieved under the threat of Soviet
energy export manipulations. Thus, while it is true that Poland has been dependent on Soviet energy, it is
not altogether clear that Soviet energy transfers represent a clear subsidy.
A similar situation exists concerning the importance of the arms trade in Poland. In June, 1990
the director of Poland's Overseas Economic Cooperation Ministry Krzysztof Jakubiszin confirmed that
"many people are employed in (the arms trade) sector and the possible liquidation of these industrial
enterprises would quite simply be tragic for Poland right now." Jakubiszin stated succinctly, "We trade,




make money and are paid by everyone." 129 Though the Poles have not abandoned their role in arms trading
as the Czechs plan to do, there are a number of factors that suggest that the arms trade industry has also
been a burden to Poland. Furthermore, given the changes taking place in Poland's domestic economy and in
those of other East European nations the perceived comparative advantage in arms manufacturing may
diminish significantly.
In the past, the CMEA-directed manufacture and sale of arms in Poland was in fact achieved by
importing large amounts of armament, military-industrial equipment and machinery from the Soviet Union.
Additionally, in order to achieve the capability to produce these arms Poland was "obligated to finance its
own arms imports with large portions of its earnings from non-military exports." 130
The breakdown in CMEA diktat, the restructuring of Polish-Soviet trade in accordance with
economic considerations vice political ones and the fact that WTO arms demand, which had accounted for
two-thirds of Polish arms trade, is diminishing rapidly, all combine to indicate that a significant change in
Polish arms production and tirade may be forthcoming. Though arms sales to countries such as India, Libya
and Syria have, and will most likely continue to be important and potentially lucrative sources of hard
currency or energy transfers for Poland, the traditional Soviet-Polish arms production and transfer
relationship may be in jeopardy. Domestic economic requirements and Polish perceptions of the moral
implications of arms transfers on the international scene are emerging as the primary focus of Poland's arms
transfer policy. Arms transfers to Iraq, for example, have been suspended following the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait in August. Though this action will have little short-term impact on Saddam Hussein's enourmous
military structure, it is an indication that public scrutiny within a democratizing Poland is compelling the
new government to come to grips with the moral dimensions of arms trading. The Polish "arms trade was
running at $200,000,000 to $300,000,000 a year" during the period 1986 to 1988, providing a ready source
of desperately needed hard currency or direct oil transfers that helped ameliorate the strain of diminishing
Soviet energy exports. Still, by 1989 the Polish arms trade had dropped to $115,000,000.131 Domestic
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economic restructuring combined with growing public disclosures on the size and moral implications of
this trade are poised to generate change. Though it appears that the arms industry in Poland will not be
eliminated it may find its transfer policy significantly restricted. Additionally, Polish arms industry
modifications such as a move away from WTO arms standards and interchangability may be manifested in
addition to the likely elimination or product line shift of many arms producing factories.
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IV. RECONSTRUCTING POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE ECONOMY
A. CHALLENGE AND CHANGE
As Poland attempts to construct an independent foreign policy and come to grips with its new
relationships with both Germany and the Soviet Union, it has become imperative to fundamentally alter the
internal political and economic situations that have tied Poland to its former ruinous path. A truly
independent foreign policy will require a dismantling of the communist institutions and bureaucracies that
have so severely limited Poland's sovereignty and autonomous political voice. The legitimacy and success
of Poland's new government will depend on the ability to dismantle these discredited structures and provide
for the construction of a functional democratic process. Closely linked to these developments is the
requirement to reestablish both a functioning free market economic infrastructure and a rejuvenated popular
enupreneurial attitude which is necessary in order to achieve a better standard of living for all Poles.
Poland's chances of success in these endeavors are enhanced by a number of factors. Poland's
population represents one of the most homogeneous societies in Eastern Europe. With the exception of
several small minorities, most notably the Germans, whose welfare has been an issue in the Oder-Neisse
border debate, Poland is almost exclusively Polish and therefore does not suffer from the type of large scale
ethnic violence that has threatened the internal stability of Romania and Yugoslavia. Cultural cohesion is
also enhanced by strong and active ties between the population and the Catholic Church.
Yet, despite the advantages, the Poles would be the first to admit that regaining their political voice
and restructuring their economy is a difficult and tenuous undertaking. Poland, however, has embarked at
full speed with ambitious programs to effect these goals. Already, there has been a marked success in both
the political and economic realms though the pace and depth of change has often been less than originally
."oped for. Still, throughout the deliberate and tedious quest for a better future, Poland has already begun to
show its own unique influence on economic and political issues in both Western Europe and the Warsaw
Pact as well as within the Soviet Union itself.
Increasingly, because of the interdependence and connectivity of traditional Warsaw Pact ties, Poland's
internal economic changes are exhibiting a growing influence on the CMEA and the WTO. Consequently,
Poland's political clout within the WTO has grown to become a factor which may prove decisive in
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determining the survival and the role of a transformed WTO and CMEA, which in turn carries the potential
to escalate Poland's political role in the process of European integration.
Of crucial significance for Poland's emerging role is the reestablishment of political sovereignty. The
Poles are determined that Poland's influence within the WTO and the European community will represent
Polish interests in relation to the way they themselves view European interests in light of Germany's
reunification and the Soviet Union's systemic problems. It is important for Poles and for NATO members
as well, given the history of the past forty-five years, to equate Polish initiatives in Europe with Polish
goals and not as a front for ulterior Soviet motives.
"Shadowy types at the communist Party's Central Committee used to make all the decisions. They
took orders from the Soviet. 'hey told us their opinion-but it was understood as an instruction,' says
Jerzy Nowak,...head of (Poland's) policy planning." 132 But Poland's landmark roundtable government and
the subsequent Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe changed all that. "The Party is through, the Central
Committee vacant. Foreign ministers finally sat in for party chiefs at a Warsaw Pact meeting this year."
"I waited thirty years for this," proclaimed Nowak. "For the first time in my life I can speak, act and think-
-the Polish way." 133 But while the withdraw of Soviet hegemony from Poland's political life represented
the removal of the major obstacle to Polish sovereignty, a great deal of work remained, indeed, still
remains, for the Polish leadership.
B. A CROWN FOR POLAND'S EAGLE
In October 1989 a draft proposition on a provisional constitution appeared before the Legislative
Commission of the Polish Sejm. The Solidarity-led coalition government--consisting of the Citizen's
Parliamentary Caucus, the Polish Peasant Party and the Democratic Party--decided to introduce into Poland's
current constitution a limited number of essential changes including: the removal of the Communist party
from its leading role in Polish government; the transfer of the state prosecutor's office to the jurisdiction of
the Ministry of Justice; the protection of private ownership; and the establishment of freedom for economic
activity. In addition to these substantive changes a group of Democratic Party deputies moved that the
name and coat-of-arms of the Polish state be amended. This demand stipulated that the "state's name be
13 2 Newman, All.
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changed from the Polish People's Republic to the Republic of Poland and its coat-of-arms, the white eagle,
be crowned." 134 Despite popular support, this symbolic gesture was initially rejected by the coalition.
For a number of reasons crowning the Polish eagle might have been too provocative for Polish coalition
politics.
A slow and deliberate pace of change had emerged from the deal struck several months prior at the
roundtable talks with the communist govermment Polish desires for democracy and independence were clear
but were limited by the pervasive sense of Soviet political, economic and military pressure that was keenly
felt by a nation whose sovereignty had been usurped and who had already been on the brink of Soviet
intervention in 1956, 1970 and, more recently, in 1981. Changes enacted by the coalition government
therefore seemed to be focused but diplomatically enacted, determined in direction but cautious in approach.
Furthermore, the Polish population had become desensitized to symbolic changes. The history of the past
fifty years was replete with symbolic changes and shifts in rhetoric that only served to thinly disguise the
fact that nothing had changed. A crown for Poland's eagle, it was argued, should only be fitted following
successful efforts by the new Polish government to reestablish Polish sovereignty. Jan Rokita, a Citizens
Parliamentary Caucus deputy stated that the eagle should be crowned "when the matter of foreign troops
stationed in our country is resolved, when the apparatus of coercion is out of the hands of a single party,
and when we have fully free elections."1 3 5 Only then would Poland be worthy of these symbols of
democracy and independence. A crown for the Polish eagle, it seemed, would have to wait until Poland was
divorced of communism and the Soviet Union.
By December 1, 1989, however, "perceptions of what was possible and necessary had changed, not
least because of the speed with which neighboring countries had seemed to cast off the communist
yoke." 136 Poland had forced the Soviets to embrace a policy that represented a dramatic reassessment
concerning the Soviet need, desire and ability to hold East European satellites. Gorbachev's response was
the dramatic fruition of an evolving doctrinal shift away from the interventionist rights reserved for the
Soviets under the Brezhnev doctrine. During an address to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg in July
13 4 Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, "Poland's Provisional Constitution," Radio Free Eurooe Repor on
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1989 Gorbachev had emphasized that, "Any interference in domestic affairs and any attempt to restrict the
sovereignty of states, both friends and allies or any other, are inadmissible." 1 37 Skepticism prevailed in
Eastern Europe, however, because similar rhetoric had been included in several bilateral Soviet-East
European agreements and these had failed to prevent Soviet intervention into Hungary in 1956 and
Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Poles themselves had evidence of a Soviet military force poised to intervene
during Solidarity's demonstrations in 1981.
But Soviet restraint during the resurgent Solidarity movement in 1988-89 and the success of
subsequent roundtable talks in forming an unprecedented coalition government indicated that Soviet policy
was beginning to reflect the rhetoric. Even when Solidarity gained substantially more political power than
had been anticipated in the partially free parliamentary elections the Soviets made it clear that they would
not interfere. Communist regimes in Eastern Europe soon found themselves increasingly isolated amidst a
mounting tide of anti-communist, pro-democracy revolution. The collapse of the Berlin Wall in November
of 1989 provided concrete evidence that this new thinking in Soviet policy was real and freedom was not
necessarily tied to a coalition arrangement such as that in Poland. Free of the Soviet threat, popular
movements in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania soon swept the illegitimate
Communist governments from power.
The rapid fall of East European communists and the new complexion of the Gorbachev doctrine
apparently left the pioneering Poles with less than what could be achieved and less than they clearly wanted.
The Poles, therefore, were not going to squander the opportunity to divest themselves more completely and
quickly of Soviet hegemony. From the time of the signaling collapse of the Berlin Wall, the Poles have
aggressively engaged in a vast and painstaking attempt to dismantle the communist system and forge a new
and beter future for their country; an effort that is quickly overtaking the terms of the roundtable contract as
well as Soviet hopes that East European losses would be held to a minimum. Carried to one potential
conclusion, Polish sovereignty coupled with a tempered backlash against the Soviet Union may accelerate
Polish integration into Western Europe at a much more rapid pace than the Soviet Union. Similar
developments throughout Eastern Europe might help to create a European security arrangement that is less
than the Soviets might expecL
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C. THE MARCH TOWARD SOVEREIGNTY
By the spring of 1990, expectations in Poland had outpaced the political and economic changes that
were being effected. Dissatisfaction with the slow pace of democratic and free-market developments has
produced a more vocal Solidarity faction which "now advocates more aggressive efforts to sweep former
communists from government." 13 8 Lech Walesa had urged a "political war" in an effort to shakeup the
stalled revolt and periodically hinted at his desire to seek the Polish presidency in an attempt to prompt
positive responses from the incumbent government.
Despite this growing sense of impatience (due most tangibly perhaps to economic hardships incurred
in realigning Poland to a market economy) the Solidarity-led government has succeeded in taking a number
of crucial steps which are necessary to divest itself of communist influence and reestablish Polish
sovereignty. These include: the establishment of a provisional constitution void of communist rhetoric and
influence; the establishment of a new law on political parties; the restructuring and depolitization of police
and security forces in the Ministry of Internal Affairs; the enactment of shock treatment free-market
economic realignment and privatization; divesting the communist party of its substantial assets and the
establishment of an autonomous defensive military doctrine.
1. A Provisional Constitution
In April of 1989 the Sejm established a Constitutional Commission chaired by Solidarity floor
leader Bronislaw Geremek whose "task is to draft a new constitution for a fully democratic and sovereign
Polish state." 139 Geremek has made it clear that the new constitution will not be handcuffed by roundtable
compromise, stating; "Political compromise must sometimes come to a halt where fundamental values are
concered."14 0 These fundamental values, heightened by a pervasive cultural disdain for Soviet repression,
will no doubt lead to a constitution that is implicitly yet decidedly anti-Soviet in its reconstruction of
Polish sovereignty. The constitution will be a decided break from the Stalinist constitution of 1952 that
has usurped Polish autonomy and subordinated Poland's foreign and domestic policies to those of the Soviet
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Union and socialism. Geremek's plan is for a constitution that is "completely new, based on Poland's
heritage and the constitutional experience of democratic states and relying on solutions consistent with a
modem democracy." 14 1 The fact that Western democracies stand as the models for post-Soviet Poland
implies a great deal of Western leverage in a nation that in very many ways is institutionalizing centuries of
anti-Soviet sentiment by establishing its long dreamt of freedom from Russian subjugation. It has been
suggested by many Poles that May 3, 1991 be set as the date for the promulgation of this new constitution.
This would appropriately mark the 200th anniversary of the first Polish constitution; a constitution that
was short-lived due to Catherine the Great and Russian intervention.
But the Poles are not waiting for this new constitution to sever their ties with communism and
the Soviets. In the summer of 1989 a sweeping revision of Poland's existing socialist constitution
produced a provisional document that purged all references to socialism, communism and the Soviet Union.
The first article was revised to establish Poland as a "democratic state ruled by law and implementing the
principles of social justice;" a fundamental step that places the law above the state in a quest for a heretofore
unrealized respect for human and civil rights. Subsequent articles expanded national sovereignty; formally
established democratic elections to the Sejm, the Senate and the People's Councils; placed no restrictions on
the activities of political parties; subordinated the Ministry of the Internal Security to the Minister of
Justice vice the President; guaranteed freedom of economic activity and established protection for private
property. Significantly, "the stipulation about strengthening friendly ties and cooperation with the Soviet
Union...was deleted." 14 2
2. Political Parties and the Depoliticization of Society
By January of 1990 a new law on political parties set the stage for a multi-party political
system. The "main significance is that (it) will free organized political life from government control and
shift the focus to free play of political forces." 14 3 As a vital step in this direction the law also includes
provisions for the complete depolitization of workplaces and all government institutions and administrative
bodies including the military. The central agent of party control in the military, the Main Political
14 1Ibid., 36.
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Administration, was dismantled in addition to an extensive organization of party controlled military
institutions tasked with party socialization and education within the military. Similar steps were taken in
the State Security and police forces in a sweeping attempt to "restructure, humanitize, depoliticize and
departisanize" these forces and ensure their subordination to the law and not the state.
3 Divesting Communists of Economic and Political Assets
Painstaking attempts have been undertaken to privatize former state run industries. Slow
adaptation to market conditions and production cuts in response to reduced demand and tight credit have led
forecasters to speculate that "fewer than 50 percent of Poland's 7,600 state firms would be in private hands
in the next three years," nonetheless drafted legislation has designed the complete, if gradual, tunsfer of all
state owned firms to private owners. 1  The Solidarity government has also dropped its conciliatory stance
against the communist party in order to take decisive measures to reclaim party property, in many cases
returning it to the rightful owners who had had their land and buildings appropriated by the Soviets as far
back as the late 1930s. In all some 1900 buildings were returned as well as millions of zloty appropriated
by the communist party in 1989 in the form of subsidies and bank credits for their unsuccessful election
campaigns.
By far the most significant step was the complete dissolution of the party-owned RSW Prasa
publishing empire which produced 70 percent of the communist party's revenues (52 billion zloty in 1989)
through monopolized control of Poland's entire publishing industry which in addition to press content also
controlled paper processing, printing, transportation, distribution and sales. Vehement protests from
communists (who now call themselves Social Democrats) concerning the legality of such a "Bolshevik"
action on the part of the Solidarity government compelled Geremek to remark, "no one had passed a law
making it legal to storm the Bastille, yet it feU." 14 5
4. An Autonomous Military Doctrine
Yet another step in the movement away from the Soviets came in the form of a profound change
in Polish military doctrine. Preliminary moves to develop Polish military sovereignty began with Polish
inputs to a revision of Warsaw Pact doctrine in 1987 which "put much more emphasis on the execution
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of...defensive operations on national territory." 14 6 Soviet developments toward "reasonable sufficiency"
and "defensive defense" had signalled this change but subsequent events in Eastern Europe soon gave
Poland's quest for military sovereignty greater momentum. In June of 1989 the Polish government
announced the merger of the Polish Air Force and the Home Air Defense Forces; a merger that represents "a
return to pre-comnmunist practices and thus honors Polish national military tradition." 14 7
Undoubtedly a step toward Polish sovereignty, this restructuring nonetheless left Polish Forces
operationally subordinate to the Integrated Air Defense Command in Moscow in time of war. By February
1990, however, Poland made public a revamped national military doctrine which eliminated Soviet
operational control, even in time of war. As perhaps the first documentary evidence of the collapse of the
Warsaw Pact, Poland's new military doctrine in effect "annuls Poland's adherence to the 'Statutes of the
Joint Armed Forces (of the Warsaw Pact) and Organs of Their Command in Wartime."14 8 Under these
1980 statutes Soviet military commanders retained control of 90 percent of Polish forces in time of war
and, most disturbingly, the Soviet High Command retained the authority to declare that the threat of war
existed, which therefore empowered the Soviets with the ability to commit Polish forces when Soviet
interests were threatened.
Poland's new doctrine places both the decision to commit troops and the control of those troops
firmly in the hands of Polish authorities. Additionally, the doctrine states that "under no circumstances will
Poland commence military action against another state or alliance of states or participate in a war unless it
or its allies become the target of armed aggression." 14 9 Furthermore, the doctrine has eliminated all
references to the Soviet concepts of Polish deployments on "internal fronts" and "external fronts" which has
been interpreted as "a determination not to use the Polish Army outside (Polish) national territory." 15 0
Similar defensive, territorially limited operations are specified for the Polish Air Force and Navy. "In
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practical terms the new doctrine means that Polish military exercises...will no longer (include) so called
'map exercises' directed against NATO territory." 15 1 Polish troop formations, traditionally poised by the
Soviets for assaults on Denmark, the Jutland Peninsula and the northern German plain, have ceased both
training and operational planning for such assaults.
Despite the substantial amount of sovereignty that this doctrinal change has recovered, critics
maintain that it remains spiritually tied to the past and has not gone far enough in distancing the Poles
from the Soviets. The new doctrine does not disengage Poland from the Warsaw Pact claiming rather that
Poland's bilateral and multilateral defensive agreements are still important elements of national security.
Clearly the most pressing element of national security in relation to this is German reunification
and the perceived threat to Poland's western territories. "While never popular, Soviet troops have been
tolerated as guarantors of Poland's Western Border."15 2 Though Lech Walesa and a substantial portion of
the Polish public support a quick and total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland, President Jaruzelski
has ruled this out until an "overall solution to the East-West division of Europe is found that would
guarantee that a reunited Germany would not seek to regain the western territories."153
But satisfactory progress has since been made in relation to the German question. Poland's
inclusion in the two-plus-four talks, the formal border agreement with a unified Germany and the fact that
the unified Germany will remain "checked" by its integration in NATO, have all quickly decreased the
utility of a Soviet troop presence in Poland.
S. Soviet Troop Withdrawals
Currently, two Soviet divisions (about 45,000 men) are stationed in Poland, primarily in
western Poland. Though this is a modest number compared to the Soviet presence in "East Germany,"
these troops remain vital for open communication and supply to the Soviet Western Group of Forces.
Additionally, Polish Silesia is host to "one of the most important Soviet military headquarters in the world,
that of the Western Theater of Military Operations at Legnica..." 154
15 11bid.
15 2 Roman Stefanowski, "Soviet Troops in Poland," Radio Free Europe Report on Eastern Europe 1,




But for many Poles a Soviet presence is both a physical and a psychological burden that should
be removed, particularly in light of Sovizt offers to negotiate a withdrawal. Polish subsidies for the
"upkeep of Soviet forces in Poland amounted in 1989 alone to 26,000 million zloty." 15 5 Housing, food
and consumer good shortages exacerbated by the troop presence are another point of contention. But by far
the historical burden of Soviet-Polish relations and the fact that Soviet troops are the personification of
Soviet repression and exploitation are the primary reasons behind the large scale public revulsion of Soviet
troops. By March of this year it was becoming obvious that "while Polish concerns about a reunified
Germany might prompt sympathy for a residual Soviet troop presence in Poland, it (was) doubtful that any
Polish government could long tolerate the continued presence of the Soviets on Polish soil." 15 6 A Soviet
withdrawal seemed to be only a matter of time.
Indeed, by mid-May the Poles had already begun negotiations on Soviet troop withdrawals. That
month a meeting was held in the town of Brzeg "devoted to the implementation of an agreement on the
withdrawal of Soviet troops from the town." 157 The town of Brzeg is located near "one of the Soviet
Army's largest airfields." Upon leaving, the Soviets vacated over 70 residences and six large buildings in
the town center and left for the Poles a deplorable environmental problem resulting from the improper
storage and handling of jet fuels and oils which now threaten the town's health. But the departure of the
Soviets from the Brzeg airfield represented the first step in what may become an eventual full scale
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland.
This possibility became closer to reality when, on July 13, 1990, the Soviets disclosed that they
were moving their most important operational command out of Poland. "The staff of the Commander in
Chief of the Western TVD has already started to leave its headquarters in Legnica, Lower Silesia, and the
Soviets have assured the Poles that this large unit will be completely withdrawn by mid-1991." 15 8 The




"Meeting on Soviet Troop Withdrawal Agreement," Opole Domestic Service 1400 GMT 11 May
1990 as cited in FBIS-EU-90-093 , 14 May 1990,43.
1 5 8 Douglas L. Clarke, "Soviets Withdraw Headquarters from Poland," Radio Free Eurne Reort on
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of the Western TVD headquarters came by way of an announcement that the Soviet Northern Group of
Forces Staff would relocate to Legnica from the town of Swidnica some 45 kilometers away in order to
occupy the more accommodating headquarters of the senior command staff. But the move is undoubtedly a
major step in determining the disposition of Soviet forces in Poland.
In any conflict with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Western TVD
headquarters would have controlled the Warsaw Pact forces on the Central front, including the Soviet Group
of Forces in East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, as well as the bulk of the East German, Polish,
and Czechoslovak armed forces." 159 However, recent developments in regard to German reunification, the
Soviet Union's rejection of their hegemonic position in Eastern Europe and their doctrinal shift to
"defensive defense" have significantly changed the situation on the Central Front. The withdrawal, by
1994, of Soviet forces from East Germany and a united Germany's membership in NATO as specified in the
provisions of the "Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany" will place the Western TVD
headquarters in a precarious forward position just eighty kilometers east of the German border.
Furthermore, the disintegration of East German Forces during the German unification process combined
with doctrinal shifts in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary and the withdraw of Soviet troops from these
countries will leave very little for the Western TVD to control.
For Poland, the absorption of East Germany into a unified and NATO-alligned German state
negates the Polish role as a vital communications link to the forward deployed WTO forces. The Poles,
therefore, are no doubt pleased that the Soviets have acted on the Polish desire to reduce the number of
Soviet garrisons in Poland despite the fact that Poland now represents what would be known in the old
paradigm as the forward battle area of the Central Front. Soviet troop withdrawals from Poland represent a
denial of "the old, offensive military posture of the Warsaw PacL"60) In this sense, they complement
Poland's new defensive national doctrine as well as the complexion that the Poles wish to see the Warsaw
Pact take on.
15 9Ibid.
16 0 Ibid., 22.
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D. ECONOMIC REFORM: ACHIEVEMENTS, IMPENDING STEPS AND
IMPLICATIONS
As will be seen, Poland's accomplishments in reforging political sovereignty have significantly
increased the Polish role in Warsaw Pact and European affairs, but this represents only half of the changes
which may serve to significantly increase Poland's clout. In addition to the political aspects of Poland's
march toward sovereignty, the Polish leadership is faced with the equally important and difficult task of
restructuring the former command economy into a viable free market system capable of providing the
Polish people with something they have never known--a decent standard of living. Though this
transformation is fraught with dangerous and painful social costs it is also ripe with positive internal
possibilities and external implications, especially as concerns the Soviet Union.
1. The Strategy and Initial Results
Formal implementation of Poland's shock treatment economic reforms began on January 1,
1990. The initial reforms addressed the need to stabilize the domestic economy and establish domestic
markets before moving on to larger structural changes and realignments. The primary concerns during the
initial reform phase were: implementing the sale or break up of large state-owned enterprises and
collectivized farms in favor of creating a network of small privately-owned firms; removing price controls
in an effort to restrain inflation and the anticipated transitional hyper-inflation and, to eliminate consumer
shortages; devaluing the zloty in an effort to establish currency convertibility and, reducing the role of the
government in the economy and society in order to promote competition and the breakup of foreign trade
monopolies and, to compel firms to restructure workforce size and product lines toward more efficient and
profitable setups.
These steps together with a significant reduction or a favorable rescheduling of Poland's $42
billion foreign debt were enacted in the hopes of decreasing inflation, undercutting the black market and
encouraging investment. As wage increases have had to be suspended to curb price escalation, anticipated
social costs have been manifested in an increase in unemployment and a perceived decrease in the standard of
living. Consumer shortages have been eliminated but real wages have declined as much as 30 percent. As
a result, many of the now available goods are unaffordable for the average wage earner. But these problems
were anticipated and are seen as transitional problems that will slowly be alleviated as a market equilibrium
is achieved, savings are encouraged and wages are adjusted slowly in accordance with market stability in
order to preclude additional inflation.
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There have been some positive trends noted, however, in relation to these social costs. The
threat of unemployment has led to an increase in worker productivity and a significant reduction in
absenteeism, representing a positive and necessary trend in improving the workforce psychology.
Furthermore, the perceived decrease in living standards is rapidly being offset by the large degree of success
achieved during the initial stages of reform implementation. In less than six months since the
implementation of Poland's reforms Harvard economist and Polish economic reform architect Jeffrey Sachs
reported that
"...the initial goals of Poland's reform program are now within reach. The corrective inflation has
passed and the excess demand in the economy--reflected in shortages and high inflation--has been
brought under control. Shortages have been eliminated in almost all parts of the economy, both at
the household and industrial level. Foreign consumer goods are widely available. In addition, the
combined effects of the austerity measures and the fixed and competitive zloty exchange rate has been
a quick turnaround in Poland's external trade situation. The trade balance with the West in the first
four months of 1990 totalled a surplus of $1. billion, which is more that twice the surplus for the
full year 1989."161
2. A Growing Incompatibility With the Soviet Union
Though Poland's domestic situation and Western trade relations are improving, the same can not
be said of Polish-Soviet trade relations. In fact, in many ways improving trade with the West appears to be
inversely proportional to trade with the Soviet Union. The Polish Ambassador to the Soviet Union
Stanislaw Ciosek provided Pravda with a frank summation of the problem:
"With respect to economics and day-to-day affairs such as deliveries of our good to your (Soviet)
market and of Soviet petroleum and gas to Poland and the fulfillment of old contracts, negotiations
are underway on these issues. However, fundamental barriers are arising. Polish enterprises are
autonomous, independent and self-managing, and our prices are market prices-extremely so because
we have to soak up excess money from the public...your enterprises, by contrast, continue to operate
under centralization and prices in your country reflect virtually nothing in economic categories.
Consequently, the two mechanisms don't match each other." 162
The result of this incompatible mechanism has been a significant drop in Soviet exports to
Poland and a commensurate decrease in Polish exports to the Soviet Union. This trend follows a 1989 trade
performance that witnessed a stagnation in Soviet-East European trade and a doubling of the Soviet trade
i
1 6 1 Jeffrey Sachs and David Lipton, "Poland's Economic Reform," EorignAffairs 69, no. 3
(Summer 1990): 58-59.
162 B. Averchenko and M. Tretyakov, At Reader's Request: Ambassador's Views," in Pravda 6 April
1990 as cited in JPRS-UIA-90-007, "Polish Ambassador Ciosek Interviewed," 27 April 1990, 53.
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deficit with these countries to more that $2.9 billion. 163 As a consequence, the Poles and Soviets have
engaged in a search for "a new model for the conduct of foreign trade and the conduct of economic and
scientific cooperation," but this has proven to be a very difficult task)l 6
Poland's debt to the Soviet Union amounting to some 5.2 billion rubles has become a sore
point in negotiations. The Soviets are anxious for repayment but the Poles maintain that the debt "figure
is almost balanced by Polish contributions (subsidies) to the exploration and exploitation of Soviet national
resources and by construction investment (oil and gas pipelines, roads and nuclear power plants)..."1 65 It is
this same argument that is used to dispel or at least diminish the notion of large Soviet energy subsidies to
Poland.
The drive to replace the transferable ruble with hard currency as a means of settling accounts is
another divisive issue. The Soviets are pressuring for a quick change as their need for hard currency grows,
but the Poles, though recognizing that such a change is necessary for long-term goals and investment
incentives, are content to protract the transition as a hedge against competition at least until Polish
production quality is further improved.
But perhaps the most divisive issue and the one that may prove to decimate Polish-Soviet trade
is that of cost accounting and pricing. Procedures for pricing and accounting, particularly for raw materials
(which constitute 80 percent of Polish imports from the USSR), "are worked out according to the Soviet
cost calculations and not on the basis of costs determined by the individual foreign trade enterprises
involved." 16 6 The fundamental problem is that virtually all key variables determining economic behavior
in Poland have been radically altered with no significant alteration in the Soviet Union. As Poland's
economic reforms mandate enterprise survivability based on profit and economic rationality, in the absence
of full scale Soviet economic reform, the long-term Polish-Soviet trade outlook appears bleak.
16 3 jan Vanous, "Soviet Foreign Trade Performance During January-September, 1989," Planecon
Rc= 6, nos. 11-12 (March 21, 1990).
164Roman Stefanowski, "Polish-Soviet Trade Relations," Radio Free Europe Report on Eastern
Eu= 1, no. 20 (18 May 1990): 32.
16 5 Ibid., 33.
166Ibid.
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Despite this, as Ambassador Ciosek points out, Poland is "paying attention to efforts to prevent
the dismanding of the infrastructure of trade with the USSR." "The past four months," he contends, "have
seen progress in our economic relations." Still Ciosek watches "with apprehension at how we are unable to
devise a concept for producing a joint television or automobile." "A frequent response to this question," he
continues, "is that Poland is a small country and cannot become dependent on the USSR, that it could cut
off our supplies of petroleum and gas." "But," he points out, "in the modem world none of this applies."
"For example, Poland produces the tail section of the Soviet IL-86 aircraft without which it cannot fly...we
need each other." 167
3. Implications for Polish Influence
Ciosek's assurances, however, may be more diplomatic than realistic. While it is true that
Poland wishes and in many ways needs to maintain healthy trade relations with the Soviet Union, it is also
true that Poland will most likely become less dependent on the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Polish
determination to adhere to the principles of economic rationality may compel the Poles to end many of their
current trade practices that violate economic principles, including those such as the construction of the IL-
84 tail section. It has already been noted that the Soviets, through the CMEA and the WTO, arranged for
the production, in Eastern Europe, of military-industrial components and products that were economically or
technologically inconvenient to produce themselves. In Poland's case such practices, particularly in
shipbuilding, created Poland's crippling foreign debt. Continued economic reforms in Poland are sure to
target these practices. Given the direction and scope of the next phase of economic reform in Poland this
seems all the more likely.
"Large-scale privatization of major enterprises was recognized as something that must follow,
rather than precede the initial stage of stabilization and liberalization." 168 Now that the stabilization of
Poland's domestic economy has made significant progress the Poles are advancing to this next stage of
reform. This part of the agenda requires the privatization and restructuring of the more than 7800 state
enterprises. There are many formidable obstacles involved in this process and they center on three main
issues: determining the desirable level of foreign investment in an individual firm; striking a balance on the
regulation of profit repatriation in order to adequately infuse the Polish economy with capital and at the
16 7 Averchenko and Tretyakov, 53.
168Sachs and L-pton, 55.
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same time provide investment incentives and; determining the type and nature of private ownership (ie. an
individual entrepreneur or worker's union) that is to manage the new fi-ms. Though divisive these issues
are being successfully addressed and the Polish leadership has a clear vision of what is required to promote
the formation of motivated private firms. The impact of privatization for Polish-Soviet trade, however, lies
in the product output that a restructured Polish economy is likely to produce.
"As is now evident, the type of production that individual enterprises will undertake in a market
environment may be vastly different from that which they have traditionally conducted under a central plan."
Polish firms cut loose from state protection and subsidies "are struggling to produce goods that the public
will buy at competitive prices. For the first time enterprises are faced with the need to market their
products actively at home and abroad and to compete with importers who can also deliver goods to the
domestic market." 169 Increasingly, therefore, Polish exports to the Soviet Union will be unaffordable and
Soviet exports to Poland will be uncompetitive. Just as importantly, as Polish firms respond to
competition and economic principles, survival will dictate the abandonment of those economically
infeasible or heavily subsidized conditions created under cooperative CMEA agreements.
Adding momentum to this trend are the planned structural changes that loom in Poland's future.
The "structural challenge is to close down parts of loss-making heavy industry and to reorient the economy
toward light industry, housing construction and services." "It is likely," states Jeffrey Sachs, "that n-uch of
the heavy industrial sector should be cut back in scale and some enterprises should be closed down
entirely."17 0 "This will mean," stated Darius Ledworowski, Polish undersecretary of Foreign Economic
Cooperation, "that those factories that export only to the Soviet Union and have no prospect of
restructuring will collapse."17 1
Thus, intertwined Polish-Soviet relations are being influenced by a number of developments
stemming from Poland's economic reforms, namely: cooperative industrial, military and consumer trade
arrangements that the Soviets have heretofore relied upon, may be scaled back or lost altogether, trade
turnover is decreasing due to market incompatibility; the Soviet Union is losing its market for non-
16 9Ibid., 53-59.
170 bid., 62.
1 7 1Joarma Strzelcsyk, "Poland and the USSR: What is Profitable?," in Gaza yk za 8 March
1990 as cited in EBIS-EEU-90-M, "Trade Debt with the Soviet Union Reviewed," 15 March 1990,40.
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competitive goods while the Poles are making progress toward Western integration and; Poland's evolution
away from heavy industrialization will decrease Polish dependence on Soviet oil and, importantly, will
interrupt the established flow of heavy industrial material and products that the Soviets have relied on to
sustain their domestic economy as well as the WTO military structure.
A Planecon report indicates that the intra-CMEA arms trade for 1990 will reflect a sharp decline
of as much as 50 percent. Polish industrial restructuring combined with the fact that "the demand in
Warsaw Pact countries for Polish tanks, transporters, ships, radio location stations and ammunition has
fallen...threatens serious financial difficulties for enterprises producing such equipment." 17 2 The removal
of subsidies and price controls and new legislation prohibiting a government bailout of threatened industries
would seem to indicate that such enterprises will not survive long.
In mid-June Prime Minister Mazowiecki, addressing an International Labor Organization
conference in Geneva, cited the cooperation between Poland and the ILO that has "already
started...restructuring in the steel, shipbuilding and mining industries..." 17 3 It is in the restructuring of the
shipbuilding industry, for example, that the trend in Poland's economy is evidenced. The Soviets have
depended on Polish shipyards for a variety of maritime vessels including the Rapucha and Polnocny class
amphibious warfare ships, and various coastal combatants. CMEA-directed shipbuilding arrangements have
been fundamental to the output of four of Poland's five major shipyards (3 in Gdansk and 1 in Szczecin).
Although these shipbuilding arrangements have been shown to be a profitable enterprise, this has been
masked to a degree by heavy subsidization, an indeterminate amount of import dependency and skewed cost
accounting based on non-market prices. It is also clear that the technological components demanded by the
Soviets on ship deliveries have played a primary role in Poland's foreign debt. For these reasons major
changes may occur in Polish shipbuilding over the next decade including, perhaps, a move cited by The
Economist, toward Poland's comparative advantage in building sailing ships and standard technology
commercial vessels exclusively.
17 2
"Arms Trade Demonopolization Within a Month," Warsaw Domestic Service 2200 GMT, 20
March 1990 as cited in -B1-,EU-9M37 23 March 1990, 69.
17 3 "Mazowiecki Addresses ILO Geneva Conference," Warsw PAP 1746 GMT, 12 June 1990 as
cited in -B[SF 1 -.- 11, 14 June 1990, 36.
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Other trends in Poland's restructuring will most likely include an increase in the food processing
and food transportation industries and an expansion of the fertilizer and farm machinery industry. As the
agricultural sector becomes more prolific Polish tank factories may turn to tractor and combine production.
Infrastructure rebuilding will create a market for road-building machinery, forklifts and cranes. The
underdeveloped service sector will undoubtedly expand, absorbing as it does the redistributed labor and
capital. Poland's comparative advantage in successful light industries such as pharmaceuticals, surgical
instrumentation and liquor production can also be expanded.
E. TOWARD ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION
The ongoing process of economic reform will continue to be a painful experience for the average wage
earner and it will continue to test the strength of Poland's political leadership. Social safety nets have
already been put in place to ease the burden of unemployment and wage freezing. Polish political
determination, however, combined with the success of economic reforms to date are cause for optimism.
Jeffrey Sachs concludes that, "the long-run economic prospects are promising. The land is well endowed
with natural and human resources and in close geographic proximity to Western Europe. There is every
reason to believe that economic and political integration with Western Europe will enable Poland to raise
its living standards decisively, if market forces are allowed to guide the transformation." 17 4
But this is only half of the picture. Poland's desire to avoid the political isolation of the Soviet
Union and the proclaimed desire to maintain a cooperative economic relationship with Moscow indicates
that Poland may be both the mechanism and the bridge by which both the political and economic
integration of the Soviet Union into Europe is effected. Just as it may be argued that Poland is gaining
political clout concerning the political agenda and direction of the Warsaw Pact, so it can be argued that,
given the Soviet desire and need for Polish trade, Poland's economic reforms will be a decisive factor in
mellowing Soviet economic behavior, which in turn will facilitate stability in Europe and set the stage for
the potential Soviet integration into the European community.
174 Sachs and Lipton, 63.
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V. A NEW VOICE AND A BALANCED FUTURE
A. A NEW MODUS VIVENDI AND A POLITICAL ROLE
Despite the Soviet role in "cooking up Poland's fate" and despite the German-Polish border treaty and
the commensurate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland, Warsaw, nonetheless, remains an advocate of
maintaining both a transformed WTO and CMEA. Polish Foreign Minister Krzyszt Shubiszewski outlined
the Polish attitude when he stated, "We are treating the Warsaw Pact as a defensive alliance in accordance
with the United Nation's charter and not as an instrument to influence the system and political and
economic order of the member states. The Pact has lost its ideological role...So long as it exists, it is
essential, from the point of view of Poland that it be transformed from a military-political alliance into a
consultative-military one." 175
The Poles have chosen to support the Warsaw Treaty for a number of reasons. Despite anti-Soviet
sentiments in Poland, the Soviet Union remains a geopolitical reality of substantial weight. "Relations
with the Soviet Union remain at the center of our political strategies," Shubiszewski told the Sejm. He
added that when "seeking to rejoin Europe and expanding ties with Western European bodies we shall not
distance ourselves from the Soviet Union but maintain an active policy of cooperation with Moscow." 176
Looking to the broader issue of European security Polish Defense Minister General Florian Siwicki claimed
that the rationale behind a maintenance of the Warsaw Pact "is that together we can have greater influence
on the process of building European security than alone." "Nonetheless," he continued, "it is necessary to
adjust the pact to contemporary needs so that it can function as NATO's partner."177
The stability inherent in maintaining ties with both the Soviet Union and the countervailing alliance
structures is crucial for the Poles who are not convinced, for example, as is Czechoslovakian President
17 5 Douglas L. Clarke, "Soviet Experts Again Propose Strengthening Warsaw Pact's Political Role,"
Radio Free Europe Reort on Eastern Eu=ne 1, no. 20 (18 May 1990): 41.
17 6Jan B. deWeydenthal, "Poland and the Soviet Alliance System," Radio Free Euro=e Renort on
Eastern 1, no. 26 (29 June 1990): 31.
177Jerzy Hernik, "Siwicki: Pact Could Be NATO's Partner," Warsaw PAP 0953 GMT, 15 June 1990
as cited in FBIS RVU-90- 16, 15 June 1990,38.
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Vaclav Havel, that a leap is ready to be made to an all-European security system. The Poles know better
than anyone that Europe and peace have never been synonymous. European integration though a credible
possibility remains, nonetheless, a distant prospecL Much of the hope for this integrated future has been
placed in the potential of the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe. This entity, however,
remains only a roving forum and not a formal organization capable of quickly assuming such
responsibilities. Furthermore, the economies of Eastern Europe, Poland included, have a great deal of
restructuring and reform to enact before integration becomes possible or advisable.
Clearly the Poles would favor an all-European security system to ameliorate their historically
precarious position between a united Germany and the Soviet Union, but until such time as an all-European
agreement is reached, a transformed Warsaw Pact is required to maintain the stability necessary to allow just
such a development. Stability is a prime consideration for Poland's foreign policy as it addresses a
changing Europe, and it is maintaining international stability that Poland sees as one of its main roles.
"Does Poland have a chance to become a factor of stability and development in Eastern and Central
Europe?," asks Waldemar Piotrowski, a specialist in international affairs in the Polish Presidential
Chancellory.
"Yes, but this requires that Poland should conduct a wise and balanced policy, both at home and
on the international arena. At home this will require following an evolutionary road of changes,
avoiding all shocks and completing the process of building structures of a democratic state next year.
On the international arena Poland must work out first a new modus vivendi with Bonn and Moscow.
As a nation we should make an effort to overcome anti-Soviet elements and anti-German
resentments." 1
7 8
Maintaining a transformed WTO is part of that new modus vivendi, one that seeks to overcome anti-
Soviet sentiments and create a WTO that can serve as a stable and long-term integrative instrument rather
than a divisive one. Poland's lead in maintaining the Pact, among other things, ensured a continuation of
the fruitful Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks in Vienna by avoiding a breakdown of the
countervailing structures that are represented there. Additionally, such a move provides for a relative degree
of stability in both the Soviet Union and Europe by preventing Soviet isolation and a sense of Soviet
security losses in the face of increasing momentum for WTO member defections to Western political and
economic organizations.
17 8 " conomist on Future EC, Warsaw Pact Relations," Warw PAP 1035 GMT, I June 1990 as
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The Soviets for their part can do lite but acquiesce on transformation proposals and the enactment of
reforms. The WTO is already a gaunt image of its former self. Any Soviet attempt to block reform such
as those put forth by Poland and Hungary at a June 1990 WTO meeting may lead to premature defections
that would spell the final and formal demise of the Pact. Poland is of particular importance to the Pact
given the size of its contributions and its strategic location and it is ironic that given these developments it
is Poland and not the Soviet Union that may wield the decisive influence within the Pact. Poland can, and
it is their intention to, use the Pact, not to maintain an East-West standoff as the Soviets had, but to create
a stable transition to an all-European security arrangement. To be sure, this was a stated goal of the
Warsaw Pact from its inception but a goal nonetheless that was never truly held as an operational design.
Such a design may now be manifested under Poland's direction, and, as Polish Prime Minister Mazowiecki
proclaimed, "when the day comes that European security can be assured without military blocs we will
leave them without regret."17 9
B. POLAND'S GROWING ECONOMIC INFLUENCE
In a similar fashion to that of political reform, Poland's influence over developments in the Soviet
Union and Europe are increasing due to the profound economic changes that are taking place in Poland.
Poland's economic vision enhanced by it autonomous national voice and it new found WTO clout may
prove to be an irresistible force for change. Poland has already "demanded major changes in the operation
and organization of the CMEA. In particular, Poland's representatives have argued during CMEA meetings
that all member states should have an equal voice in decision making, that the entire organization should
concentrate on facilitating contacts with Western economic bodies, that it should implement a uniform
pricing system and, that individual member states should adopt policies promoting market principles in
their economies." 180
But it is not only through direct CMEA changes that Poland will influence the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe. Poland's transition to a market economy, despite the painful and anticipated social costs, is
precisely the type of radical reform that Western analysts (and the IMF) deem necessary for a market




half-measure reform plans that both Western analysts and Soviet liberal reformers claim are not enough to
achieve any degree of economic rejuvenation. This is a fact that Gorbachev is now coming to grips with as
a result of pressure from reformers such as Boris Yeltsin and the impetus of social pressure evidenced, for
example, during the recent bread shortages in Moscow. The impact of Poland's actions, however, is that,
CMEA formalities notwithstanding, Poland is laboring toward economic activity based exclusively on
economic feasibility, profit margins, comparative advantage and economies of scale and not, as had been the
case under Soviet control, on political or military rationales. Long-term prospects for trade relations
between the Soviet Union and Poland, therefore, will most likely be less than favorable for the Soviets and
may prove significantly disruptive given the growing incompatibility of two heretofore closely intertwined
economies. This in turn may prove to be a decided leverage point for continued and full scale economic
reform in the Soviet Union in that Moscow is increasingly confronted with the need to reform or risk
losing a significant and valuable trade partner.
Polish measures for establishing both national sovereignty and economic restructuring have
concentrated primarily on internal policies, but given the interdependence inherent in the WTO and the
CMEA as well as the integrative designs of the Western economic organizations that both Poland and the
Soviet Union aspire to, Polish reforms have a decided external influence. The Soviet's are not unaware of
this developing process but are hampered by a reliance on half-measures and socialist design holdouts.
Professor Ivan Ivanov, a department chairman at the State Foreign Economic Commission concluded in late
1989 that, "these processes (international cooperation and integration) are seen to be developing relatively
more rapidly within the framework of the CMEA by regenerating the dynamics of socialist economic
integration and by coupling it not only to intergovernmental cooperation but also to cooperation at the
level of economic links. An amalgamated market of interested socialist countries as the aggregate of their
reciprocally open national markets should form in the future." 18 1 Clearly, if European integration proceeds
as anticipated including a broadening to include Eastern Europe, the amalgamated market will consist of
more than jus: interested socialist countries, and it also seems clear that cooperation at the level of
economic links will become more prevalent than those at the intergovernmental level. But despite this
Ivanov realizes the need for Soviet trade liberalization and identifies many impediments to such a
18 11van D. Ivanov, "The Restructuring of Foreign Economic Relations in the USSR: First Results
and Basic Problems," in Mirovava Economika I Mezhdunarodnve Otnosheniva No. 10, October 1989 as
cited in JIRS-UIA-90-004, "Impediments to Soviet Foreign Trade Detailed, Analyzed," 14 March 1990,19.
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development. New tariff legislation, market pricing of imports and exports, decentralization of
import/export regulations and a transition to wholesale trade are necessary but as yet unrealized reforms.
"Without this," claims Ivanov, "there can be no real and competitive market in the USSR." 1 8 2
Furthermore, the trend toward open market interdependence and integration has made it "clear that the
success of perestroika will depend in large measure on the degree to which its foreign economic component
is activated "183
As Poland proceeds toward a free market economy, discontinuities and dysfunctions in Polish-Soviet
trade are growing. The Soviet Ambassador to Poland Yariy Kashlev stated succinctly; "our relations are
becoming more complex. Economics is the cornerstone of all relations and difficulties are arising in our
eonomic and trade relations."184 This trend has been growing for some time. An increased emphasis on
economic rather than political criteria is now the guiding principle in economic decision making in Poland.
As Western economic aid moves into Poland in an effort to promote and assist its economic transition,
Poland will gravitate further out of the sphere of Soviet influence, increasing both its own autonomous
voice in European affairs and its direct and indirect influence on activating that foreign component of the
Soviet economy.
C. INTERDEPENDENCE, DISCONTINUITIES AND REDEFINING
RELATIONSHI: S
"Poland strategically speaking is much more important to the USSR that any other Eastern country.
Therefore, the Polish economy is much more intertwined with the Soviet economy than any other
Eastern bloc country economy especially as it pertains to certain industries...it is important to
understand that Polish industrial production is intricately linked to the Soviet war production."1 8 5
These economic links have been key to the direction of Soviet-Polish relations. "Economic
relations," stated Michael Checinski, "in the long-run have the strongest impact not only on the formal and
18 2 Ibid., 24.
18 3 Ibid., 25.
184 Zygmunt Slomkowski, "The Number One Country," in Ilyb=ua, 13-14 June 1990 as cited in
IS-EEU-90-l19. "New Soviet Ambassador on Relations," 20 June 1990,39.
18 5 US Congress, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, "Implementation of the
Helsinki Accords: Soviet Involvement in the Polish Economy" Hearing April 1, 1982, Washington D.C.,
USGPO 1982, cited in Checinski, 34.
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informal links of both CMEA and the WTO themselves but also the entire complex of Soviet influence and
control in Eastern European countries." 18 6 Two years before the revolutionary events of 1989, Checinski
indicated that an increasingly independent Polish voice in economic issues combined with a weakening of
Soviet hegemony within the WTO and CMEA had raised the possibility that Poland "may in the long-term
become an instrument of coercion against the USSR." 187 Following the establishment of the Roundtable
government in 1989, the subsequent steps for establishing Polish sovereignty and the increasingly crucial
role that Poland is playing in determining the survival and direction of the WTO and the CMEA, it is
already evident that Poland's voice has and will most likely continue to become a significantly influential
instrument in determining Soviet behavior. Given the interdependent nature of Polish-Soviet trade and the
radical economic transformation that is underway in Poland, the likelihood of such a development is great
and the potential impact of this is decidedly significant.
Poland is already engaged in a broad redefinition of its relationship with the Soviet Union. "Seeking
out this new relationship need not, as Polish leaders have made clear, mean reverting to a hostile
relationship...but it is clear that it will mean for Poland...the opportunity to practice policies which accord
with their national needs as defined in (Warsaw) rather than Moscow." 188 Trade between the two countries
will be shaped by Poland's concern for profit motive, and the implementation of the economic principles of
comparative advantage and economies of scale. "Thus," according to European analyst Ronald Linden, "we
will certainly see more assertion of national interests evident in the shift to world economic forces in
Soviet-(Polish) trade, the continued erosion of the Warsaw Pact and very likely the eventual complete
dissolution of the moribund Council for Mutual Economic Assistance."
In regard to the shift to world economic forces, Poland's reforms will compel the Soviet's to move
quickly in this direction as well. Polish advances in this area have increased the likelihood and have perhaps
shortened the time required to realize Polish integration into Western economic organizations, highlighting
an economic reform model that can not go unnoticed in Moscow. Though Poland will soon have the the
18 6 Michael Checinski, "Warsaw Pact/CMEA Military-Economic Trends," Problems of Communism
36, no. 2 (March-April 1987): 28.
18 7 Ibid.
18 8 Ronald Linden, "The New Eastern Europe," Radio Free Euop Report on Eastern Enr 1, no.
28 (13 July 1990): 4.
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economic stability, currency convertibility and the competitive market structure to allow for Western
substitutes to replace lost Soviet trade, the Soviets, in the long-run, do not enjoy such prospects and will
be forced to watch traditional military and non-military CMEA trade dwindle. Increasingly, the choice for
the Soviet Union will be to reform or self-destruct. In this respect Poland may provide the impetus and
model for Soviet economic reform, and a stable bridge allowing the Soviets to make a similar
transformation.
Increasingly the mechanism for this may assume the form of direct economic ties between Poland and
individual Soviet republics, which in itself will provide a decided political stimulus to sovereignty issues
in the Republics. Such a policy would be selective and cautious for it does not serve Poland's interests to
couple with malignant centrally-planned Soviet enterprises or to draw the consternation of Moscow.
Nonetheless, as Byellorussia, the Ukraine and the Baltic states press for independence and sovereignty, and
restructure individual economic enterprises, the opportunity for mutually beneficial economic ties are
formidable. Polish proposals along these lines have been forthcoming, suggesting that as Poland's
economic policy makers looks to the East, they are looking to stimulate and support economic contacts
that adhere to economic rationality and free market mechanisms, and at least implicitly are supporting
greater economic independence for the republics.
Proposals, for example, have been advanced to develop economic cooperation with the Kaliningrad
Oblast of the Russian Soviet Federated Republic on Poland's East Pomeranian border. The establishment
of the Soviet naval base at Baltiysk and the Oblast's "Stalinist-style border--locked, bolted, and double
locked again"--have contributed to the collapse of traditionally prosperous rade, shipping, fishing, material
processing and tourist industries on this stretch of the Baltic coast. Many Poles, however, are eager to
repair the neglected communications infrastructure with the Oblast and promote the resurrection of these
industries under a free trade zone agreement. After all, contend these proponents, the Stalinist style border
between Poland and Kaliningrad "has become an historical, as well as political, anachronism...in today's
Europe as (it) strives for unification." 189
It should also be noted that proposed Polish economic ties with the Kaliningrad Oblast and other Soviet
republics come in response to German overtures in the same direction. Poland is concerned that German
18 9 Stanislaw Kulawiec, "Within a Hand's Reach: To Get a Start on Germans in Kaliningrad," in
Pol1izxk 21 April 1990 as cited in FBIS-E2U-90-108, "Cooperation With Kaliningrad Region Urged," 5
June 1990, 57.
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economic influence may gain too strong a foothold in the Soviet Union and disproportionately increase
German influence while at the same time restricting broader European cooperation and investment
In regard to the dissolution of the WTO and the CMEA, it is likely that Poland and the other East
European countries, such as Hungary and Czechoslovakia, will determine both the pace and the terms of
these events, and in doing so can create a structured path for Soviet reform. Polish moves to enter the
integrative Western organizations such as the Council of Europe and GAIT aim at eventual membership in
the European Community (EC). The process of European integration contrasts directly with the traditional
role of CMEA, but Poland has opted to transform the traditional CMEA relationships in order to continue
those intra-CMEA ties and European practices that are beneficial to its short-term interests. In doing so
they may be able "to utilize the currently untapped trade opportunities that exist among Central European
nations." 19 0 There is a potential, therefore, to form a "post-communist association as a waiting room for
admission to the EC." Polish influence is already accelerating the dismantling of the institutionalized
decision making process that has maintained Soviet control over industrial and military production within
the CMEA. As the CMEA adapts to the integrative European process, the Soviet Union will be provided
with both a stimulus for change and a structure for its implementation.
There is every reason to believe that this scenario may occur, for even as Soviet hegemonic control
over CMEA decision making is being diffused, the established CMEA-produced infrastructure of Poland and
Eastern Europe that is so important to the industrial, military and consumer sectors of the Soviet Union is
in jeopardy of being dismantled. "The CMEA economics must undergo massive restructuring: labor must
be shifted away from the grossly loss-making industries to more competitive branches or the underdeveloped
service sector or both." "As subsidies are removed and market prices and exchange rates are introduced into
Poland's economy, loss-making industries will become more apparent and will inevitably collapse." 19 1
Additionally, transitions to more productive and competitive product lines will most likely transform a
great deal of the traditional military-industrial production output.
19 0Vladimir Sobell, "East European Economies at a Turning Point," Radio Free Eurone Report on
Easten EM= 1,no. 18 (4 May 1990): 42.
19 1Sobefl, "The Economic Reintegration of Eastern Europe," 15.
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D. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
All of these historic, political, social and economic factors point to an increasingly autonomous and
western-oriented Polish political voice. Poland has long "starred in the superpower struggle as the Soviet
Union's greatest policy irritant and the West's greatest hope." "Last year Solidarity came through, setting
the pace for the fall of the Soviet empire." 19 2 But now that Soviet hegemony has receded from Eastern
Europe and Poland is rapidly rebuilding its traditional democratic traditions, the opportunities to follow
through on the success of NATO and Western democracy are immense. The implication of Poland's new
sovereignty is that Polish influence with respect to its support of western values, institutions and security
concepts will be increasingly important in erecting a European security system on Western terms and not
on those of a retreating Soviet Union and a failed political and economic system.
Until this past year it has not always been easy to separate Polish desires for a new European security
system from that of Soviet designs and initiatives prompted be less sincere motives. The Poles have long
sought a solution to the geostrategic misfortune that places them as "good tank country" between two
perennial and often belligerent European giants. Initiatives such as the Rapacki Plan in the 1950s and its
resurrection as the Gomulka Plan in the 1960s, heavily influenced by the Soviets, can be interpreted as
sincere attempts by Poland to forge a stable political and military arrangement in Europe in order to
establish some degree of Polish security. But the Rapacki and Gomulka Plans were easily viewed as
benefiting Soviet purposes as a disengagement strategy designed to decrease U.S. influence in Europe,
delegitimize its extended nuclear deterrence and thwart increased European unity.
As of 1989, however, Poland has found the freedom to speak for itself, often to the dismay of the
Soviets. The impact of this autonomous Polish voice was clearly felt in regard to Soviet desires
concerning German reunification. The Soviets wanted Poland and the rest of the Warsaw Pact countries to
oppose the West's demands that a unified Germany join NATO. To the Soviet's dismay, the Poles as well
as the Czechs and Hungarians clearly stated that a unified Germany checked by its membership in NATO
would be the most stable solution for European security. The Kremlin's hopes that the disengagement of
the United States and NATO could be effected even as the Soviets were compelled to retreat from Eastern
Europe were dashed. It can be argued that the Soviet acquiescence on a unified Germany maintaining NATO
192Newman, A 11.
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membership that developed in mid-Junr was directly related to a lack of Polish and other Warsaw Pact
member's support for Soviet desires.
As Poles begin to exercise this new voice and influence it is sure to have a decided impact on the
developing European security system. Clearly, as the Poles have long known, their security interests
would best be served by an effective all-European security arrangement. A just and equitable Pan-European
system would best serve Poland in its ability to control the historic clash of countervailing German and
Russian interests that have met on Polish territory. As an all-European system would undoubtedly uphold
the principles of national sovereignty, peaceful resolution of conflict, non-interference and non-use of force
and the inviolability of borders, Poland might at last enjoy a sense of security it has never known.
Though an all-European system may yet come to pass, and clearly the changes that have taken place
in Europe indicate that it may, it appears that its time may not yet have arrived. Many factors are
conspiring to prevent the effectiveness of collective security in general and the potential success of a CSCE-
based system in particular. In the final analysis, the political maturity of Europe may not be developed to
the point necessary for such a system.
Enemy images still persist in Europe. Suspicion among nations is still prevalent, most notably
toward the power, economic and otherwise, of a unified Germany. Questions concerning the ultimate
designs of perestroika remain, conjuring the specter of a politically and economically resurgent Soviet
Union. Nationalism has resurfaced as a Dotent destabilizing factor in Eastern Europe. Asymmetrical
political and economic conditions threaten to hamper European unity. Even the established European
Community which enjoys a relatively high degree of political and economic symmetry has difficulties as
concerns unity and effective policy implementation. The CSCE would no doubt encounter substantial
problems as the inheritor of the responsibility for an all-European security system not least because it has
no organization or infrastructure. Clearly the CSCE has a vital role in the evolution toward this all-
European system but again it may be premature to assume that it or Europe in general is ready for such a
step.
Perhaps the greatest problem is that nations still functional as the dominant political, t.conomic and
cultural unit of Europe. Trust among nations and cultures has not fully extended across political borders
though clearly this is the process that is underway in such European activities as the CSCE, the planned
1992 economic union under the auspices of the EC and the ongoing talks on nuclear, chemical and
conventional arms control. Still national interests and national sovereignty hold fast in the political hearts
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of European diplomats. For this reason "the men who bear the responsibility for conducting the foreign
relations of states (will continue) to regard their business as a pragmatic endeavor, requiring careful attention
to cases rather than doctrinaire application of a formula"...that would be required under a collective security
arrangement in which "all nations (band) together in undertaking a vague obligation to perform unspecified
actions in response to hypothetical events brought on by some unidentifiable state." 19 3
But rather than abandon the dream of Europax, it would appear more realistic and proper to nurture the
process that is underway in the interest of building further trust among nations and eliminating destabilizing
political and economic asymmetries. In this way a more level and firm foundation could be laid for an all-
European security institution. For Poland, this course means embarking on a path of western integration
while maintaining the stable NATO-Warsaw Pact alliance structure and a cooperative and open political and
economic relationship with the Soviet Union.
This is not a path that is trying to play both sides of the field, for clearly the Poles know that
historically this has never been accomplished. Rather, it represents a realistic course which is attempting to
ensure stability and buy the time necessary for eliminating economic asymmetries between East and West
and overcoming political and cultural differences that threaten to stall or prevent European integration.
Increasingly, Poland's internal restructuring is advancing the course of Western integration by working at
eliminating those economic asymmetries and establishing an operational rationale for a transformed and
integrative CMEA to act as a staging ground Eastern European and even Soviet integration into the West.
Poland's desire to maintain a working relationship with the Soviet Union coupled with the direct and
indirect influence of Poland's internal restructuring on the Soviet economy avoids the destabilizing isolation
of the Soviet Union and establishes a fundamental basis for future cooperation that may direct the Soviet
economy toward liberal reforms and perhaps even influence sovereignty issues in u~e Soviet republics.
Warsaw's desire to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union must rationalize itself against a
popular Polish mood that condemns the Soviets for creating Poland's horrible fate. Improved Polish-Soviet
relations stemming from a growing resolution of their historical blank spots and the utility of the Soviet
counterweight to a potentially resurgent Germany aid this rationalization but there is more to it. The
Soviet Union's geopolitical inertia can not be ignored. In the future, the Russian Republic, by itself, could
still represent a potential threat to Polish interests. This threat is focussed by the unpredictability of
19 3Claude Innis Jr., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), 200-201.
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Gorbachev's future, the potential widespread and violent breakup of the Soviet empire, and the potential
establishment of a military, totalitarian successor state. In this sense, the Soviet Union's future, like that
of united Germany's, represents a great unknown. Poland, therefore, is determined to maintain the current
NATO-WTO alliance structures, not only to avoid Soviet isolation, but to maintain stability as Europe
moves toward the unknown. The maintenance of NATO and a U.S. role, in particular, is important to the
Poles given the potential for German hegemony, a violent Soviet meltdown or a potential German-Soviet
entente. If NATO and a U.S. role can be maintained as a hedge against these potential threats then the
Poles will feel secure in working to encourage Soviet reform and European integration. Increasingly it will
be the foreign trade mechanism which encourages this Soviet reform and keeps European efforts on an
integrative track.
For Poland's security in the new Europe this is crucial. Other European nations though advancing the
rhetoric of European integration have certain fall-back positions which threaten to stall integration. German
ascendency, British insularity and a French desire to maintain their special relationship within NATO and
Europe, it can be argued may work to contradict the rhetoric. Poland, however, does not stand to contradict
it. The domestic and inter-CMEA impact of Poland's economic reforms, the design for a transformed
CMEA and the increasing influence Poland wields in Polish-Soviet relations are beginning to operationalize
the East European role in European integration. Poland realizes that closing the gap between the rhetoric
and the reality will be a long and difficult process, but Polish security depends on doing just that.
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VI. SOVIET DISINTEGRATION AND U.S. INTERESTS IN EUROPE
A. FROM THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE TO THE SINATRA DOCTRINE
Eastern European governments had long been testing the limits of their own national voices in the
face of Soviet hegemony and the Brezhnev Doctrine. Poland, in particular, has a post-World War Two
history that is a litany of unsuccessful or partially-successful attempts to establish some degree of political
or economic control over their own affairs. Polish uprisings in 1956, 1970 and 1981 were direct results of
the economic crisis and political repression that were characteristics of the "era of diktat"
But in response to Poland's persistent pressure and after analyzing both the political and economic cost
of the East European empire, the Soviet Union began to question its desire, need and ability to maintain the
East European buffer zone. Along with this questioning came hints, suggestions and eventually speeches
announcing the demise of the Brezhnev Doctrine. During an address to the Council of Europe in Strasborg
in July 1989 Gorbachev had emphasized that, "any interference in domestic affairs and any attempt to
restrict the sovereignty of states both friends and allies or any other are inadmissible." 19 4 Still the Poles
and Western analysts remained skeptical. In Poland previous changes in rhetoric only served to thinly
disguise the fact that nothing had changed. Western analysts, long suspicious of Soviet initiatives
concerning European reform and security, searched for clues to the rationale behind the new Soviet rhetoric.
The Soviet motivation behind the new "Sinatra doctrine" had been the subject of continuous debate in
the West. It was not clear whether the intense rhetoric concerning "solving global problems" and "building
an all-European security system" was a true change in Soviet attitudes or merely a change of tactics. These
concepts had traditionally been Soviet goals since the inception of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The
concluding article of the Warsaw Pact Treaty states plainly that "in the event of the establishment of a
system of collective security in Europe and the conclusion for that purpose of a General European Treaty
concerning collective security, a goal which the Contracting Parties (of the Warsaw Pact) shall steadfastly
strive to achieve, the present Treaty shall cease to have effect as from the date on which the General
19 4Rachwad, 379.
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European Treaty comes into force." 19 5 Despite the altruistic overtones of Gorbachev's "universal human
values" and a "common European home," many Western analysts nonetheless discerned significant Soviet
motives behind the trend in European affairs. Among these were the prospects of a diminished or even a
disengaged U.S. role in European security, including the potential denuclearization of German soil or larger
Western European gains, increased economic and technological opportunities for the Soviet Union, and the
potential for a strong Soviet voice in European, including Western European, security issues.
It was argued that at the same time that the new Soviet tactic was advancing the credibility of the new
Soviet rhetoric and attempting to maintain influence in Eastern Europe it was winning points with Western
governments and more specifically with the Western public. "Appeals to unite energy and effort in the
interests of solving mankind's global problems," wrote Gerhard Wettig, "leaving aside all differences in
political persuasion and ideological belief, are presently the principle means the Kremlin has decided to use
in order to undermine public support for Western policies and the NATO alliance in Western Europe and the
United States. The Soviet leadership expects that large sectors of the Western public, notably the new
social movement and even conservative supporters of Western governments...will ally with the Soviet
Union in its fight against the Western policy of nuclear deterrence, which the Soviets see as perpetuating
the Western social status quo."196
Thus, during this seemingly altruistic retreat from Eastern Europe Gorbachev was seen to be
engineering a strategy that might prove to be more successful than former Soviet strategies for expanding
Soviet influence in Europe. Achieving "a position of dominance in an all-European order" has long been a
stalwart of Soviet policy. The Soviet Union has long sought "to neutralize United States security
guarantees to Western Europe and to promote a reduction in the United States military and nuclear presence.
The USSR has at the same time tried to discourage the defense efforts of Western European countries, either
in alliance with the United States or each other. The Soviet goals have included promoting United States-
1 9 5
"Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance..." United Nations Treaty
Series, 219 (1955): 24.
19 6 Gerhard Wettig, "New Thinking on Security and East-West Relations," Problems of Communism
37, no. 2 (March-April 1988): 13-14.
93
Western European disunity and preventing intra-European cooperation from posing a threat to the USSR's
preeminence." 197
Under Gorbachev, Moscow was seen to be "sponsoring a carefully orchestrated convergence between...
Eastern and Western countries in Europe. The ultimate objective (being) to overcome the division of
Europe on Soviet terms." 19 8 In the final analysis, there appeared to be more continuity than change in
Gorbachev's doctrine. Like Brezhnev, Gorbachev was believed to be concerned with finding a workable
method to perpetuate Soviet influence in Europe. The primary device for this ambition was to be the
creation of an all-European security system and here Gorbachev displayed, as Western analysts described it,
an ability to build a position of strength from one of weakness. The majority of the successful institutions
that stand as the logical extensions to a European security order are of Western design such as the European
Economic Community and NATO, and they stand in direct contrast to the troubled Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance and the Warsaw PacL Despite this, Gorbachev's rhetoric has produced a vibrant
Soviet focus on creating an institution that they have long held as a strategy for disengaging U.S. military
and nuclear forces from Europe and increasing Soviet preeminence.
However, as the year 1989 neared its revolutionary conclusion, extreme economic difficulties in the
Soviet Union, difficulties that were now apparently worse than originally believed, were seen to be the
driving influence behind Soviet behavior. Soviet foreign policy, particularly in Eastern Europe, was seen to
be most decidedly influenced by domestic exigencies, not a sudden change in the complexion of Soviet
values. Richard Perle pointed out, "...Gorbachev's contribution to the liberation of Eastern Europe, if one
can put it that way, was not a desire to see change there. It was a decision not to use force to sustain
bankrupt regimes. That decision in turn was a result of the economic failure of the Soviet Union and the
need on the part of the Soviet Union for a relationship with the West that may offer some way out of that
economic failure."199
Several arguments suggested that a Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe would not be catastrophic
for Soviet interests. "Geostrategic realities," it was thought, "(would) give the majority of East European
19 7 David S. Yost, "Soviet Aims in Europe." SociW 24 no. 5 (July-August 1987): 72-73.
19 8 Rachwald, 408.
19 9 Richard Perle, "If the Warsaw Pact is Past, What is the Future of NATO?," Lecture at the
Heritage Foundation, 19 December 1989, 2.
94
nations no alternative but to maintain close links with Moscow." Furthermore, the supposed viability of
East European reform communists, such as Jaruzelski in Poland, led the Soviets to calculate that the
"domestic changes taking place within the region (would) not (necessarily) jeopardize the Soviet position in
Europe but (would) substantially reduce the cost of empire."20 0
By mid-1989, however, persistent economic and social dysfunctions in Eastern Europe contributed to a
new build-up of anti-Communist sentiment. In the summer of 1989 persistent Polish resistance realized
what was perhaps the first tangible manifestation of Gorbachev's intentions for Eastern Europe. In an
unprecedented and unexpected move Communist control was eased to allow partially-free elections in
Poland. As a result the Polish Sejm was significantly purged of communist members and the formal role
of Solidarity in Polish politics was established with the creation of a coalition Roundtable government.
Though a resounding victory for Solidarity and a blow to the Communist Party, these Polish developments
were still somewhat tenuous. It was still not clear how far political and economic autonomy could be
taken, nor was it certain that any steps undertaken would prove successful. Momentum was on Solidarity's
side but decades of a repression-reform-repression syndrome had instilled the Poles with a stoic fatalism that
awaited the Soviets next constrictive move.
But what followed was a developing situation in East Germany where East German emigres desiring
movement to West Germany swelled to large proportions. Hungary's subsequent decision to allow East
Germans to pass through Hungary enroute to the FRG opened the floodgates for what could soon become
an alarming drain on the East German economy and an explosive crisis for the East German government.
The resulting crisis, bolstered by Gorbachev's progressive rhetoric and the successes achieved in Poland,
proved to be the downfall of the Communist East German regime. As the East German government
struggled to maintain control, Soviet inaction soon sounded the death knell for the Brezhnev Doctrine of
intervention. "The watershed date was November 9, 1989; the breaching of the Berlin Wall was the
dramatic symbol of a new, profoundly different era in Europe. It was now clear that the wall's collapse
offered indisputable proof that the Soviet Union would not use the Red Army to maintain the East-West
divide."2 0 1 This, in turn, would signal the beginning of the popular East European uprising which quickly
led to the collapse of communism throughout Eastern Europe.
200Rachwald, 379.
201Flora Lewis, "Bringing in the East," Foreign Affair 69 no. 4 (Fall 1990): 15.
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Initially, there may have been a belief that the political rhetoric of glasnost and perestroika and
Soviet efforts toward establishing a "common European home" might be able to create unity, with a
potential Soviet influence, out of the growing diversity in East European political structures. But demands
for Soviet troop withdrawals, and concerted drives toward democratization, free-market economies and
Western integration soon proved that Eastern Europe had its own agenda. By June of 1990, following the
Warsaw Pact meeting in Moscow, Pravda was compelled to proclaim that "the era of diktat has disappeared
for good." This sentiment reflected a recognition of the profound changes that had swept through Eastern
European governments and through both the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance. But, given the emerging views of the now autonomous East European nations, it may also
reflect the situation concerning Moscow's position to influence the terms of an all-European security
system. This is particularly true given the Soviet Union's increasingly volatile internal situation.
1. From Doctrine to Disorder
Not long after the Moscow WTO meeting, the seven major Western industrial nations met in
Houston, Texas to discuss, among other issues, the question of aiding Gorbachev's troubled economy. At
issue was whether aid should sent immediately or only after the Soviet Union had made significant steps
toward political and economic reform. By the autumn of 1990, however, deepening economic and political
crises in the Soviet Union rendered the issue irrelevanL "The disintegration of the Soviet Union as a state,
along with its economy, is happening so fast that the chicken-and-egg issue, aid first to enable reforms or
reforms first to justify aid, has been overtaken." 2 02 The same is true concerning the perception of any
Soviet design behind European security issues. Increasingly, the decisions confronting the United States
and its NATO allies deal not with motivating Soviet reform or countering Soviet designs in European
security but revolve around "a bigger decision...on what kind of regime or regimes it wants to see emerge in
the Soviet Union."2 0 3 Solving this conundrum will no doubt prove difficult for increasingly it involves
contributing to the developing transformation in the Soviet state as it exists today while avoiding the
instability of an explosive collapse. Furthermore, if such a transformation can be effected, it remains to be
seen whether a collection of sovereign and independent republics will be able to maintain peace. It is more
likely, contends Flora Lewis, that they will begin to fight, adding a new dimension to the security
2 0 2 Flora Lewis, "To Help or Not to Help," New,. kimes, 31 October 1990, A23.
2 0 3 Ibid.
96
environment, in which their wars would "spill over and drag in others, spreading a vast new source of
disorder."2 0 4
This new potential threat to European security has emerged at a time when the maintenance of
Western security structures is under pressure due to the diminished direct Soviet military threat to Western
Europe. The unlikely possibility of a Soviet attack on NATO and the substantial increase in warning time
if they did choose to attack has set the stage for the atrophy of NATO's integrated military structure. Force
withdrawals have already begun. NATO proposals to "make a continued foreign military presence more
acceptable to the public in Germany and other host countries," such as an increasing reliance on
multinational corps and a broadening of NATO cross-stationing arrangements, have met with French
resistance.2 05 Prospects for maintaining a U.S. presence in Germany are in danger from increasing public
ambivalence. These are a few of the developments which have made seeking a post-Cold War rationale for
NATO difficult despite a general concensus, particularly among the ruling European elite, that the U.S.
commitment to European security is indispensable.
For its part, Poland's leadership also views the U.S. commitment to Europe as indispensable.
The prospect of a diminished U.S. presence in Europe threatens to give greater rein to Germany's potential
for future political, economic or military choices that may not be beneficial to Polish interests. This threat
is heightened by the prospect of the Soviet Union's inability, unwillingness or even complicity in such a
development. Maintaining a U.S. commitment would serve to dissuade such developments and keep
Europe on an integrative course, free of German hegemony. Additionally, maintaining the U.S.
conventional and nuclear presence provides a valuable and stable counterweight to the Soviet Union's still
formidable military power. Furthermore, if the violent breakup of the Soviet Union is eventually realized,
viable NATO forces, such as the proposed multinational corps, may be of great utility in protecting Poland
from the spread of violence and upheaval.
Poland therefore has a huge stake in the success of NATO which serves to compliment its
interest in building an all-European security order. This goal is further enhanced by Poland's desire to avoid
the political isolation of the Soviet Union and to avoid a Soviet implosion by providing a positive and
productive influence on foreign trade potentials through CMEA reforms and direct economic contacts with
20 4 1bid.
2 0 5 Yost, "France in the New Europe," 119.
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individual Soviet republics in an attempt to promote economic activity capable of healthy partnership.
This position represents a balanced approach to European security, one that serves both Polish security
needs and, it can be argued, long-term U.S. interests in Europe.
B. POLAND'S PLACE IN HISTORY AND EUROPE
"We are already drifting horribly nearer to a new war, which will probably start on the Polish border.
The young men have had eighteen years in which to learn how to avoid iL. I wonder whether they do
know much more about how to avoid it than the despised and driveling old men of 1914. How many
of the young men, for instance, have made the smallest attempt to understand Poland. How many
would have anything to say to Hitler, to dissuade him from setting all Christendom aflame by a raid
on Poland? Or have the young men been thinking of nothing since 1914..."2 06
G.K. Chesterton penned this prophecy on September 24, 1932, almost a full seven years before Nazi
Germany and the Soviet Union dissected Poland in accordance with the secret protocol of the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact. Chesterton knew then what in many ways is true today; Poland's historical struggle for
national independence, its long history of volatile border changes and its geostrategic position between
Germany and the Soviet Union, have made the "Polish Question" fundamental to the stability and balance
of power in Europe.
In a welcome contrast to 1932, however, the specter of a new European war does not loom on the
horizon. Indeed, the new horizon in Europe holds the potential for a peace that Europe has never known.
The remarkable events of the past year have put an end to Cold War rivalry, enabled a final conclusion to
the Second World War, and paved the way for the creation of an all-European security system based on
respect for freedom, human rights, national sovereignty, territorial inviolability and, free, open and
integrative national economies. Such a security arrangement lies at the heart of U.S. interests in Europe.
As the United States works to influence and encourage a framework for peace and security in Europe, it may
find that Poland is again fundamental to this task. This is true, not in the sense that the Polish Question
remains unsolved, but rather in that Poland's emerging independent voice and its increasing ability to
influence the pace and direction of change in Europe are supporting European security strategies which
coincide directly with U.S. interests. In this sense, Poland may be the perfect instrument for advancing
U.S. goals in post-Cold War Europe.
206 George Marlin, Richard Rabatin and John Shaw, eds., More Quotable Chesterton: A Toical
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C. U.S. INTERESTS IN EUROPE: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES
The end of the Cold War has presented the United States with both an enormous opportunity and a
difficult challenge. "Europe is more Wilsonian now than it has ever been," wrote Walter Russel Mead.2 0 7
After failing twice-in 1919 and 1945-to establish a lasting peace in Europe, the European nations, together
with the United States and the Soviet Union, appear to be on the brink of establishing a stable European
balance of power that will make the threat of another European War obsolete. Soviet President Gorbachev's
dramatic peace initiatives and his doctrinal emphasis on "war prevention" have laid the groundwork for for
an unprecedented level of East-West security cooperation. As a result such breakthroughs as the INF treaty,
the reduction of forces in Europe and the long awaited "Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to
Germany" have been effected. These developments together with the democratic revolutions that have swept
through Eastern Europe in response to Gorbachev's new doctrine, seem to indicate that after decades of
aborted attempts and cynical denunciations, Wilson's vision of "a world of democracies bound in their
international relations by a steadily growing network of laws and agreements" has, at last, found fertile
ground.
This development also comes at a time when the planned economic integration of Europe carries with
it the promise of establishing an open and integrated European market. Such a market has fruitful
implications not just regionally but globally as well. After years of denouncing Western economic
organizations as organs of imperialist exploitation, the Soviet Union has requested membership in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATIT), the international Monetary Fund (IMF), the Council of
Europe and the European Community. Eastern Europe has also requested admission and many of its
nations have begun the prerequisite economic restructuring that is required to create comparable economic
mechanisms that are capable of integration. The United States stands to gain significantly from such
developments, both directly and indirectly. An economically integrated Europe opens up new and less
restrictive markets for U.S. goods and at the same time opens up those markets to other global economies,
thereby easing some of the export dumping on U.S. markets. It also enhances global competition,
encourages the global application of the principle of comparative advantage and contributes to global
20 7 Walter Russell Mead, "The United States and the New Europe," World Policy Journal 7 no. 1
(Winter 1989-90): 39.
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economic prosperity, which in the long-term is our best guarantee of peace. And it is in this last sense that
the change in Europe is most encouraging, particularly for U.S. interests.
The emergence of a new political and economic order in Europe would establish more than just a
regional quiet spot for U.S. policy. It would mean that an overcommitted American foreign policy agenda
would no longer be faced with the crippling opportunity costs that have drained the intellectual and financial
resources of the country for over four decades. Free of the requirement to tie up large amounts of political
aplomb, technical expertise and military expenditures in Europe, the U.S. policy agenda could then look to
long neglected priorities that have waited impatiently while the United States was engaged in a nuclear
stand-off with the Soviets. U.S. policy can now turn to other regional questions as well as pressing
domestic issues in an attempt to proliferate the encouraging developments in Europe and to improve and
secure the United States' position of leadership for the future.
Theoretically, the United States, while not abandoning Europe, can now shift the weight of its foreign
policy intellect toward gaining a solution in the Middle East. Despite the destabilizing impact of Saddam
Hussein, Muammar al-Qaddafi and Iranian clerics, there is every reason to believe that with the cooperation
of the moderate Arab states and the Soviet Union a solution to this troubled region can be achieved.
Resources previously engaged in Europe may now also be free to fully address the much neglected North-
South problem. Efforts to improve the standard of living and the economic integration of Latin America
can be stepped up in order to facilitate greater hemispheric cooperation. In the United States itself, grave
and neglected social dysfunctions can now be given the attention they so badly need. America's position of
leadership requires that a number of urgent problems be given the attention and resources that they require..
The alarming decline in the U.S. public education system, the staggering environmental crisis, crime and
decay in the inner cities and, declining U.S. economic competitiveness and productivity are issues that can
now be addressed in order to improve the economic and intellectual foundation upon which America's
leading pretion in the emerging global community will rest.
The end of the Cold War, therefore, carries the potential to create a "reversion to the situation in
which, first Britain, then we, and now Japan have grown great--that is, the situation of a relatively pacific
maritime rading nation in an open world system." 20)8 But although the potential for such a development
exists, it is by no means assured. The end of the Cold War represents a dismantling of the major barrier
208Ibid., 37.
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that has prevented the cre- .,on of a stable European security system but this falls quite short of actually
establishing such a system. Furthermore, there are many forces that are conspiring to wreck a smooth
transition to such an agreement.
Revolutionary forces, even democratic ones, are not always easy to control and channel into productive
energies. Democracy as a dream in Eastern Europe will undoubtedly prove easier to conceive than it will be
to institutionalize. Many factors work against it, not the least of which is Eastern Europe's lack of
democratic experience. Many of these nations proclaim a democratic heritage and a traditional Western
cultural predisposition, but this does not eliminate the fact that 50 years of Soviet hegemony has eradicated
two generations of democratic thinkers and free market entrepreneurs. Despite the enthusiasm of repatriated
dissidents and a new democratic East European elite, constructing democracy and integrative market
economies amidst the ruins inherited from Soviet system will be extremely difficulL
Economic troubles lie at the heart of the difficulties facing Eastern Europe's new ruling elite. The
downfall of the communist regimes came about mainly due to their historical and persistent inability to
provide an adequate social existence for the people. Failing to achieve a reasonable standard of living for the
populace, the communist governments never achieved any degree of political legitimacy. Today, despite the
optimistic outlook for the creation of free markets in Eastern Europe, the standard of living will, in all
likelihood, not witness a dramatic short-term transformation. Unemployment and a decrease in real wages
have already, and will continue to evoke intense public pressure on new, fragile democracies. Though
shortages of such essentials as bread, fruit and shoes are being eliminated, the higher and unaffordable prices
of many commodities have not yet altered the working man's perception that the living standard has actually
decreased. An East European populace, conscious of it united power, may construct new obstacles to the
creation of a stable and integrated Europe through strikes, protests and violent demonstrations.
Rounding out the conspiratorial forces that threaten the European transition is the reemergence of
nationalism. Ethnic and regional rivalries as well as international border tensions have resurfaced as viable
destabilizing factors. The Balkans have reemerged as a hotbed of seemingly irreconcilable ednic differences.
Regional ethnic tensions in areas such as Transylvania threaten the fabric of democratic change.
Fundamental components of democracy and international security have been jeopardized. Cooperation, trust
and a respect for pluralism have yet to be fully assimilated into ethnic cultures that have struggled with each
other for centuries.
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The intention of citing those forces that work against the creation of a stable all-European security
arrangement is to point out that although the Soviet threat has withdrawn from Europe and the Cold War is
over, there is still a need to secure the ultimate goal of U.S. European policy. Forty-five years of
containment has prevailed against the xenophobic and hegemonic Soviet Union that was our Cold War
nemesis, but this has not assured the creation of a stable and lasting European peace which truly is the
fundamental goal behind the U.S. involvement in Europe.
The fundamental objective for the United States! cultural, historic, economic and security interest in
Europe has been to create a stable and secure European peace, which ensures free and open economic trade
and is free of any hegemonic control under either a Napoleon, Hitler or Stalin, or in the future under the
domination of Bonn or Moscow. Though the end of the Cold War has presented the United States with
ability to capitalize on its peace dividend we must heed Virgil's warning delivered centuries ago, that you
must not give up just when your goal is in sight. The euphoria surrounding the collapse of the Berlin Wall
and demise of the Cold War should not mask the fact that the construction of a new European order is a
complex and as yet incomplete undertaking and one that still remains of vital interest to the United States.
The end of the military stand-off in Europe will continue to be a primary source of economic, technical and
human resource windfalls that may by applied to other pressing U.S. foreign and domestic agenda items.
But what is required in Europe today is a clearly defined U.S. strategy that possesses a clear vision of what
U.S. interests are in the new Europe and how these can most effectively be achieved.
For some time to come, Europe will be in a state of flux. Neither the end of the Cold War nor the
recently signed "Peace Treaty" has established an institutional framework for European security. Much
hope for this new framework lies in the promise of the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE). This entity, however, remains only a roving forum and possesses no organizational infrastructure.
The enduring sense of an inexorable movement toward an all-European security system seems to stem from
the multitude of encouraging developments that have occurred or are, in fact, still taking place within the
European theater. The on-going transformation of the Warsaw Pact (WTO) and the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (CMEA), the East European successes in constructing viable democratic institutions
and free market mechanisms, the success at promulgating a settlement on the German Question, the success
of conventional, chemical and nuclear arms negotiations in Vienna, the planned economic integration of
1992 and the eventual extension of GATT, IMF, Council of Europe and EC membership to Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union are but a few of these developments. As of yet, however, there is no master plan for
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creating the security arrangement or economic integration which are seen as the most secure future for
Europe. The United States, therefore, must ensure that it possesses a clear view of the complexion that the
new Europe should take in order to best suite its interests, and it must find the most effective instruments
to guide and influence developments in that direction.
D. DEFINING U.S. GOALS IN POST-COLD WAR EUROPE
The first consideration in creating a stable European security arrangement is that the Soviet Union not
be isolated, either politically or economically. Political realities being what they are, political isolation
seems to be the least of Gorbachev's problems, at least as far as foreign isolation is concerned. Gorbachev
has been fully embraced, if not in his own home republic or country, most assuredly among the Western
nations. Economic isolation, however, is a very real potential. In the absence of a transition to a fully free
market economy, the Soviet Union's long-term trade relations with the West are not favorable. Without the
full benefit of Western technology and trade Gorbachev's economic panacea may not be achieved in time to
ameliorate the explosive domestic economic situation. Additionally, as the East European nations make the
transition to a market economy they will find their economic mechanism incompatible with the Soviet's as
well. As East European economies become driven by economic rationality and not political considerations,
the Soviet Union may stand to lose its market for exporting substandard goods and find that the heavy-
industrial sectors that they had constructed in Eastern Europe to infuse their economy with raw materials,
semi-finished and finished products have been dismantled or have changed their product line. Given these
considerations, it becomes essential to encourage the mellowing of Soviet economic behavior by
promoting, directly or indirectly, the shift toward free market mechanisms, a task made increasingly difficult
by the growing economic crisis and political uncertainties.
A second consideration for U.S. interests in Europe is to avoid the turning in of the integrated
European Community. The concept of a fortress Europe does not serve the long-term interests of the
United States. Indeed, the integrative developments in Europe must not work against the integration of the
global economy as a whole. A fortress Europe would mean a decreased demand for U.S. exports and, U.S.
securities and financial obligations. The value of the dollar would ultimately suffer. The U.S. agricultural
sector would lose an important market for a product mix that is undoubtedly an area of U.S. comparative
advantage. The displacement of European imports by integrated European substitutes would prove
detrimental to the United States both directly through the loss of the European market as well as indirectly
through the likely surge of Asian products to our own market. Furthermore, American influence in
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European affairs would be significantly diminished. Germany could again rise to a level of political and
economic prowess that enables it to disregard U.S. or even French and British desires. The same could
potentially apply, years from now, to a restructured and rejuvenated Soviet Union.
Another U.S. priority in laying out a European strategy is that Eastern Europe must be afforded the
economic success that is required to ensure the survival of democratic institutions committed to peace. The
conspiratorial forces mentioned earlier suggest that such an outcome is not necessarily assured. In addition
to the perpetuation of democratic institutions, the economic success of East European nations is necessary
to preclude the long-term instability that would be caused by their exclusion from the integrative process.
Nor should East European economic development be stalled thereby establishing and perpetuating a charnel
house of cheap labor subsisting on meager living standards. East European integration will undermine the
potentially calamitous rise of mistrust, antagonism and fervent nationalism that would likely emanate from
a Europe divided into haves and have-nots. Long-term American interests dictate that the stability inherent
in European integration be achieved and that it be extended from Europe to promote global integration.
Global integration will accelerate and improve the likelihood of success for European integration and will
prevent the evolution of an integrated but closed Europe and the likely formation of three antagonistic
economic blocs-Japan and Asia, Europe and North America.
To prevent the breakdown of European and global integration will require effective American
participation. In this sense another important consideration for U.S. policy in Europe is to maintain an
active presence. As the Cold War is consigned to the past, the threat of a hot war is commensurately
diminished. Therefore, a large American troop presence, and most assuredly, a strong U.S. nuclear arsenal
in Europe have lost or will likely lose a great deal of utility, both militarily and politically. The future
military presence will undoubtedly be smaller, backed up perhaps by a larger and more credible rapid
deployment force, but it is of significant value to maintain a U.S. presence in Europe. The U.S. military
presence has been the deciding stabilizing factor in European affairs for the past five decades and it is
premature to look for a full disengagement, such as the mistaken U.S. withdrawal which followed the First
World War. Rather, lower yet significant U.S. force levels must remain engaged in European affairs as
capable military force. The traditional NATO relationships may be expanded to include new missions such
as guaranteeing borders and enforcing civil laws as part of multinational corps efforts but it seems certain
that for general stability, a U.S. force presence will be a decidedly important factor in European politics.
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An energetic U.S. economic presence is also required to maintain and encourage the growth-oriented
and integrationist trends now being manifested in Europe. American investment and support in Eastern
Europe, as well as our encouragement of other non-European investment there, will help prevent Bonn or
Moscow from achieving an unstable domination and control of Eastern European economics and will
promote the full success of market restructuring and the evolution toward global integration.
For now, with the exception perhaps of a growing anti-nuclear/anti-U.S. movement in Germany, the
populace and governments of Europe (including the FRG's ruling CDU) support both a U.S. economic and
military presence in Europe. The security that the United States brings to Europe during the transformation
of Cold War organizations, governments and economies is palpable. East European governments sense this
as well. Poland, for example, is comforted by a united Germany that is checked by its inclusion in NATO
and by the presence of U.S. forces. For its part, U.S. economic assistance to Eastern Europe is also
welcomed in that it relieves Western European markets and investors from overcommitting resources in an
attempt to single-handedly raise a phoenix from the Stalinist ashes. In the long-term, energetic
participation by the United States, and by other nations such as Japan and Canada is in everyone's interest.
"The 'new Europe' of 1989," observed Walter Mead, "resembles the Europe of 1919; an American
presence will be needed both to bring some order to the East and to give the Western countries, especially
France, the sense of security that will allow, among other things, the integration of a united Germany into
the family of nations." "President Bush," he continued, "must succeed where President Wilson failed and
find a framework for continued American involvement that commands support on both sides of the
Atlantic."2 09 Though most of Europe currently welcomes a U.S. role, there is a certain momentum in
U.S. domestic attitudes surrounding the euphoria related to the end of the Cold War that anticipates a decided
downward shift in foreign policy emphasis in Europe. The perception that "all is quiet on the NATO front"
has obscured the fact that a stable European security arrangement and a globally oriented economic
integration, both of which are fundamental to U.S. interests, have not been established and will require
focussed U.S. attention to achieve. What is needed is a "grand vision" which establishes the framework for
the direction of change. Such a vision "should seek to promote reform and recovery in Eastern Europe,
along with integration of the European economies, but in a context that is fundamentally favorable to the
2091bid., 53.
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evolution of wider global system."2 10 The U.S. commitment to democracy, economic freedom and global
prosperity have been a source of this nation's power as surely as its wealth and military prowess have been.
The ideological victory over totalitarian rule and communist economic isolation have boosted the premium
on this source of power, but it must not be squandered.
The revolutionary change that has taken place in Europe and the encouraging direction of reform and
integration must not become a missed opportunity for securing fundamental U.S. interests. To ensure this
does not happen will require the elocution of such a "grand vision" but more importantly its effective
execution. This execution will involve, among other things, a continued U.S. economic aid and
investment package to secure East European success and integration and to promote global integrative
tendencies in the process. Not being able to accomplish such a monumental undertaking by itself, the
United States must engage in adroit diplomacy with its traditional partners to form a common vision and
effect its realization. Additionally, the United States must look to non-traditional partners that may offer
significant influence and cost effective strategies to achieve these same ends.
2101bid., 56.
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VH. CONCLUSION: POLAND AS A CONDUIT OF U.S. POLICY IN EUROPE
Polish foreign policy, as it is emerging today, represents a significant influence on the direction of
Europe affairs. For both geopolitical and economic reasons, the designs that determine Poland's strategy in
Europe are directly compatible with those of United States, suggesting that aid, assistance and investment
in Poland will have a decided impact on shaping the future of Europe far beyond simply restoring Poland's
economic position.
Poland is currently in the process of constructing its own sovereignty based on democracy and rule of
law, as well as a Western style market economy. In the process, Poland has emerged as both a direct and An
indirect influence on the direction of European evolution. Geopolitics is crucial to Poland, perhaps more so
than for any other Central European nation, and it has shaped a very keen awareness of the need for a stable
balance of power in Europe. Situated as the strategic crossroad of Europe, Poland has endured the liability
of its physical existence between two great and frequently belligerent superpowers. This strategic position
lies at the heart of what has been a two hundred year struggle for independence and national identity. Four
major partitions and a multitude of occupations and border transformations comprise the Polish national
legacy. In an attempt to reconcile this legacy with the current uncertainties concerning Germany, the
Soviet Union and the chances for the development of a functioning all-European security system, Poland
has advanced a definitive strategy.
In institutional terms, Poland's strategy views membership in the EC as the fundamental aim of
economic policy. As a preliminary step this requires reforming the CMEA in order to enhance East
European trade potentials and compliment internal reforms in an attempt to reduce East-West asymmetries
and provide both a strategy and a staging ground for East European and even Soviet entry into the EC. In
the political sphere, the Polish strategy views the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe as the
logical body to assume the task of European political union but remains fundamentally skeptical concerning
its present viability to institutionalize a firm security arrangement. Because the Poles are keenly aware that
the defense domain is an area that will not tolerate a vacuum, they have sought to maintain a reformed
Warsaw Pact and encourage the maintenance of NATO and a strong U.S. commitment to Europe.
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Polish support for this strategy stems from a sense of vulnerability, enhanced by historical memory
and contemporary realities that translate into a guarded optimism concerning Europe's future. The purposes
behind Poland's strategy appears to include the following:
" to secure Polish sovereignty and autonomy, free of political or economic domination by the Soviet
Union or Germany;
" to establish a vital Polish voice in European affairs in order to preclude any European security
arrangement that neglects Polish interests;
" to facilitate, encourage and maintain the momentum for a full and open European integration
process in order to avoid the economic division of Europe into poor and rich, discourage Germran
domination and diminish the prospects of a German-Soviet entente;
" to encourage continued German efforts for normalization with Poland and economic cooperation
with Eastern Europe, as well as continued commitments to Western security institutions in order
to preclude future German neutrality;
" to avoid the political or economic isolation of the Soviet Union and the inherent instability this
would bring to European security;
" to encourage continued and capable U.S. commitments to Europe in order to maintain stability,
check any future destabilizing German aspirations and provide security in the event of the violent
break-up of the Soviet Union; and finally,
" to retain the NATO-WTO balance of power structure with a decided reformation of WTO doctrine
and decision making authority in order to provide for stability and the development of pact-to-pact
cooperation in the realm of securing an eventual all-European settlement.
"FHistorically, Polish foreign policy has revolved around four options: to ally with either Russia or
Germany; to attempt to isolate herself and be totally independent of European conflicts; to rely on a third
power such as France or Great Britain; or to instigate a general and permanent settlement, a security system
in which Poland's situation between "Russia" and Germany becomes a mere fact rather than a liability."2 1 1
The first three options have been judged by history to be less than optimum for securing Poland's security
and sovereignty, and though the Poles have long realized that an all-European settlement is the most
attractive security situation, the prospects for its establishment have been poor--at least until 1989.
In constructing their autonomous foreign policy, Poland is determined to achieve a secure balance
between a united Germany and a troubled Soviet Union. For the Poles, this means maintaining the present
balance of power while constructing a foundation of trust as well as an organizational framework for an all-
European security system. Additionally, it entails the prevention of German economic hegemony within
Poland itself and within Europe in general or a similar situation under a cooperative German-Soviet
economic and military agreement. Furthermore, despite a widespread Polish revulsion of all things Soviet
2 1 1 potichnyj and Shapiro, 152.
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and the attraction of Western culture and economic assistance, this also means preventing the political and
economic isolation of the Soviet Union and ultimately influencing its integration into Europe. Poland's
strategy for achieving this may prove a valuable tool in maintaining order in what is an increasingly
desperate situation in the Soviet Union. Maintaining the WTO and political ties with the Soviet Union
adds a degree of stability to the central government in Moscow and, increasingly, Polish economic
initiatives and reforms are influencing Soviet-Polish trade relations to the point where firm to firm ties and
direct economic contacts with individual Soviet republics may offer a strategy for developing some form of
healthy economic activity in the Soviet Union as well as an impetus for the political recognition of
sovereign republics.
In these ways, Poland is attempting to rise above the burden of Nazi and Stalinist history, with a
cautious recognition of lessons of the past and the need for stability, but with a determination to form the
new relationships that will promote the establishment of their only firm security guarantee--an all-European
security system. In this way, and because Poland's strategy provides for the maintenance of NATO and a
focussed commitment to a full and open European integration, Poland stands as a potentially valuable non-
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